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Abstract
Passive Radar (PR) is a form of bistatic radar that utilises existing transmitter infras-
tructure such as FM radio, digital audio and video broadcasts (DAB and DVB-T/T2),
cellular base station transmitters, and satellite-borne illuminators like DVB-S instead
of a dedicated radar transmitter. Extensive research into PR has been performed over
the last two decades across various industries with the technology maturing to a point
where it is becoming commercially viable. Nevertheless, despite the abundance of PR
literature, there is a scarcity of open literature pertaining to electronic countermeasures
(ECM) applied to PR.
This research makes the novel contribution of a comprehensive exploration and valida-
tion of various ECM techniques and their effectiveness when applied to PR. Extensive
research has been conducted to assess the inherent properties of the lluminators of
Opportunity to identify their possible weaknesses for the purpose of applying targeted
ECM. Similarly, potential jamming signals have also been researched to evaluate their
effectiveness as bespoke ECM signals. Whilst different types of PR exist, this thesis
focuses specifically on ECM applied to FM radio and DVB-T2 based PR.
The results show noise jamming to be effective against FM radio based PR where
jamming can be achieved with relatively low jamming power. A waveform study is
performed to determine the optimal jamming waveform for an FM radio based PR.
The importance of an effective direct signal interference (DSI) canceller is also shown
as a means of suppressing the jamming signal. A basic overview of counter-ECM
(ECCM) is discussed to counter potential jamming of FM based PR.
The two main processing techniques for DVB-T2 based PR, mismatched and inverse
filtering, have been investigated and their performance in the presence of jamming
evaluated. The deterministic components of the DVB-T2 waveform are shown to be an
effective form of attack for both mismatched filtering and inverse filtering techniques.
Basic ECCM is also presented to counter potential pilot attacks on DVB-T2 based
PR. Using measured data from a PR demonstrator, the application and effectiveness
of each jamming technique is clearly demonstrated, evaluated and quantified.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Radar, short for RAdio Detection And Ranging, is defined by the IEEE Std. 686 as
“An electromagnetic system for the detection and location of objects that operates by
transmitting electromagnetic signals, receiving echoes from objects (targets) within
its volume of coverage, and extracting location and other information from the echo
signal” [1].
Radar has many applications, including but not limited to:
• Target detection
• Range, height, angle and velocity measurements
• Applications in guidance systems
• Weather monitoring
• Imaging
Inggs et al. offered a taxonomy of Electromagnetic (EM) sensors in [2] where they
described two main categories of EM sensors, namely active and receive only. The
authors defined active sensors as those with a dedicated radar transmitter that radiates
EM energy in accordance with the defined radar application. The second category is
that of ‘receive only’ systems, commonly referred to as ‘passive radar’.
Passive radars use transmitters of opportunity where the radar operator has no in-
fluence on the waveforms. There are many examples of such systems in literature
e.g. [3–9] to list a few. There are many names for ‘passive’, receive only radar found
throughout literature such as Commensal Radar (CR), Passive Coherent Location
(PCL) radar, Passive Bistatic Radar (PBR) and Passive Radar (PR). This thesis will
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use the most common term, PR, to describe such systems because this term is widely
used and understood. In these forms of passive radar the operator has no influence on
the transmitter, nor the transmitted waveform.
1.1 Overview of Passive Radar
Significant research into PR has been performed over the last two decades across var-
ious industries as PR technology has matured. There are several challenges unique
to PR that include waveform suitability, performance complications owing to bistatic
geometry and the effects of Direct/Multi-path Signal Interference (DSI) in the surveil-
lance channel.
Target echoes are typically multiple orders of magnitude weaker than the DSI. Mul-
tipath versions of the direct signal can also be deleterious to PR performance. This
multipath interference along the zero-Doppler ridge together with DSI and reflections
from stationary scatterers can often mask target echoes. The problem of DSI associated
with continuous-wave PR necessitates receivers with high dynamic range [4, 10–12].
As mentioned, PR is a type of radar system that utilises existing transmitter infras-
tructure to perform target detections. These uncooperative transmitters are referred
to as illuminators of opportunity [10, 13]. Common illuminators of opportunity in-
clude analogue based systems such as High Frequency (HF) and FM radio as well as
digital based systems such as Digital Audio Broadcast (DAB), Digital Video Broad-
cast Terrestrial (DVB-T), Digital Video Broadcast Terrestrial 2 (DVB-T2), Global
Positioning System (GPS), Global System for Mobile communications (GSM), Digital
Video Broadcast Satellite (DVB-S) and wireless local area networks (WiFi). While
there are many different transmitters, not all of them are necessarily desirable.
In order for an illuminator of opportunity to be considered ‘desirable’, two main con-
ditions need to be met [10, 14]:
1. The transmit power and antenna beam pattern must be sufficient for the desired
coverage.
2. The modulation bandwidth of the illuminating signal should be sufficient to meet
the desired range and Doppler resolutions.
3. Appropriate line of sight between potential transmitter-target and target-receiver
pairs.
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Unlike typical active monostatic radars, where the transmitter and receiver are co-
located as shown in Figure 1.1, passive radars are inherently bistatic - meaning that
there is dislocation between the transmitter and the receiver, as shown in Figure 1.2.
As a result, the variety of channel combinations is huge, where waveform and spatial
diversity can be exploited.
Target
Monostatic
Tranceiver
Tx
Rx
System under control
Figure 1.1: Basic monostatic radar geometry.
It can be seen from Figure 1.1 that the basic active monostatic radar consists of a
Transmit (Tx)/Receiver (Rx) module that transmits a user-specified pulse and receives
the resultant target echo. Both the transmitter and receiver chain are under full control
of the radar operator. Contrasting this to the bistatic case of a PR, the fundamental
difference is the baseline separation between the Tx and Rx sites as well as the lack of
control over the transmitter infrastructure.
Uncooperative
Transmitter
Target
Ref_Rx Sur_Rx
DSI
System under control
β
Figure 1.2: Typical bistatic passive radar system geometry, illustrating target detec-
tions utilising existing, uncooperative transmitter infrastructure.
Due to the lack of waveform control with a PR, the processing chain is normally
different to that of an active radar. Most PR is Continuous Wave (CW) and therefore
requires continuous monitoring of the transmitted waveform. To constantly monitor,
a basic PR makes use of two receiver channels. One of the channels, referred to as the
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reference channel, is used to record the signal arriving at the receiver along the direct
path form the transmitter. A second channel, referred to as the surveillance channel,
is used to record signals within the designated surveillance coverage volume. Both the
reference and surveillance channels are continuously receiving and digitising received
signals.
One of the major advantages of passive radar is that it does not emit any EM energy,
making it difficult to detect using Electronic Support (ES) systems and therefore more
difficult to counter by conventional means such as anti-radiation homing. PR vulnera-
bilities against Electronic Countermeasures (ECM), however, have so far received little
attention in open literature.
One of the perceived strengths of PR is its ability to be diverse in either frequency
of operation, spacial coordinates or both. While the combination of spacial and/or
frequency diversity of a PR is immense, their performance and tolerance against ECM
is critically important along with their ability to provide potential Electronic Counter-
countermeasures (ECCM).
1.1.1 Co-located and Separated Receiver Channels
The reference and surveillance channels are generally configured as two independent
antennas in two main categories. The first category is referred to as a co-located
reference and surveillance system, by far the most common, is depicted in Figure
1.3 while the second category is referred to as a separated reference and surveillance
system, as shown in Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.3: Co-located reference and surveillance system where both the reference
and surveillance antennas are at the same physical location [11].
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Figure 1.4: Separated reference and surveillance system where the reference and
surveillance channels are at different locations, usually with physical shielding such
as a large structure separating the two channels for additional DSI suppression [11].
The major benefit to utilising a separated reference and surveillance configuration is
that the two receive channels can be spatially separated by a physical structure, leading
to greatly reduced DSI. The most obvious drawback to such a configuration is the need
for coherent synchronisation of the two channels. This is not the case with a co-located
configuration however, co-located would typically systems experience increased levels
DSI associated with being in direct Line-of-Sight (LoS) to the transmitter, as shown
in Figure 1.3.
Both configurations require largely the same processing with the separated reference
and surveillance configuration requiring additional data synchronisation and trans-
portation steps as illustrated by the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) an-
tennas and data link network in Figure 1.4.
1.1.2 The Growing Need for Passive Radar
As mobile technology improves and becomes more integrated into our day-to-day lives,
the drive to free up existing spectrum for the purposes of telecommunications and
broadcast systems is at an all time high. Currently the greatest portion of spectrum
is allocated for telecommunication services, with a much smaller allocation for radar,
including Air Traffic Control (ATC) and navigation radar [15, 16].
In a 2014 report by the GSM association, found in [17], the authors found that between
1991 and 2008 50 billion USD had been raised through spectrum auctions, with this
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value expected to grow exponentially over the coming years. In the same report it was
estimated that the annual cost of poor spectrum utilisation in India is in excess of 3.6
billion USD.
Combining the need to free up existing spectrum with the exponential growth of air
traffic across the world, the prospect of a PR based Air Traffic Management (ATM)
system becomes evermore appealing. In order for PR based ATM systems to be
considered in a commercial sense, it needs to be reliable and potential vulnerabilities
to ECM fully understood [18–20].
1.2 Overview of Electronic Attacks
To investigate the performance of PR in the presence of ECM, it is important to
discuss the common forms of ECM applied to radar systems. There are various types
of jamming techniques used to counter radar systems, including [21]:
• Stand-off jamming
• Stand-in jamming
• Self protection and escort jamming
This can be further broken down into basic sub-categories such as:
• Broadband or barrage jamming
• Narrowband or spot jamming
• Deception jamming using DRFM
• Deception jamming using decoys
1.2.1 Barrage vs. Spot Jamming
As the name suggests, barrage jamming attempts to radiate EM energy to cover a
very wide bandwidth while spot jamming is very narrowband in comparison. One of
the benefits to barrage jamming is that the user requires very little knowledge of the
enemy system as all frequencies within the jammers band get attacked. The downside
to this is that the total jammer energy is spread across a very wide band, leading to
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much higher power levels being required. This also leads to barrage jamming being
easier to detect than spot jamming.
Spot jamming, on the other hand, greatly improves the jammers performance as almost
all of the energy is transmitted in the direction of the threat radar. This narrow band
technique allows the jammer operator to operate the jammer at a much lower power
level in order to achieve the same results as with a broadband jammer. The downside
to spot jammers, however, is that they require detailed knowledge of the threat-radar
frequency and bandwidth.
1.2.2 Stand-off vs. Stand-in Jamming
Stand-off jamming, as the name suggests, is a technique where the jammer is placed
at a safe distance from the radar, this distance is equal to the radars instrumented
range. This allows masking of friendly targets while remaining out of harms way.
Contrasting this with stand-in jamming where the jammer is placed in a considerably
more vulnerable position within range for an attack such as by an anti-radiation missile.
The major benefit to using stand-in jamming as opposed to stand-off jamming is
the reduction in the power requirements. In both cases, the jammer operates as an
independent system that is placed in a strategic location with the goal of masking a
target within the radar surveillance volume.
1.2.3 Self Protection and Escort Jamming
Self protection jamming refers to a case where a target carries a jammer while escort
jamming is when the target is escorted by friendly craft that jam threat radars. The
major downside to escort jamming is that the target or target escort becomes a beacon
for ES systems as it emits EM energy. Another limitation of self protection and escort
jamming is the increase in crossover and burn-through range.
The crossover range is the range at which the Jammer-to-Signal ratio (JSR) becomes
ineffective. The burn-through range is the range at which the jamming signal equals
the target echo and the jammer becomes ineffective. This occurs because the tar-
get approaches the radar and its echo strength increases by a factor of R4 while the
jamming signal increases at the receiver by a factor of R2.
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1.2.4 Sidelobe vs. Mainlobe Jamming
Another aspect that must be considered when jamming a radar is whether the trans-
mitted energy is aimed at the mainlobe or the sidelobe of the radar. A common
technique used to counter jamming is to steer a null of the antenna into the direc-
tion of the jamming source. This requires a well calibrated ES receiver with direction
finding capability in order to detect the presence and location of the jamming source.
1.2.5 Main Jamming Techniques Investigated
Broadband noise-jamming
One of the key metrics to assess the performance of a jammer against a radar is the
JSR at the receiver. The aim of noise jamming is to raise the noise floor of the PR
such that targets are masked. The minimum effective JSR is determined by the radar
sensor and is often related to the integration gain achieved by the processing chain.
In the case of a PR, with the target echo potentially 90 dB below the DSI, even a
moderate JSR could raise the noise floor enough to mask the target.
The advantage of this noise jamming technique is that it covers the PR range and
Doppler extent. The disadvantage however, is that the noise power is widely spread,
so a jammer with higher ERP would be needed if the jamming signal is to be effective.
Jamming Through Coherent Integration
Unlike noise jamming that simply raises the receiver noise floor, coherent integration is
achieved by transmitting a part of the radar waveform back in such a way that it causes
additive or coherent integration when passed through the radar processing chain. This
is achieved in two ways, either through attacking the deterministic components of the
illuminator signal or through the use of Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM)
based systems. It must be noted however, that most repetitive signals found in both
surveillance and reference channels, not exhibiting Doppler, will likely be removed by
the cancellation processing.
In contrast to noise jamming, coherent jamming requires a lower jammer ERP to
generate false targets. False targets can therefore be placed in the receiver using
relatively low power and while it is a strength of the tracking process to remove false
targets, a system that is able to overload the tracker with a large number of false
targets might have success.
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1.3 Problem Statement
Before PR can be used in a military context, the system vulnerabilities to ECM need to
be properly understood. As will be shown in Chapter 2.2, there is clearly a gap in the
literature with regards to ECM applied to PR with the only relatively comprehensive
open research performed by Inggs et al., found in [2]. This is due in part to the
classified nature of the research as well as the assumed resilience PR has to ECM.
Another contributing factor to the lack of sufficient open literature is due to the vast
variety of PR architectures, making it difficult to comprehensively and quantitatively
draw conclusions as to what the real world effects will be with regards to ECM and
ECCM.
This thesis aims to fill the important gap in open literature regarding ECM and ECCM
in the PR context. The objectives for this research are therefore:
• Perform a complete and comprehensive investigation on the effectiveness of var-
ious countermeasures, focusing specifically on ECM applied to FM and DVB-T2
based PR.
• Propose basic ECCM to mitigate the effects of various Electronic Attacks (EA)
against both FM and DVB-T2 PR.
• Provide representative experimental results from a real FM PR to verify the
simulated results.
1.3.1 Research Novelty
The goal of this thesis is to provide the first comprehensive, open investigative and
quantitative study on ECM and ECCM applied to FM and DVB-T2 based PR. The
novel aspects of this research include:
FM Passive Radar
• The effect of the DSI canceller in FM PR in the presence of jamming is quantified.
• A complete waveform study is performed to demonstrate the optimal FM jam-
ming waveform.
• Basic ECCM is presented to counter potential jamming of FM PR.
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• A representative measurement of a real FM PR is shown to validate the simulated
results
DVB-T2 Passive Radar
• An in depth review of the performance of the two most common processing
techniques, ‘mismatched filtering’ and ‘inverse filtering’, in the presence of noise
jamming is presented.
• The deterministic components of the DVB-T2 waveform are shown to be an effec-
tive form of ECM for both mismatched filtering and inverse filtering processing
techniques.
• Basic ECCM is presented to counter potential pilot attacks on DVB-T2 PR.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is divided into the following chapters:
A comprehensive review of PR literature is provided in Chapter 2. The chapter begins
with a comprehensive overview of research performed over many years in the field of
PR before providing a brief but comprehensive review of available literature focusing
specifically on ECM applied to PR.
FM PR is covered in Chapter 3. The chapter begins by providing a comprehensive
review of the FM waveform before detailing the typical FM PR processing chain that
is used in this thesis. The simulation set-up is then discussed before the effects of DSI
cancellation in the presence of jamming is analysed.
Chapter 4 presents a comprehensive jammer waveform analysis followed by an expo-
sition of the measured results in Chapter 5 where the simulated results are compared
to a real world FM PR.
Chapter 6 begins by providing a complete overview of the DVB-T2 signal structure.
The typical processing methods, which include mismatched and inverse filtering are
then presented and the Ambiguity Function (AF) is discussed.
Chapter 7 investigates the effectiveness of different types EA applied to DVB-T2 PR.
Each attack is demonstrated and compared using both mismatched and inverse filtering
processing methods before a brief section on potential ECCM is provided. The chapter
then concludes with a short discussion on results of each simulation.
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The thesis concludes with Chapter 8 where conclusions and future work is discussed.
A brief overview of required jamming power levels for different scenarios is given in
Appendix A that demonstrates the importance of having intelligence regarding the
location of the enemy PR receiver when attempting to jam it.
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Chapter 2
Literature Critique
This chapter critiques the relevant literature on PR and assesses current research
programmes across various research groups. Various commercial systems are discussed
prior to providing a review of literature focusing specifically on ECM applied in the
PR context where a clear gap in open literature is shown. The chapter concludes with
a summary of the current state-of-the-art pertaining to PR countermeasures.
2.1 Passive Radar Research
This section provides a review of some of the important literature related to PR.
Beginning with a discussion of the numerous illuminators of opportunity such as HF
radio signals, Very High Frequency (VHF) FM radio signals, DAB, DVB-T, DVB-T2,
GSM, GPS, and satellite broadcast services such as DVB-S. Early work on PR is then
discussed before moving to system limitations and suggested solutions on overcoming
these limitations.
2.1.1 Early Work in Passive Radar
While research in the field of PR has increased over the last decade, the concept of PR is
as old as radar itself [22–24]. In a 2005 paper by Howland [22], the authors describe how
the famous Daventry experiment in 1935 was the first PR demonstration as it utilised a
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) broadcast illuminator of opportunity rather
than its own dedicated transmitter. Other examples of early passive radar systems
were developed in World War II (WWII) by the German armed forces to exploit
transmissions from the British Chain Home radars [23]. After WWII, little interest in
passive radar remained due technical limitations at the time as well as the emergence of
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monostatic active radar systems until about the late 1980s [23]. This renewed interest
was sparked by improvements in technology, most notably the availability of cheap
computing resources such as General Purpose Graphics Processing Units (GP-GPUs),
high resolution Analogue-to-Digital Converters (ADC) [11, 25] and high performance
Software Defined Radio (SDR) such as the Ettus SDR platform [26].
In work by Griffiths and Long [3], analogue Television (TV) broadcasts were used from
the Crystal Palace transmitter in South London as the illuminator of opportunity to
detect aircraft landing and taking off from Heathrow airport. In these experiments, the
receiver was placed 11.8 km away from the transmitter which had an omni-directional
antenna with an ERP of 1 MW. The system operated on TV channels between 487.25
and 567.25 MHz.
Each channel had a bandwidth of 8 MHz, resulting in an ERP of 250 kW/channel.
It was found that the autocorrelation function of the sync-plus-white waveform of the
analogue TV signal exhibited high sidelobes with poor range resolutions and severe
ambiguities at 9 600 m and integer multiples thereof. It was therefore concluded that
the analogue TV signal was not a good illuminator of opportunity due to the sync
pulses. At the time, ADC technology was limited to 8 bits or 48 dB of dynamic range
which proved to be insufficient with Griffiths noting that the processing gain can not
exceed the dynamic range of the system. With 8 bits, and likely even lower Effective
Number of Bits (ENOB), this meant that a maximum of 48 dB of potential integration
gain was likely insufficient for most targets of interest [10].
In 1992 and revisited a decade later in 2002, Griffiths et al. [27, 28] discussed the
use of space-borne Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) as an illuminator of opportunity
for a ground based PR. This has been further explored in recent years with satellite
based illuminators being used to conduct Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR)
experiments for imaging and coastal surveillance purposes [29–32].
In a 1999 paper, Howland [33] managed to extract Doppler and bearing information
from the echoes using the analogue TV video carrier. He further demonstrated the
ability to detect and track aircraft at ranges of up to 260 km. In this work, Howland
exploited the fact that very accurate Doppler measurements could be obtained when
using a stable carrier frequency. As a result, Howland was not concerned with the
signal modulation and therefore did not experience the ambiguities encountered by
Griffiths in [3].
Howland, like Griffiths, used a dual channel receiver, one channel for the reference and
the other for target surveillance. The baseline distance between the Crystal Palace
transmitter and the receiver at Pershore was 150 km. He constructed a phase inter-
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ferometer consisting of a pair of Yagi antennas separated by 0.6λ. As the receiver was
situated beyond the LoS of the transmitter, the DSI was substantially reduced. It was
also noted that the mutual coupling between the antennas caused inaccuracies in the
bearing measurements and had to be compensated for.
Zoeller et al. [34]. found that FM radio signals are attractive illumination signals due
to their copious availability, comparatively high transmit powers, and random (noise-
like) features, which mean that their AF (depending on suitable programme content)
can approach the ideal thumbtack response.
Zoeller found that, due to the low carrier frequency of FM broadcasts, the PR receiver
must use long processing intervals to obtain good velocity resolution. The process-
ing intervals experimented with ranged from 0.125 to 0.5 seconds, which equated to
velocity resolutions from 3 m/s to 12 m/s [34]. However, processing intervals of 1 to
4 seconds are typically reported in more recent literature [7, 10, 11, 13]. Like most
systems, Zoeller utilised a two channel receiver which provided Zoeller with detections
of up to 100 km from the receiver. It was however, noted that correct site location for
the receiver is critical for the overall system performance.
In 2005, Griffiths and Baker published two papers detailing work analysing the ex-
pected performance of PR utilising different transmit waveforms [13, 35]. In these
papers, the authors detail the theoretical performance that can be achieved by using
FM, DAB, DVB-T, analogue TV and GSM base stations as illuminators, while also
evaluating the bistatic radar range equation in the context of PR. In [13], the authors
also make mention of the problems related to DSI, providing six different approaches
to the suppression of DSI. The authors presented the results shown by Sahr in [36]
as an example of how physical shielding can be used to reduce DSI. In [35], the au-
thors demonstrate the usefulness of using the AF as a means to determine the signals
suitability for use in PR.
In work reported in 2005, Howland et al. [4] developed a PR that utilised an FM
transmitter located at Lopik, approximately 50 km from the receiver. As a result
of the shorter baseline compared to the baseline used in [33], Howland suffered a
significant increase in DSI compared with that of his previous work. In an attempt to
reduce the DSI, a null in the antenna beam was physically steered in the direction of
the transmitter.
A significant challenge presented as a result of DSI, is the saturation of the frontend
ADC which greatly limits the ability to detect targets. Howland notes that once the
DSI was sufficiently reduced and filtered, the data could be processed to search for
Doppler and time shifted echoes from potential targets. The receiver bandwidth in
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[4] was limited to the effective bandwidth of a single FM channel, resulting in a range
resolution of approximately 2 km. While a range resolution of 2 km might seem poor
at first glance, the fact that these targets were tracked as far as 150 km from the
receiver, illustrates the systems’ usefulness [10].
It is well documented that FM transmissions are suited for long range PR coverage
due to their large transmit powers and relatively long wavelengths. FM antennas also
tend to have wide antenna elevation characteristics when compared to their terres-
trial digital counterparts, which allows for better coverage of high altitude targets as
demonstrated in [14]. Research at the University of Cape Town (UCT) has focused
on FM PR since 2007 [2, 7, 37–45] due to the prevalence of FM radio infrastructure in
developing nations, especially across Southern Africa. While FM transmitters remain
the most ubiquitous across the globe and offer high powered illuminators of oppor-
tunity, the performance of a PR depends heavily on the instantaneous bandwidth of
the signal used. The instantaneous bandwidth of FM signals vary depending on their
on-air content, which can result in inconsistent performance [46]. This led to the de-
velopment of a system that combined multiple FM channels in an attempt to improve
the overall system performance [47]. In the same paper, Lauri et al. investigated
the performance between direct sampling and a super heterodyne receiver architec-
ture, noting that the direct sampling provided performance advantages over the super
heterodyne architecture.
Despite having to deal with inconsistent signal bandwidths, FM PR have a number of
advantages over often lower power digital signal based PR. These advantages include
improved range performance due to high power transmitters in the lower frequency
VHF band, high Doppler resolution due to long integration times and possible en-
hanced Radar Cross Section (RCS) (depending on target shape) at certain geometries
due to the relatively long wavelengths of FM signals [11].
2.1.2 General System Limitations
It is clear that one of the biggest technical challenges for continuous wave PR is the
presence of DSI, since the target echo can be as much as 90 dB or more below the
DSI level [4, 5]. In 2007 Griffiths and Baker published a paper titled “The signal and
interference environment in passive bistatic radar” [48]. The paper compared different
ambiguity functions of various illuminating waveforms as well as investigating different
sources of interference and how to cancel them. They emphasise that up to 80 dB of
interference suppression is typically required for reliable target detection. This implies
an ADC dynamic range of at least 80 dB or 13 bits is required.
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The limitation caused by DSI can be overcome in various ways such as use of physical
shielding using separated reference and surveillance channels as was demonstrated by
Howland [4], O’Hagan [10], Tong [49], Morabito [50] and Inggs [51]. In a 2012 paper
by Tong et al., a Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) based architecture for
FM PR is introduced [42]. In [42], the authors demonstrated an equivalent monostatic
detection range of 100 km (290 km bistatic) using a transmitter with an ERP of 1.3 kW
and employing low cost GPS Disciplined Oscillators (GPSDO) [52, 53] to synchronise
the separated receivers.
O’Hagan et al. demonstrated the effect of shielding the surveillance antenna from
DSI through some physical means [54] which resulted in a less stringent requirement
on the ADC dynamic range. Like Morabito [50], Inggs demonstrated that significant
performance gains could be achieved through channelising the signal of interest by
using a high sensitivity pre-select filter [55] which was demonstrated to reduce out
of band interference by as much as 110 dB. Inggs et al. then demonstrated that
a 14 bit channelised narrowband architecture exhibited similar performance to a 16
bit wideband architecture, even though it had 12 dB less theoretical dynamic range
[7, 55]. This demonstrates that the difference between a wideband and narrowband
frontend receiver architectures can be as much as 12 dB due to the presence of out-
of-band interference within the wideband architecture. It must be noted however,
that a narrowband architecture such as the one described in [55] limits the number of
transmitters that can be used with a single receiver.
Another means of mitigating the effects of DSI is through antenna beamsteering as has
been demonstrated by Malanowski in [56] and more recently by Strom in [57]. Tsai
et al. [58] investigated the use of an 8 element dipole array to reduce the effects of
DSI in an FM PR where a 20 dB null was placed in the direction of the DSI source,
resulting in significant performance improvements. In [59] Bournaka et al. investigated
the design of a phased array pattern synthesis algorithm for use in DVB-T PR where
nulls of up to 40 dB are placed in the direction of either the DSI or other interference
sources. Another example of an antenna array being used for null-steering in a DVB-T
and DAB PR application is shown by O’Hagan in [60]. Under certain conditions, the
authors managed to place a 50 dB null in the desired direction using an 11 element
array at 675 MHz, thereby significantly reducing the levels of DSI.
Gould et al. [61] documented the performance and issues relating to a BAE Systems
multi-band PR prototype which operated from 100 MHz through to 2 GHz. They
developed a 4 channel system which could capture data at 10 MHz, providing enough
bandwidth to capture either analogue or digital transmissions in the FM and DVB-T
bands. The authors highlight the fact that one of the major difficulties was that of
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high dynamic range in order to detect targets as low as 90 - 100 dB below the DSI.
In order to overcome the issues caused by the DSI, the authors implemented analogue
beamforming for null placement and were able to detect targets up to 80 km bistatic
range. While beamsteering has been shown to be an effective means of suppressing
DSI, most of the work undertaken in the PR context has been with higher frequency
digital systems such as DAB, DVB-T and DVB-T2. This is because at the lower VHF
band, the size of the antennas for arrays becomes a limiting factor on the null depth.
To supplement physical shielding and null-steering for DSI removal, significant research
has been carried out into the removal of DSI in the signal processing domain, with a
number of prominent DSI cancellation algorithms being developed. In one of the earlier
papers on this type of adaptive filtering, Boray [62] discusses the trade-off between
computational complexity and convergence performance in a conjugate gradient based
method. This concept was further explored and optimised by Sheng et al. in [63]. A
real-time implementation of the Conjugate Gradient Least Squares (CGLS) algorithm
was demonstrated by Tong [11] using Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) hardware
such as GP-GPUs for use in FM PR. This approach was preferred to another popular
algorithm known as Extensive Cancellation Algorithm (ECA) due to the relatively
fixed execution time of CGLS [11].
In 2006 Colone [64] described an ECA and its ability to remove DSI from a PR.
Colone and O’Hagan et al. expanded this work into what became a widely used and
implemented multistage algorithm for disturbance removal and target detection using
FM illuminators of opportunity in 2009 [65]. While it is noted that real-time oper-
ation was not the objective of the authors, one of the major drawbacks to the ECA
algorithm is the long computation times that result from large clutter estimation ma-
trix dimensions, making it impractical to use in real-time systems. Work has been
undertaken to improve on the computational efficiency of ECA and in 2016 Chen et
al. [66] demonstrated significant computational speed-ups by using a Frequency Mod-
ulated Continuous Wave (FMCW)-like batches approach which he called Extensive
Cancellation Algorithm - Batches (ECA-B). This batches approach is similar to that
demonstrated by Griffiths in [67] and later expanded upon by Petri in [68] that sees a
96% reduction in computational time for the creation of an Amplitude-Range-Doppler
(ARD) map. Again, a similar approach was adopted by Ansari in a 2016 paper that
proposed the use of a Sequential Cancellation Batch (SCB) algorithm which was shown
to have less computational complexity and lower memory requirements than both ECA
and ECA-B whilst providing similar cancellation performance [69].
Other, less common DSI cancellation algorithms have been investigated such as Se-
quential Cancellation Algorithm (SCA), Least Mean Squares (LMS), Recursive Least
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Squares (RLS) based algorithms and variations thereof which have been directly com-
pared in the context of PR in [70–74]. Whilst the algorithms mentioned operate in
the time domain, highly efficient frequency domain implementations have also been
developed as part of the move towards frequency domain based digital Orthogonal Fre-
quency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) waveforms such as DAB, DVB-T and DVB-T2.
A frequency domain approach called Extensive Cancellation Algorithm in Carrier and
Doppler (ECA-CD) was proposed by Schwark in [75]. In [75] the authors demonstrate
the ability to cancel all multi-path clutter, independent of path length, with or without
small Doppler shifts by exploiting the signal structure and the range-Doppler process-
ing technique known as inverse filtering. It is important to note that while digital
processing has improved significantly, it is not uncommon for both physical shielding
and DSI cancellation algorithms to be used in conjunction with each other.
2.1.3 Current Research Focus
Over recent years, there has been significant research into WiFi PR. Early work by
Guo et al. in [76] demonstrated the feasibility of using WiFi access points as an
illuminator for detecting short range targets in a controlled environment such as an
anechoic chamber. Following this work, Chetty et al. [77] published the results of
experiments using WiFi as an illuminator in an indoor environment to demonstrate
the detection capabilities in high clutter environments. The authors demonstrated
the ability to detect human targets above the clutter at walking speeds using highly
directional antennas. In 2012 Chetty et al. then demonstrated the ability to detect
targets through multi-layered walls [78] which was later expanded upon by Broetjie
[79] in 2013 and Wu [80] in 2016 where complete multi-static systems were shown to
track human targets for through-wall monitoring and surveillance.
In a paper investigating the use of satellite based DVB-S signals for use as PR illu-
minators, Sun et al. [81] demonstrated that a theoretical range resolution of 4.95 m
could be achieved due to the relatively high bandwidth of 30.27 MHz per channel. In
[81] the same authors calculated that with the use of a 0.5 second integration time,
a velocity resolution of 0.024 m/s could be achieved, noting that this makes DVB-S
highly suitable for 2D moving target detection applications.
DVB-T is, next to FM broadcasts, one of the most common signals of opportunity
for passive radar. The second generation of terrestrial Digital Video Broadcast, called
DVB-T2, is increasingly being deployed world-wide [82]. Germany, for example, is
entirely serviced by DVB-T2. Over the past decade there have been numerous PR
demonstrators designed and developed to operate with the original DVB-T broadcast
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standard [65, 83–90]. Now, however, PRs are being adapted to utilise the increasingly
widespread DVB-T2 standard [91–97].
Digital broadcast protocols have the advantage that they have high and constant
bandwidth compared to traditional analogue systems. The wider bandwidths provided
by digital broadcast services yield finer range resolution, however these systems are
not without their drawbacks. DVB-T2 is an evolution of DVB-T and introduces a
high level of flexibility in its transmission. This higher level of flexibility enables the
standard to be used in a wider range of transmission environments and support for
higher data rate transmissions [98, 99].
Like other digital signals, DVB-T and DVB-T2 offer some major advantages for use
in passive radar such as high and constant bandwidth as well as the possibility of
reconstructing a perfect reference signal using a de- and re-modulation scheme [100–
102] commonly referred to as ‘demod-remod’. Demod-remod is made possible because
the signal follows an open standard, such as [99] in the case of DVB-T2, that can
be implemented by anyone. Signal reconstruction, however, is also possible for an
adversary, who may exploit the deterministic parts of the signal that are used for
synchronization and signalling purposes.
The demod-remod process is discussed by Searle et al. in [103] in the context of DVB-
T while O’Hagan et al. demonstrate using demod-remod in the DAB context [100]. In
a paper titled “enhancing target detection using real-world data from an (Australian)
8k-mode DVB-T system [89]”, Palmer notes that demod-remod process can be used to
effectively remove pilot signal ambiguities within an ARD map. Palmer demonstrates
that a 36 dB reduction in residual ambiguity peaks is achieved over standard matched
filtering with only a 1 dB sacrifice in the zero Doppler, zero delay peak level. In a 2018
paper by O’Hagan and Paine, ambiguity removal in DVB-T2 PR was demonstrated
using a demod-remod process [93].
Basic AF analysis of DVB-T2 signals was performed by Pidanic in [104] where DVB-T2
signal with a 4K Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) size is used along with Pilot Pattern
(PP) 4. The authors detail the position of the pilot ambiguities however it must be
noted that the position of these ambiguities will depend on both the signal FFT size
and the pilot pattern in use [93].
In 2010, Baczyk and Malanowski published a paper that demonstrated the process
of demod-remod using universal COTS SDR components not dedicated for DVB-
T using a chirp-Z transform to estimate the length of the OFDM symbol through
autocorrelation [105]. The authors demonstrated the feasibility of this with tests
utilising real DVB-T data. While this is a novel approach, it offers little benefit over
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conventional demod-remod processes. A year later, the same authors expanded on the
approach to evaluate its performance from the view of clutter removal and ARD map
calculation [88].
Transmitters using OFDM based DVB-T and DVB-T2 signals for PR have been in-
vestigated by numerous researchers, most notably [83–86, 89, 90, 102]. Since OFDM
signals are digital, they contain periodic structures within the signal itself such as pilot
signals. These pilot signals are used for frequency correction and channel estimation
and correction which is used in the demodulation of such signals. Unfortunately for
PR, these periodic signals cause ambiguities within the ARD map that need to be re-
moved. As a result, there are two widely used approaches to processing OFDM based
signals in PR, with the first being mismatched filtering as proposed in [83, 84] and fur-
ther explored in [86, 89]. Mismatched filtering is a traditional cross-convolution based
approach which involves demodulating the reference signal and then remodulating it
to obtain a clean, slightly modified reference. The new remodulated reference signal
is then used as a ‘mismatched’ filter when performing the range-Doppler processing.
A second approach adopted by Berger in [85] and expanded by Fang in [90] is referred
to as inverse filtering. Inverse filtering is a process whereby the signal undergoes
demod-remod to produce a noise free reference signal. This noise free reference signal
is then used to perform the range-Doppler processing by first dot dividing the OFDM
symbols in the surveillance channel by the same OFDM symbols in the remodulated
reference channel. A 2D FFT is then applied to produce an ARD map. This in effect,
normalises the carriers and shifts the direct signal clutter into the zero Doppler bin of
the ARD map.
A third, less common approach was demonstrated by Polonen et al. in [91] and later
again by Cui and Himed in [106] where the authors suggested target detection through
the use of the DVB-T2 control symbol. The DVB-T2 signal consists of a P1 symbol
which is used for initial synchronisation, course frequency offset correction and P2
parameter descriptions. To achieve this, a unique structure consisting of three distinct
parts C, A and B is used. Part A is the main part of the P1 symbol and is 1024
samples long. Part C sits in front of part A to form a cyclic prefix 542 samples long,
shifted by one carrier up in frequency. Part B is a cyclic suffix 482 samples long which
is also shifted up in frequency by one carrier and appended to the back of part A.
Together, the unique C-A-B structure forms the P1 symbol, 2048 samples long which,
when correlated with a frequency shifted version of itself, produces a unique impulse
response [93, 99]. A further illustration of the signal characteristics is given in Chapter
6. As Polonen demonstrates in [91], the unique P1 symbol can potentially be used
to detect the presence of targets without the need for a demod-remod stage. It is
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however, unlikely that such an approach will work under real world conditions using
real world signal levels.
In a 2009 paper by Bongioanni et al., an interesting new approach to ambiguity removal
in DVB-T ARD maps was proposed [107]. Rather than removing the ambiguities in
the demod-remod stage by normalising the pilots, the authors proposed a computa-
tionally efficient approach using an AF based filter that normalises the ambiguities
based on their expected positions within the ARD map. This proposed technique is
demonstrated to be more robust under certain conditions while being computationally
more efficient and does not require strict synchronisation with the reference signal. It
is unlikely however, that this approach will be able to adapt to a changing environment
such as when there is interference or jamming applied.
Migration from DVB-T to DVB-T2 means that the internal processing of the PR needs
to be adapted. In a paper by Winkler et al. [95], the authors highlight that the same
basic processing steps used in DVB-T can be deployed for Single Input Single Output
(SISO) DVB-T2 networks. However, since the DVB-T2 standard allows for Multiple
Input Single Output (MISO) operation, whereby transmitter groups can transmit sim-
ilar but different content, additional processing is required to remove the interfering
transmitter groups. Another characteristic of demod-remod based processing is chan-
nel errors. Wojaczek and Cristallini performed a sensitivity analysis regarding the
influence of channel errors in mobile DVB-T PR where the effects of inter-channel in-
equalities within the receiving chain was analysed [108]. The authors noted that while
advanced processing techniques such as Displaced Phase Centre Antenna (DPCA) and
Space-Time Adaptive Processing (STAP) rely on external calibration, this is not suit-
able for use in covert PR and as such, proposed digital and post processing based
calibration techniques where the direct signal itself is used to calibrate for the inter-
channel errors.
2.1.4 Commercial Systems
Over the last two decades, PR have matured to the point where commercial products
are being made available. Such systems include Hensoldt’s Passive Radar demonstrator
(PARADE) [109, 110], the Thales HA-100 [111], the PARASOL system by Fraunhofer
FHR [112] and the ComRad3 PR from Peralex Electronics [113]. Older systems such
as the Lockheed Martin Silent Sentry that utilised FM radio broadcast transmissions
[114] and CELLDAR, developed by BAE Systems and Roke Manor Research [115]
to utilise transmissions from GSM mobile phone broadcasts provided an early insight
into the commercial viability of PR.
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The Fraunhofer FHR PARASOL is the first PR in the world to receive certifying ap-
proval from an airspace surveillance and regulatory body, namely the German Deutsche
Flugsicherung (DFS) [112]. Passive Radar has also been demonstrated on moving
platforms with Warsaw University of Technology (WUT) being one of the first open
publications on airborne PR [116, 117]. In 2014, Fraunhofer FHR together with the
Australian Defence Science Technology Group (DSTG), then called Defence Science
Technology Organisation (DSTO), were among the first researchers to demonstrate
the use of PR on a moving maritime platform (a boat) and utilising land-based il-
luminators of opportunity [118–120]. Presently Fraunhofer FHR is a research leader
in the field of Airborne Passive Radar (APR) and in recent years have demonstrated
PR SAR and Ground Moving Target Identification (GMTI) [108, 121]. Another inno-
vative and niche PR program was performed by Peralex Electronics in South Africa.
Peralex, together with the Square Kilometer Array (SKA) consortium demonstrated
the deployment of a PR in proximity of highly-sensitive radio astronomy receivers
[94]. The purpose of the deployment was to detect all aircraft in the vicinity of the
radio astronomy reserve. Transponder-carrying aircraft pose a particular danger to
the sensitive Radio Frequency (RF) circuitry of the radio telescopes. Therefore when
an aircraft is detected by a PR, to avoid interference and data corruption, the radio
telescope is “informed” (by the PR) so that it can temporarily be de-sensitized, or
even shut-down.
The use of multiple DVB-T channels for higher range resolution was demonstrated
in a paper by Conti et al. [9]. The authors present two different architectures for
exploiting multiple adjacent DVB-T channels, a wideband approach which samples
the entire band and a channelised approach which samples each channel individually.
In both cases the authors were able to demonstrate that the range resolution perfor-
mance could be improved by N times with respect to a single channel architecture
where N is the number of channels sampled. Regardless of the relative performance of
each architecture, it is clear that sampling each channel individually provides better
Electronic Protection (EP) as the attacked channel can simply be removed from the
ARD map rather than cause significant out of band interference for the open channels.
Modern PRs are increasingly moving away from single illumination sources and to-
wards multi-illuminator operation, often incorporating a blend of FM, DAB, DVB-T
or DVB-T2. Schroeder et al. [122] demonstrated such a system in 2012 that utilised
FM, DAB and DVB-T with power levels of 50 dBW for FM and DVB-T and 27 dBW
for DAB. The system used a 7 element array for the FM and DAB frequency range
(88− 240 MHz) while a 2x7 element array was used for the DVB-T (474− 850 MHz)
frequency range. The system was able to selectively process 8 FM channels simulta-
neously and the authors noted that targets were detected in both the FM and DVB-T
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channels up to 38 km bistatic range.
Edrich et al. published a paper in 2014 detailing the design and performance evaluation
of a mature FM, DAB and DVB-T PR with the goal of building a system for airspace
surveillance with a range resolution comparable to that of an active ATC radar while
covering an area with a diameter of 200 km and a target location accuracy of 100 m
[123]. The authors mention that the use of FM transmitters allows for greater coverage
due to both the high power transmitters (10−100 kW) as well as the limited down-tilt
on the antennas [14]. The DVB-T and DAB transmitters were used as they provided
significant improvements in range resolution over the FM PR. The authors were able
to demonstrate detections up to and beyond 250 km bistatic range with Automatic
Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) data indicating target altitudes of 10 000
m.
Paine et al. published a paper in 2018 on a multi band FM and DVB-T2 PR that
utilises Yagi antennas for the FM band (97.6 MHz) and wire reflector TV antennas
for the DVB-T2 band (706 MHz) [94]. The typical FM transmit power in the region
was 40 dBW for FM while the DVB-T2 transmit power was 47 dBW. While this is
significantly lower than the older 60 dBW analogue TV transmitters used by Griffiths
et al. in [3], targets were shown to be detected in both the FM and DVB-T2 channels
at bistatic ranges up to 140 km and 36.5 km respectively.
One of the two major challenges remaining for PR in the commercial and military
context is the lack of statistical quantification of system performance as is common
with active radar systems. Significant research has been undertaken in an attempt
to address this and other performance related metrics with O’Hagan publishing his
PhD thesis on the “Performance Characterisation Using FM Radio Illuminators of
Opportunity” in 2009 [10]. As recently as 2017, Lysko and Maasdorp published pa-
pers describing the efforts of the South African Counsel for Scientific and Industrial
Research (CSIR) to fully characterise the FM PR being used for air traffic monitoring
in the Johannesburg area of South Africa with the aim of “proving the technology and
addressing the needs of ATC in developing countries” [124, 125]. The other major
challenge still facing PR is the lack of open knowledge on the performance of a PR in
the presence of potential countermeasures.
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2.2 Electronic Countermeasures Applied to Pas-
sive Radar
This section provides a critique of the limited but important literature relating to
ECM in the context of PR. ECM is a widely discussed technology field, however,
with regards to research relating to ECM applied to PR, few studies exist in the
open literature. Most papers on PR, such as [13] and [126], offer generalisations
about the effectiveness of such systems against ECM, and that it can provide excellent
ECCM against potential ECM, but almost no evidence is provided in support of such
assertions. Part of the problem with ECM in the PR context is the diversity associated
with PR, making it a huge task to assess all possible operational scenarios where
jamming could be applied.
2.2.1 Passive Radar in the Military Context
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Science and Technology Organisation
(STO) Advanced Modelling and Systems Applications for Passive Sensors Group SET-
164 produced a comprehensive report on PR performance, focusing particularly on the
impacts of clutter [127]. Another NATO group, SCI-190 Electronic Countermeasures
to Radar with High Resolution and Extended Coherent Processing held a specialist
meeting on PR jamming in 2017 that the author of this work contributed towards
[127, 128].
A report by Arend G Westra [129] states that “The U.S. military must gain an un-
derstanding of passive radar, not merely theoretically, or with minor research and
development projects, but with a dedicated effort.”
He then notes, “Why build a stealth counter when there is no immediate stealth peer
competitor?”
To which he replies, “We cannot afford to spend billions on stealth, only to fail to
thoroughly understand and counter rival systems [129].”
It is generally accepted that one of the principal advantages of PR is that it serves as
a potential counter to Low Observable (LO) targets. This is due to two aspects of the
systems design:
• LO targets are generally designed to present a very low RCS in the monostatic
region at microwave frequencies (1 to 10 GHz). Due to the relatively low oper-
ating frequency of FM based PR (100 MHz), the longer wavelengths result in an
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increased RCS of the target.
• The bistatic or multistatic nature of PR results in a situation where the reflected
energy is radiated towards the radar rather than away from it as is often the case
with monostatic radar and LO targets.
While PR typically exhibits these characteristics, it is unlikely that a PR system will
be deployed primarily to counter stealth targets. This is partly due to the difficulty
in utilising forward scatter regions for enhanced RCS. In addition to this, if covert
operation is not the primary requirement, a multistatic VHF or Ultra High Frequency
(UHF) radar will allow for more control and improved system performance.
2.2.2 Electronic Countermeasures Applied to Passive Radar
in Open Literature
A rudimentary analysis of the effects of active jamming on an FM band PR is per-
formed by Sendall in a 2016 report [12]. In the report, the author presents an attack
where a secondary transmitter is transmitting energy in the same band and therefore
unintentionally interfering with the radar system (Page 22). The author models the
reference signal as: r(t) = pk(t) + ql(t) + n(t), where k(t) is the normalised signal
transmitted by the transmitter of opportunity, l(t) is the normalised signal transmit-
ted by the interfering source (which is assumed to be uncorrelated), n(t) is Additive
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) while p and q are complex weights for scaling of the
signals.
The surveillance channel is modelled as: s(t) = rk(t) + sl(t) +m(t) +n(t), where m(t)
represents the target echo returns while r and s are complex weights for signal scaling.
The author then notes that in order for successful DSI cancellation to be implemented,
the ratio: p/q ≈ r/s, must hold true but since there is likely to be spatial differences
between the two sources, the cancellation will be impaired, leading to target masking
due to high signal sidelobes. The author concludes that even though the effects of the
additional in-band interference, l(t), has not been fully analysed, due to its effect on the
reference signal and therefore the cancellation, it can “be established that the presence
of an additional, in-band interferer is highly detrimental to system performance.” [12].
The most comprehensive, open source of literature on ECM and ECCM applied to PR
is provided by Willis et al. in [130] and [131]. In [130], Willis discusses noise jamming
and what he calls the ‘benchmark range’ of the PR. The so called benchmark range
of a PR is essentially the root of the product of the transmitter-to-target, receiver-to-
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target range (RB =
√
RTx ·RRx). See equation (6.8) of Chapter 6 of [131] for a full
expression.
Once the benchmark range has been calculated, Willis then proceeds to calculate
Jammer-to-Noise ratio (JNR) and estimate input noise temperature (using equation
(6.54)). Being a noise jammer, the effect on the PR is considered to be an addition to
the noise temperature of the receiver. He then divides the benchmark range, RB, by a
factor depending on the ratio of the jammer noise to the system noise to demonstrate
the effect on the benchmark range using equation (6.55).
Willis then assumes a specific range difference, ∆ = RTx−RRx, before finally calculat-
ing the resultant receiver-to-target range and coverage area due to the noise jammer
using equations (3) and (4) along with Table 6.5 [131] page 129.
To demonstrate, Willis examines an FM PR with a 250 kW transmitter and an effective
channel bandwidth of 100 kHz. Two jammers are considered, one with an ERP of 100
W and another with an ERP of 1 kW. The results show that the PR is very vulnerable
to jamming in the mainlobe of the receiver but considerably less so when the jamming
is applied to the sidelobe of the receive antenna. This further emphasises the idea of
spatially diverse receivers as a counter to ECM. In the same book Willis also dispels
the idea that the jammer can be used as an illuminator of opportunity for the PR by
illustrating that the power levels are simply too low [131].
In a paper by Zheng [71] the authors discuss accidental jamming of an FM PR. They
point out that DSI cancellation techniques have been discussed by many authors,
with most implemented algorithms adopting a single-stage adaptive filter processor
structure to remove or cancel the DSI. It was shown that in practice, because of the
complicated atmospheric propagation influence (such as maritime evaporation ducts),
or even active radio jamming, a single-stage DSI canceller could potentially be invalid.
Zheng noted that in practice, due to atmospheric propagation effects and/or active
radio jamming, a two-stage canceller should be used to combat the DSI and jamming
effects on the system. They report on field experiments and simulations to validate the
approach, demonstrating a jamming suppression of more than 20 dB, achieving desired
performance through cancellation of the DSI signals from the selected transmitter.
In one of the few journal papers on the subject, which builds off the work in [45],
Inggs et al. [2], demonstrated the ability of a noise jammer to effectively jam an FM
PR provided the receiver location is known. Through the simulation package Flexible
Extensible Radar Simulator (FERS) [132, 133], Inggs demonstrated that a simple 10
W noise jammer could be used to completely mask a potential target, however, it is
clear that this approach is simplistic in that without looking at the specific JSR for a
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given scenario, the jammer ERP is largely meaningless. Inggs also pointed out that
the work performed by Willis in [131] is an oversimplification since only looking at
the change in Signal-to-Noise ratio (SNR) would not account for the highly non-linear
effects of the DSI cancellation algorithms and Constant False Alarm Rate (CFAR)
filters. It was however mentioned, that systems utilising multiple distributed receivers
would be significantly more difficult to counter.
It is further concluded that in [2]:
• If the Rx sites are known, the PR is very vulnerable to a jammer with very
modest power levels (1 to 10 W).
• Cancellation techniques seem unlikely, since if they work at high fidelity, they
will also remove the signal.
• If the receiver sites are unknown, it will be very difficult for the ECM operator
to ensure that sufficient jammer power is provided to all the receiver sites.
• It seems that any signal that fills the PR bandwidth will be successful in jamming.
• Spatially diverse receivers will be very difficult to jam.
• Simple null steering is an effective countermeasure to stand-off jamming.
• Self protection jamming will be very difficult to mitigate.
• Considerable research into various aspects of each jamming technique still needs
to be performed.
Unlike analogue based FM PR that have no strictly deterministic components, digital
OFDM based PR such as DAB, DVB-T and DVB-T2 have deterministic components
that can be exploited by a potential attacker. This was demonstrated by Schu¨pbach et
al. [134] when the Phase Reference Signal (PRS) was exploited to successfully attack
a DAB PR. It was noted that due to the robustness of the DAB signal, attacking the
reference channel to prevent reconstruction would require jammer power of the same
order of magnitude as the transmitter of opportunity, making this an undesirable form
of attack. The authors demonstrated the effectiveness of utilising coherent jamming
over noise jamming on the surveillance channel for these types of systems due to
significant integration gain that can be achieved.
This approach was taken further by Schu¨pbach and Paine et al. in [135] where it
was shown that the deterministic components of the DVB-T signal, namely the pilot
carriers, could be exploited to effectively attack the PR with relatively low power levels.
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This demonstrates that the deterministic components within the reference signal can
be exploited and used as attack vectors in OFDM based PR.
In a paper by Giusti et al. [136], the authors demonstrate self-protection jamming
through the use of a target-on-board DRFM based attack to insert false targets into an
OFDM based imaging PR. The authors begin the paper with the broad statement that
PR is robust against jamming because the receiver location is unknown. It is noted
that since PR systems utilise broadcast transmitters, operating in frequency bands
requiring a licence that forbids the transmission of interfering signals, conventional
jammers cannot be used. This is a largely moot point since in a hostile environment,
the idea of adhering to spectrum licensing is largely ignored.
The paper then states that the use of OFDM based signals as a reference signal further
improves robustness against jamming due to the random nature of the OFDM signal.
This is incorrect and is in direct contrast to what has been demonstrated by Schu¨pbach
and Paine et al. in [134] and [135] where it was shown that the deterministic nature of
the OFDM signal can be used to achieve additional processing gain to improve jamming
performance. In [134] and [135] the authors demonstrated the ease at which an OFDM
based DAB or DVB-T PR could be jammed or spoofed using a self protection DRFM
based attack.
While DRFM based attacks are common in more advanced ECM systems used against
traditional active radar, little work has been done on their application to PR. Contin-
uing with the assumption from [136] that the DRFM signal should not interfere with
the broadcast transmitters, one of the advantages of using a DRFM based attack is
that the low power DRFM signal cannot easily be intercepted since it is hidden by the
high powered transmitter signal.
As was noted in [134] and [135], the authors of [136] point to the fact that while the
DRFM signal delay can be controlled to appear near the true target echo, the Doppler
shift cannot be due to the unknown location of the receiver. This can, however, be
overcome by transmitting multiple false targets at various different Doppler shifts
in an attempt to overwhelm the receiver. This is demonstrated through the use of
simulations whereby false targets are placed in the vicinity of the true target echo,
resulting in reduced detection and classification performance of the imaging PR.
It is clear from the few available open literature that PR are not as robust against
ECM as originally thought, provided the receiver location is known to the attacker.
However, as PR receivers emit no EM energy, one of the greatest difficulties in jamming
and deceiving PR is that the receiver location is unknown and can be difficult to locate.
A technique to locate PR receivers was proposed by Hoyuela et al. [137]:
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• Satellite imaging radar (eg. SAR).
• Electro-optic sensors.
• ‘Realistic ideal’ location estimation.
Therefore, to avoid using kilowatts of jamming power, an additional means of intel-
ligence has to be used. For the detection of PR receivers, surveillance with imaging
radar or electro-optic cameras to detect the relatively large antennas is one possibility.
Research has been undertaken on the optimisation of the receiver location for given
performance requirements. Often the optimised result is unrealistic so Digital Ter-
rain Elevation Data (DTED) and Geographic Information System (GIS) data can be
utilised to establish the ‘realistic ideal’ receiver location [42, 44, 137–139].
Tactics employed in active radar such as relocation and transmit waveform agility are
not feasible with PR since the receiver has no control over the transmitter and the
transmitter infrastructure can be easily and cheaply destroyed. To combat this, a
dual mode Active Fall-back Component (AFC) was proposed by O’Hagan et al. in
[140] whereby if anything were to happen to the transmitter infrastructure, the AFC
could be used as a supplement. Ideally, in a conflict environment, the PR sensor
would remain as silent as possible to remain hidden to reduce the risk of it being tar-
geted while utilising as many available transmitters as possible to maximise robustness
against transmitter attacks. However, all transmitters are vulnerable to some form of
attack, be it physical or electrical whether the receiver is co-located or not. Examples
of such attacks include:
• On April 23rd, 1999, the Serbian state television headquarters in Belgrade was
destroyed by NATO bombing.
• Between March 24th, 1999 and June 10th, 1999, bombings reduced the Serbian
broadcast infrastructure.
• Broadcast infrastructure also destroyed in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and
other places.
• Broadcast infrastructure can be destroyed in many ways (asymmetric vulnera-
bility), e.g. Lightning, Sabotage, Terrorism, War, Cyber attack.
• Elimination of power grid.
This emphasises the need for a PR to utilise multiple transmitters and multiple site
locations in order to at the very least ensure redundancy.
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2.3 Chapter Summary
To conclude this literature review, there is clearly a gap in the literature with regards to
ECM applied to PR. As noted, there is little to no open literature available on ECM
against PR, with the only relatively comprehensive open research being performed
by the UCT Radar Remote Sensing Group (RRSG), found in [2]. This chapter has
discussed various technical aspects regarding the use of PR. Also covered is a brief
overview of past and present PR while highlighting PR ECM specific literature.
Regardless of the implementation of future ATM systems, such as ADS-B or mul-
tilateration, there will still be a requirement for Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR)
coverage by primary radar due to national defence and system security needs. PSR
will be used as a back-up system and as a means of tracking non-cooperative users.
A Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) roadmap for implementation of changes to surveil-
lance over the next 20 years plans the “introduction of Multi-Static PSR to replace
primary radar” in 2015 to 2020 and beyond 2020, the CAA plan a “Wider roll out of
Multi-Static PSR” [19].
With sensors becoming more and more prevalent in the military context and civilian
context, this thesis aims to fill the important gap in open literature regarding ECM
and ECCM against PR. All of the limited available literature is based off simulated
results with no real world data to verify these claims. As a result, this thesis focuses
specifically on ECM applied to FM and DVB-T2 based PR and provides real world
representative measurements to validate the simulated results.
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Chapter 3
FM Passive Radar
This chapter begins with an overview of the FM radio signal structure and then leads
to an investigation of the performance of a single node FM radio based PR in the
presence of jamming and quantifies the effect of DSI cancellation. A complete jammer
waveform study is presented and the most effective jamming waveform is investigated.
A representative measurement from a real FM radio PR is presented as a validation
of the simulated results.
3.1 FM Signal Overview
The mathematical description of broadcast FM radio signals is developed in this sec-
tion. The mathematical description follows that by Stremler in [141]. Frequency
modulation is a form of analogue modulation where the baseband information carry-
ing signal, typically called the message signal, m(t), modulates the frequency of the
carrier wave. Broadcast FM radio signals are generated by applying a message signal
to a Voltage Controlled Oscillator (VCO). The output of the VCO is a constant ampli-
tude sinusoidal carrier wave whose frequency is a function of the control voltage, m(t).
When no message signal exists, the carrier wave is simply at its centre frequency, fc.
When a message signal exists, the instantaneous output signal varies about the carrier
frequency as expressed by:
fi(t) = fc +KV CO ×m(t) (3.1)
where KV CO is the voltage-to-frequency gain of the VCO, expressed in units of Hz/V.
The resultant output of KV CO ×m(t) is the instantaneous frequency deviation, ∆f .
The instantaneous phase of the signal is equal to 2pi multiplied by the integral of the
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instantaneous frequency, giving:
θi(t) =
∫ t
0
fi(t)dt
=
∫ t
0
2pifcdt+
∫ t
0
2piKV CO ×m(t)dt
= 2pifct+ 2piKV CO
∫ t
0
m(t)dt
(3.2)
The output FM waveform, XFM(t), is therefore represented by:
XFM(t) = Ac cos(θi(t)) (3.3)
If the initial phase is assumed to be zero for simplicity, the output FM signal becomes:
XFM(t) = Ac cos
[
2pifct+ 2piKV CO
∫ t
0
m(t)dt
]
(3.4)
where the frequency modulated output, XFM(t), has a non-linear dependence on the
message signal, m(t), making it difficult to analyse the exact properties of an FM
signal. The baseband message signal, m(t), can be modelled mathematically as a sum
of each channel component:
m(t) = C0[L(t) +R(t)]
+ C1cos(2pi × 19 kHz× t)
+ C0[L(t)−R(t)]cos(2pi × 38 kHz× t)
+ C2RDS(t)cos(2pi × 57 kHz× t)
(3.5)
where C0, C1 and C2 are the gains used to scale the amplitudes of the left channel
audio, the right channel audio, the 19 kHz pilot tone, and the Radio Data System
(RDS) subcarrier, respectively, to generate the appropriate modulation index, β. For
simplicity, the FM signal bandwidth can be estimated by representing the message
signal, m(t), by a single tone:
m(t) = Amcos(2pifmt) (3.6)
where Am is the amplitude of the message signal and fm is the message tone frequency.
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Substituting (3.6) into (3.4) gives:
XFM(t) = Ac cos
(
2pifct+
KV COAm
fm
sin(2pifmt)
)
= Ac cos
(
2pifct+
∆f
fm
sin(2pifmt)
)
= Ac cos(2pifct+ β sin(2pifmt))
(3.7)
The peak frequency deviation, ∆f = KV COAm, is a result of the message amplitude
and gain of the VCO. The ratio of the peak frequency deviation, ∆f , and the message
signal frequency, fm is known as the modulation index, β. The number of significant
sidebands in the output spectrum is a function of the modulation index. This can be
seen by representing the FM output signal in terms of nth order Bessel functions of
the first kind:
XFM(t) = Ac
∞∑
n=−∞
Jn(β) cos(2pi(fc + nfm)t) (3.8)
By taking the Fourier transform of (3.8), the discrete FM spectrum can be represented
in magnitude by coefficients as a function of β:
XFM(f) =
Ac
2
∞∑
n=−∞
Jn(β)
[
δ(f − fc − nfm) + δ(f + fc + nfm)
]
(3.9)
The number of sidebands of an FM signal and its associated magnitude coefficient can
be found with the help of Bessel function tables [142, 143].
The average power envelope of an FM signal is constant and can be determined using
the Bessel functions as:
Pave =
1
2
A2c
∞∑
n=−∞
J2n(β) (3.10)
As the bandwidth of the message signal reduces, the number of significant sidebands
required for transmission reduce. This leads to an increased level of the carrier com-
ponent, J0. As the bandwidth of the message signal increases however, the number of
significant sidebands required for transmission increases, i.e. Jn for n > 0 increases,
and the level of the carrier tone, J0, subsequently decreases.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the FM radio station spectrum output for high, medium and low
bandwidth message signals. Each signal is normalised to the maximum level within
each plot. From (3.10), the average power envelope across the channel must remain
constant. It is therefore clear by comparing the high bandwidth signal (left) to the low
bandwidth signal (right), that the carrier tone levels are significantly higher for a lower
valued β than for high values. In the context of using FM radio signals as illuminators
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of opportunity, it is important to note that the integration gain achieved through
matched filtering is directly proportional to the instantaneous signal bandwidth. If the
message bandwidth occupied the maximum permissible FM radio station bandwidth
[2], the corresponding maximum integration gain would be 59 dB (assuming for the
time being an integration time of 4 s), as calculated in (3.11).
Gint = tint · B
= 10 log(4 s · 200 kHz)
= 59.03 dB
(3.11)
A 59 dB integration gain can only be achieved when the entire modulation bandwidth
is filled for the duration of the Coherent Processing Interval (CPI). Realistically, this
will only be the case when applying broadband noise jamming to the PR receiver. A
more realistic integration gain for the FM based PR receiver under normal operation
is determined by the average modulation bandwidth across the CPI. This results in
an integration gain of approximately 55 dB as shown in (3.12).
Gint = tint · B
= 10 log(4 s · 80 kHz)
= 55.05 dB
(3.12)
∴ 55.05 dB < Gint < 59.03 dB (3.13)
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Figure 3.1: FM channel output for high, β = 4 (left), medium β = 2 (middle) and
low β = 0.25 (right) bandwidth message signals.
3.2 Typical FM Passive Radar Processing Chain
The exact processing chain used in FM PRs varies depending on system architecture.
However, the underlying process is the same for most architectures. An overview of the
processing chain used for this investigation is presented while a more comprehensive
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discussion on FM PR processing chains can be found in [11]. Figure 3.2 illustrates a
block diagram of the processing stages involved.
Aliasing Filter
ADC
Data Synchronization
Surveillance Rx
Reference Rx
DSI and clutter cancellation Data Processing
CAF Calculation
ARD Processing
Post Processing
Position Mapping
Tracking, CFAR, etc
Figure 3.2: Basic passive radar processing chain [11].
As is common with most FM PR, there are two receive channels, one for reference
and one for surveillance. The reference channel is directed towards the transmitter of
opportunity and is used to record the illuminating signal. The surveillance channel
is directed away from the illuminating transmitter and towards the desired coverage
area. The raw data is sampled and filtered, usually using a frontend pre-select filter
stage to remove out-of-band interference. It is important that the two channels are
synchronised to allow for coherent processing.
As discussed in Chapter 2, DSI cancellation is critical for FM PR performance. While
null-steering of the antenna helps to improve channel separation that results in a
reduction in the DSI in the surveillance channel, an additional software based DSI
cancellation process is typically also used. As mentioned in Chapter 2, there are many
different DSI cancellation algorithms available with most resembling some form of LMS
based filter. This work demonstrates the use of two different DSI cancellation algo-
rithms namely: ECA and CGLS, the exact details of which are described in Appendix
B.
Once the signal is recorded, the DSI is removed from the surveillance channel and
range-Doppler processing is performed to produce an ARD map. Range-Doppler pro-
cessing in FM PR is achieved using a typical Cross multiply - Fourier transform (XF)
or Fourier transform - Cross multiply (FX) based process. Due to there being more
Doppler bins than range bins in the output ARD maps, it is computationally more
efficient to use the XF process, however, the resultant output is the same regardless.
The output ARD map is then passed to a Greater of Cell Averaging (GOCA) CFAR
filter that extracts target detections above a pre-defined threshold. The theory of
CFAR filters has been extensively documented in literature [144–148] and will not be
discussed in detail here.
The exact parameters of the CFAR filter change depending on the system environment
but typically 4 guard and 8 reference cells are used around the Cell Under Test (CUT)
with a desired probability of false alarm, Pfa, of 10
−5 in FM PR systems. A GOCA
CFAR filter is chosen as it has been proven reliably reject clutter ridges which are
common due to the mountainous topography surrounding the Western Cape of South
Africa [11]. The CFAR filter is applied in the Doppler dimension due to the large
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bandwidth and therefore range fluctuations from CPI to CPI in an FM PR. While
not implemented for the purpose of this investigation, the next step is for the CFAR
detections to be handed to a tracking filter.
3.3 Jammer-to-Signal Ratio
Simulations are described in Section 3.5 with the aim of quantifying the performance
of an FM PR in the presence of various jamming signals. However, before these
simulations can be performed, appropriate performance metrics need to be determined.
One of the challenges to quantifying the performance of a PR in the presence of
jamming is attempting to quantify the PR itself. The required jammer power depends
on the relative positions of the target, illuminator of opportunity and all the relevant
link budgets, making it difficult to quantify jamming performance in a generic way. As
a result, the JSR at each Rx channel, prior to integration gain, is used as a performance
metric. the JSR is determined using the one way range equation for the jammer power
(3.14) and the two way bistatic range equation for the signal echo power (3.15).
J =
PjGjGrλ
2
(4piRjrx)2
(3.14)
S =
PtGtGrλ
2σ
(4pi)3R2txR
2
rx
(3.15)
where,
J = Direct path jammer signal at surveillance receiver.
Pj = Jammer transmit power.
Gj = Jammer antenna gain.
Gr = Receive antenna gain.
Rjrx = Distance from jammer to receiver.
λ = Free space wavelength (c/fc)
S = Target echo power at the surveillance receiver.
Pt = Transmitter of opportunity transmit power.
Gt = Transmit antenna gain.
Rtx = Transmitter to target distance.
Rrx = Target to receiver distance.
σ = Bistatic RCS of potential target.
Resulting in a Jamming-to-Target-Echo ratio (JSRE) on the surveillance channel of,
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JS
=
PjGjGrλ
2(4pi)3R2txR
2
rx
PtGtGrλ2σ(4piRjrx)2
=
PjGj4piR
2
rxR
2
tx
PtGtσR2jrx
(3.16)
When calculating the JSR for the reference channel, the equation is modified slightly.
The one way propagation path loss from the transmitter to the receiver using (3.14)
is compared to the one way propagation path loss from the jammer to the receiver∗.
Once an appropriate representation for the JSR has been determined, an appropriate
JSR is chosen to compare the performance across all simulations as shown in Section
3.5 below. The jammer power before antenna gain in each simulation was therefore
chosen to be 5 W. This was chosen as it provides a practical power level for a real
world jammer. Increasing the power level of the jammer would allow the jammer to
be placed at further distances from the receiver while maintaining the same JSR.
JSRsurveillance = 58.9 dBstart to 52.6 dBend (3.17)
JSRreference = −31.6 dB (3.18)
Equations (3.17) and (3.18) show the JSR at each channel across the simulations. The
JSR on the surveillance channel is the ratio of jammer power to target echo power and
therefore it is dependent on the target position within the simulation. At the start of
the simulation, when the target is furthest from the receiver, the JSR is its highest
at 58.9 dB while at the end of the simulation when the target is at the closest point
to the receiver, the JSR is at its lowest at 52.6 dB. The JSR on the reference channel
remains at -31.6 dB however, as it is determined by the ratio of the jammer power to
the reference transmitter power and is therefore independent of the target position.
3.4 Discussion of CFAR in the Context of PR
Unlike false alarms in traditional active monostatic radar, false alarms in PR, and
particularly in FM PR, are not statistically well defined. In an active system, a
threshold above the noise (in a noise limited system) can be defined from the Receiver
Operating Curves (ROC) corresponding to a desired Pd and Pfa for a given SNR.
This is not the case for a PR system since the receiver has no control over the transmit-
∗The assumption is made that the gain of the reference antenna in the direction of the jammer is
0 dBi as the jammer is pointing into a side lobe of the reference antenna and the main lobe of the
surveillance antenna.
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ter or the transmitted waveform. In the case of an FM PR, the transmitted waveform
is continuously changing in a random fashion, resulting in variable system perfor-
mance. Digital PR systems such as DVB-T2 provide a more consistent performance
measure and while work has been done to quantify the performance of PR systems
[10], significant work is still required to statistically characterise each system in a given
environment.
In an active radar system, the receiver has complete control over the transmitter and
the transmitted waveform. The transmitted waveform can therefore be dynamically
adjusted along with the CFAR parameters in the presence of interference. This would
be done to maintain the desired Pd and Pfa in the presence of a dynamic interference
environment. With PR, there is no such control of the transmitter or the transmit
waveform and so the CFAR is established locally and is not dynamic.
Furthermore, the zero-Doppler direct signal introduces additional artifacts and while it
is largely suppressed, it may both directly or indirectly mask targets at lower Doppler.
The very act of suppressing DSI can reduce the target SNR.
3.5 System Simulation Parameters
As shown by Inggs et al. in [2] and [55], AWGN can be an effective means of jamming
an FM PR. It was also mentioned by Sendall in [12] that any potential jamming would
have an adverse effect on the DSI cancellation and therefore the detection performance
of the system. To investigate these claims and to further examine the effect of the DSI
canceller when jamming is applied, numerous simulations were performed and the
results analysed.
The FM PR was simulated using FERS [132], a powerful radar simulator developed
at UCT that allows for an arbitrary number of transmitters and receivers. For the
simulations shown here, a single FM band (88 − 108 MHz) transmitter-receiver pair
was modelled while two system configurations were investigated, the first being a co-
located system (whereby both the reference and surveillance antennas were at the
same location) and the second being a separated system (whereby the reference and
surveillance antennas were significantly spatially separated).
To allow for consistency across simulations, the system specifications were kept con-
stant across each run-cycle. Table 3.1 outlines the simulated system parameters used
in this investigation. Figure 3.3 illustrates the simulated system geometry at the start
of the simulation. Figure 3.4 depicts a plan view of the simulated system geometry
corresponding to the actual system geometry used. The scene depicts the Western
38
Cape of South Africa. The simulated parameters mimicked real world placement of
each component such as height and location in 3D space. It must be noted however,
that due to limitations in the FERS simulation package, no clutter or terrain mapping
is simulated and therefore DSI is only present for the first few range bins.
Each simulation uses real recorded FM signals for the transmitter of opportunity. The
FM radio signal was recorded at UCT and therefore provided an accurate signal model.
Each simulation is a 3 minute scenario, allowing the target to descend from 10 000 m to
5 000 m as it approached the Cape Town International airport (CPT) (represented by
the two yellow pins in Figure 3.4). The jammer was placed on the top of Tygerberg hill
to allow for optimal coverage and its main beam aimed towards the airport to mimic
a possible tactical deployment. Unless otherwise stated, each simulation output was
processed using the CGLS method of removing DSI as this was the technique that was
implemented in the practical system, using real world parameters, available at UCT.
CGLS has inherent benefits in that real time processing can be achieved over long
processing intervals while maintaining a fixed memory footprint within the processing
chain [11, 41].
To maintain consistency with each of the results, the ARD map that was shown for
each simulation was from the same, one minute interval into the simulated flight.
Unless otherwise stated, each ARD map is normalised to zero where zero represents
the maximum peak within the plot. Figure 3.5 shows a two second spectrum output
of the signals used in the FERS simulations. The CPI for each simulation was set to
4 seconds as this was in line with what is used in the real systems [11].
Figure 3.3: Cartesian geometry entered into FERS for the start of the simulated
flight path.
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Figure 3.4: Overhead view of scenario geometry used in each FERS simulation with
antenna beam patterns overlayed [55].
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Figure 3.5: (Top) Two second spectrum of the real recorded FM signal that is used
as the transmit signal in the FERS simulations. (Bottom) Two second spectrum of
the in-band real recorded Gaussian noise signal that is used as the jamming signal
in the noise jamming FERS simulations.
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Table 3.1: Simulation parameters used in each of the FERS simulations.
Transmitter (Tx)
Antenna Beam Pattern Isotropic
Antenna Gain 0 dBi
Antenna Altitude 400 m
Carrier Frequency 89 MHz
ERP 10 kW
Waveform Real recorded FM data, 204.8 kSps complex sampled
Reference and Surveillance Receivers (Rx)
Antenna Beam Pattern Sinc
Antenna Gain 7.2 dBi
Antenna Altitude 240 m
LO Error 50 ppb (std. dev. of 0.01 Hz @ 204.8 kSps)
Noise Figure 4 dB
Digitisation 204.8 kSps complex, 16 bit quantisation
Target
Initial Altitude 10 000 m
Final Altitude 5 000 m
Velocity Constant 200 m/s
RCS @ 89 MHz 23 dBsqm (200 m2 a large airliner)
Swerling Case 0 (Non-fluctuating)
Jammer
Antenna Beam Pattern Sinc
Antenna Gain 7.2 dBi
Transmit Power 5 W before antenna gain
Carrier Frequency 89 MHz
Waveform AWGN, Sine wave on carrier
Processing Parameters
DSI Cancellation 5 range, 5 Doppler bins
DSI Cancellation CPI 102400 samples (0.5s)
Range/Doppler Processing 120 range, 1601 Doppler bins
Range/Doppler CPI 819200 samples (4s)
CFAR Algorithm GOCA-CFAR
CFAR Window 4 guard cells, 8 reference cells (either side of CUT)
CFAR Dimension Doppler (Robust against bandwidth fluctuations)
CFAR Threshold Pfa = 10
−5 (exponential noise model)
3.6 Quantifying the Effect of a DSI Canceller
This section investigates the effects of a DSI canceller by first injecting AWGN into
both reference and surveillance channels as would be the case with a co-located system
and then into only the reference or only the surveillance as would be the case with a
separated reference and surveillance system.
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Using the simulation parameters described in Section 3.5, a clean simulation, i.e. one
that contains no jamming, is run to provide a performance benchmark for the sys-
tem in absence of jamming or other unwanted interference, the results of which are
demonstrated in Figure 3.6.
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(a) No jamming
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(b) Noise jamming
Figure 3.6: FERS simulated target one minute into the 3 minute long simulated
flight path with jamming applied to both channels. Target location is located in the
red oval. The increased noise floor as a result of the jamming can be seen by the 22
dB reduction in dynamic range between the target and the surrounding noise floor.
Once it was clear that the target was detected when no jamming was present, simula-
tions were run to determine the effects of applying broadband noise jamming in each
channel of the PR. The first jamming simulation is completed by applying the jammer
to both the reference and surveillance channels, as would be the case in the scenario
demonstrated in Figures 3.4 and 3.3 with co-located channels. Figure 3.6b illustrates
the result of applying 5 W of noise jamming across the FM channel where the same
target, clearly visible in Figure 3.6a, was masked by the raised noise floor.
Passing the output of the ARD maps into the CFAR filter described in Table 3.1 results
in an accumulated output as shown in the top left corner of Figure 3.7. It illustrates the
resultant combined output of the CFAR filter for the simulated system with jamming
applied to the different channels. The results demonstrated in Figure 3.7 indicate
that jamming performance heavily depends on two factors, namely: which channel
(reference or surveillance) of the PR is affected by the jamming and the performance
of the DSI canceller to suppress the jamming signal.
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Figure 3.7: Combined CFAR output over the entire simulated flight showing the
comparative system performance in the presence of jamming. (Top Left) Clean
simulation, no jamming applied. (Top Right) Jamming applied in only the reference
channel and not in the surveillance channel. (Bottom Left) Jamming applied in only
the surveillance channel and not in the reference channel. (Bottom Right) Jamming
applied in both the reference and surveillance channels.
The performance of the system in the presence of jamming is defined by the number of
target detections, Nd, achieved while jamming is applied, compared to the number of
target detections achieved when no jamming is applied (where Nd = 100%). Observing
Figure 3.7, the top left plot shows the accumulated CFAR output for the target over the
full 3 minute flight simulation. This results in 45 ARD maps (180 seconds divided into
45× 4 second plots) being filtered and a target being detected in each plot. Applying
a jamming signal to the reference channel, typical for systems that utilise separated
reference and surveillance channels [42, 49], shows no visible reduction in the number
of target detections at the output of the CFAR filter. This is as a result of the jammer
signal being 31.6 dB lower than the reference signal. Applying the same jamming
signal to the surveillance channel, while maintaining a clean reference channel results
in a drastic reduction in system performance with Nd dropping to 29%. Injecting the
same jamming signal into both the reference and surveillance channels, as would be
typical for a system that utilises co-located antennas (such as the one described in
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Figures 3.4 and 3.3), results in a relative improvement in detection performance such
that Nd = 44% compared to Nd = 29% when jamming only the surveillance channel.
It is clear from the results demonstrated in Figure 3.7 that applying the jamming
signal to only the reference channel is the least effective, while applying the signal
to only the surveillance channel is the most effective. Applying a jamming signal to
both the reference and surveillance channels sees a reduction in jamming performance
when compared to jamming of only the surveillance channel. When the jamming
signal appears in both the reference and surveillance channels, as would be the case
with a co-located system, the target is found to be detected more consistently than
with only the surveillance channel being jammed. This result is attributed to the DSI
cancellation step in the processing chain. If the jamming signal is found in both the
reference and surveillance channels, the DSI canceller, which suppresses the reference
signal in the surveillance channel, suppresses the added jamming signal as it appears as
part of the reference (since it appears in both channels). The canceller then attempts
to remove the jamming signal and in doing so, slightly reduces its effect on the system.
The reason that the jamming signal is not fully removed is due to the fact that it is
at such a low level when compared to the reference signal itself, as shown in (3.18).
For the DSI canceller to remove significantly more of the jamming signal, it would
require a very sharp and deep null, leading to increased computation time and system
complexity.
As discussed in Chapter 2, Zheng et al. [71] describe how they were able to achieve
more than 20 dB of interference cancellation using a two stage canceller to combat
inadvertent jamming. It is clear from Figure 3.7 that the DSI canceller has a positive
effect on the performance of the system in the presence of jamming. In order to evaluate
the significance of the DSI canceller in the presence of jamming, the performance of the
FM PR is tested across different cancellation parameters. As such, each simulation
is passed through the GOCA CFAR filter (described in Table 3.1) using different
cancellation parameters and number of successful detections are then counted and
compared to the maximum number known to be in the CFAR output under perfect
conditions.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the effect of increasing the number of cancellation iterations. The
number of cancellations used by the canceller is started at 10, the minimum practical
number of iterations required by the CGLS algorithm to allow for convergence to begin.
It can be seen from Figure 3.8 that at 10 iterations, even the number of detections
when no jamming is present is unsatisfactory.
Increasing the number of iterations to 15 shows improvement in each of the three
test metrics, with the greatest improvement seen from the system with no jamming
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present. Increasing the number of iterations further to 20 resulted in two of the
scenarios reaching convergence in terms of maximum detection performance, namely
the scenario whereby no jamming is present and where jamming is only present within
the reference channel.
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Figure 3.8: Comparing CGLS to ECA cancellation in the presence of jamming. The
dashed lines represent the Nd where ECA was used while the solid lines represent
Nd when CGLS is applied. The blue lines (squares) represent the scenario where
there is a jamming signal present in the surveillance channel but not in the reference
channel. The black lines (dots) represent the scenario where there is jamming in both
the reference and surveillance channels. The green lines (rings) represent the scenario
where jamming is present only in the reference channel but not in the surveillance
channel. The red lines (diamonds) represent the scenario where no jamming is present
in either channels i.e. the system is clean of any jamming.
Increasing the number of CGLS iterations further to 30 (the number used in all other
presented simulations), results in a further increase in the performance of the system
with jamming applied to both the reference and surveillance channels, while the other
two scenarios remained unchanged in terms of their detection performance. This illus-
trates very clearly the results shown in equations (3.19) through (3.32). This pattern
of detection performance improvement when jamming both the reference and surveil-
lance channels continues until the number of cancellation iterations is increased to
50, at which point convergence is achieved, resulting in all 3 graphs remaining flat
regardless of further increases in number of iterations.
A comparison between the two main cancellation techniques is also shown in order
to evaluate the performance of each algorithm in the presence of jamming. Figure
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3.8 shows the Nd achieved in the presence of jamming when applying ECA or CGLS
across various scenarios. It is clear that using ECA results in a significantly more
consistent output when compared to using CGLS. This is expected as ECA has a
constant output with it being a ‘one shot’ algorithm where the interference matrix is
built and subtracted from the surveillance channel in one go, while CGLS runs for a
set number of iterations regardless of whether convergence is achieved or not, refining
the cancellation matrix in small increments each iteration [11, 65]. The advantage
of ECA is consistency in the output, however the disadvantage is that the execution
time and computational load is significantly more than iterative approaches. This
makes ECA difficult to implement in real time due to the variability of the FM signal.
CGLS however, can be implemented using a smaller fixed matrix size and memory
footprint dependent on the number of range and Doppler bins required for cancellation.
This leads to a controllable execution time and is therefore suitable for real time
implementations.
To elaborate on the effect of the DSI canceller, a derivation of the construction of the
ARD maps is shown, beginning with (3.19). The reference signal, r(t), contains the
direct path signal as well as some noise, n1(t). The surveillance signal is therefore
made up of some scaled version of the reference signal, Ari(t), its own uncorrelated
noise, n2(t), as well as the echo signal, e(t), which is simply a time and Doppler shifted
version of the reference signal. The following signal models make the assumption that
the jamming signal is at a considerably lower level than the reference signal, as has
been the case in the simulations discussed thus far.
r(t) = ri(t) + n1(t)
s(t) = Ari(t) + e(t) + n2(t)
(3.19)
The DSI cancellation algorithm, typically a LMS based algorithm, is used to remove
the reference signal found in the surveillance channel, resulting in a new scaling term
for the reference signal within the surveillance channel, B, where B << A. This results
in a new expression for the signal present in the surveillance channel:
srm(t) = Bri(t) + e(t) + n2(t) (3.20)
where srm defines the signal in the surveillance channel after DSI cancellation has been
applied. Creating the ARD map, χ, is then achieved by correlating the two channels
as shown in (3.21).
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χ =
∫
T
r∗(t)srm(t+ τ)e−i2piftdt (3.21)
Introducing the jamming signal results in the jamming signal being imposed on both
the reference and surveillance channels, rj(t) and sj(t) respectively, provided the re-
ceiver channels are co-located as is the case under consideration in (3.22):
rj(t) = r(t) + jr(t)
sj(t) = s(t) + js(t)
(3.22)
where jr(t) and js(t) represent the jamming signal present in the reference and surveil-
lance channels respectively. Ignoring the cancellation step for the time being, the ARD
map from the resultant reference and surveillance channels is produced in the same
way as before, but now with the added terms.
χ
†
jr/s =
∫
T
r∗j (t)sj(t+ τ)e
−i2piftdt
=
∫
T
r∗(t)s(t+ τ)e−i2piftdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
χ
+
∫
T
r∗(t)js(t+ τ)e−i2piftdt
+
∫
T
j∗r (t)s(t+ τ)e
−i2piftdt+
∫
T
j∗r (t)js(t+ τ)e
−i2piftdt
(3.23)
The addition of a jamming signal clearly adds additional terms to the ARD map, as
seen in the decomposition of χjr/s in (3.23). It is shown in (3.22) and (3.23) that the
jamming signal appears in both the reference and surveillance channels as an additional
interference term. Provided the antennas are co-located, the jamming terms in each
channel will be coherent with the only difference being their relative amplitude, i.e.,
js(t) = Cjr(t) where the scaling factor, C, is related to the relative antenna gain in
the direction of the jamming signal source.
Applying the same cancellation technique as before, to remove the DSI, provides an
interesting result where the jamming signal in the surveillance channel is suppressed
slightly by the DSI canceller due to its presence in both channels. The amount of
suppression is heavily dependant on the signal level in each channel relative to the
reference signal. It is therefore demonstrated that the jamming signal present in the
surveillance channel after cancellation is reduced from js(t) −→ D(τ, f)jr(t) where
D(τ, f) is a suppression factor representing the cancellation spread in both range and
Doppler along with the scaling factor C.
†This representation of the ARD map excludes the use of a DSI cancellation scheme.
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rj(t) = r(t) + jr(t)
sj(t) = srm(t) +D(τ, f)jr(t)
(3.24)
Building the ARD map from this gives
χjr/s =
∫
T
r∗(t)srm(t+ τ)e−i2piftdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
χ
+
∫
T
r∗(t)[D(τ, f)jr(t+ τ)]e−i2piftdt
+
∫
T
j∗r (t)srm(t+ τ)e
−i2piftdt
+
∫
T
j∗r (t)[D(τ, f)jr(t+ τ)]e
−i2piftdt
(3.25)
where χjr/s represents the output ARD map when jamming is applied to both the
reference and surveillance channels. Depending on the amount of suppression achieved
through the canceller and therefore the value of D(τ, f), the amount of jamming signal
seen in the output ARD map can vary.
χjr/s =
∫
T
large︷︸︸︷
r∗(t)
small︷ ︸︸ ︷
srm(t+ τ) e
−i2piftdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
χ
+
∫
T
large︷︸︸︷
r∗(t)
small︷ ︸︸ ︷
[D(τ, f)jr(t+ τ)] e
−i2piftdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
χn1
+
∫
T
small︷︸︸︷
j∗r (t)
small︷ ︸︸ ︷
srm(t+ τ) e
−i2piftdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
χn2
+
∫
T
small︷︸︸︷
j∗r (t)
small︷ ︸︸ ︷
[D(τ, f)jr(t+ τ)] e
−i2piftdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
χn3
(3.26)
∴ χjr/s = χ+ χn1 + χn2 + χn3
For low jamming powers, jr and srm are two small uncorrelated signals and the output
of their correlation is small compared to that of the other elements, resulting in a very
slightly raised noise floor from the χn2 contribution. This leaves the terms χn1 and χn3 .
Looking at χn1 , there are two uncorrelated signals but unlike with χn2 , where jr was
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small, r(t) is large and therefore the output of this correlation can lead to a significant
increase in the noise floor of the entire ARD map. χn3 contains two relatively small
signals however, since they are the same, the correlation results in a matched filter
response which causes a significant spike in the ARD map around the zero Doppler and
zero range bins. The scaling factor D(τ, f) is important here because it determines
the amount of influence each term χn1 and χn3 have on the overall ARD map. In the
case of χn3 , almost all of the zero Doppler, zero range interference is removed from
the ARD map by the canceller and therefore the term χn3 will become insignificant,
giving us an ARD map consisting of:
∴ χjr/s ≈ χ+ χn1 + χn2
The level of interference and increase in noise floor of the ARD map is therefore hugely
dependant on χn1 , which can be reduced by creating a deeper and wider null in the
canceller. It is clear that the canceller plays a major role in the performance of the
system when both channels are in the presence of jamming. This assumption will only
hold true in the case of relatively low jamming power as the other terms in the ARD
map will no longer be insignificant.
It must be noted that there are real world limitations to how deep and wide a null
can be created with the canceller, namely the ENOB of the ADC in order to capture
the full dynamic range of the reference plus echo plus jamming signal, as well as the
computational complexity of the canceller for real time output.
Further investigation into the case of jamming only the reference channel or only the
surveillance channel is presented. Jamming of only the reference channel results in
js(t) = 0. Applying the DSI cancellation algorithm before creation of the ARD map
significantly removes the direct signal, leaving only srm(t) in the surveillance channel
as shown in (3.20). The ARD map can then be constructed as
rj(t) = r(t) + jr(t)
s(t) = srm(t)
(3.27)
χjr =
∫
T
r∗(t)srm(t+ τ)e−i2piftdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
χ
+
∫
T
j∗r (t)srm(t+ τ)e
−i2piftdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
χn2
(3.28)
∴ χjr = χ+ χn2
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Because r(t) >> jr(t) and jr(t) does not appear in the surveillance channel, the
resultant effect is
∫
T
large︷︸︸︷
r∗(t)
small︷ ︸︸ ︷
srm(t+ τ) e
−i2piftdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
χ
>>
∫
T
small︷︸︸︷
j∗r (t)
small︷ ︸︸ ︷
srm(t+ τ) e
−i2piftdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
χn2
(3.29)
As is the case with very low jamming power levels relative to the transmitter power,
χn2 ≈ 0 and therefore has very little effect on the overall ARD map output. As the
jammer power increases relative to the transmitter power, this assumption no longer
holds true. It is clear then that large amounts of jamming power is required to jam
through the reference channel alone. This can also be seen by looking at the relative
JSR of the reference channel shown in (3.18).
Applying the jamming signal to only the surveillance channel results in a similar
ARD calculation but with jr(t) = 0, leading to a vastly different outcome. The DSI
cancellation algorithm is applied as usual, leaving srm(t) + js(t) in the surveillance
channel. The resultant ARD plot is determined as
r(t) = r(t)
sj(t) = srm(t) + js(t)
(3.30)
χjs =
∫
T
r∗(t)srm(t+ τ)e−i2piftdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
χ
+
∫
T
r∗(t)js(t+ τ)e−i2piftdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
χn1
(3.31)
Unlike with jamming only the reference channel, where jr(t) << r(t), jamming of
only the surveillance channel, even with very modest power, leaves js(t) ≈ srm(t).
Correlating these two signals with the reference signal results in
χjs =
∫
T
large︷︸︸︷
r∗(t)
small︷ ︸︸ ︷
srm(t+ τ) e
−i2piftdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
χ
+
∫
T
large︷︸︸︷
r∗(t)
small︷ ︸︸ ︷
js(t+ τ) e
−i2piftdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
χn4
(3.32)
50
∴ χjs = χ+ χn4
Comparing all three scenarios for the ARD map creation, it is clear that with the
addition of DSI cancellation, an FM PR will perform better if the jamming signal is
present in both the reference and surveillance channels. The best performance in the
presence of jamming is achieved when the surveillance channel is clear of the jamming
signal i.e., the jamming signal is applied to the reference channel only. This is generally
only a consideration with spatially separated reference and surveillance channels.
3.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented an overview of the FM signal structure along with a typical
FM PR processing chain. Simulations have been performed to determine the effect of
a DSI canceller on the performance of an FM PR in the presence of jamming. This
was achieved by applying a noise jamming signal to each of the radar channels, first
investigating jamming only the reference channel while maintaining a clean surveil-
lance channel and then vice versa, effectively simulating a system utilising a separated
reference and surveillance channel. Jamming was then applied to both the reference
and surveillance channels as would be the case of a system with co-located reference
and surveillance channels.
The results demonstrated in Figure 3.8 indicate that an FM PR is more vulnerable to
jamming when using separated reference and surveillance channels. Jamming only the
reference channel results in the least system performance degradation while jamming
only the surveillance channel results in the most performance degradation, more so
than when both channels are jammed (Nd = 29% vs Nd = 44%). It was shown that
this result is due to the ability of the DSI canceller to partially suppress the jamming
signal when it appears in both reference and surveillance channels.
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Chapter 4
FM Jammer Waveform Design
The results shown in Section 3.6 illustrate the importance of the DSI cancellation stage
of the FM radio based PR processing chain, not only in normal operation but also in
the presence of noise jamming. The effectiveness of noise jamming against an FM radio
based PR when the location of the receiver is known has also been demonstrated.
This chapter expands on the concepts demonstrated through noise jamming and in-
vestigates the effect of using more advanced, tone based and Wide Band FM (WBFM)
modulated waveforms broadcast on the same FM frequency channel as the reference
signal in order to determine the optimal jammer waveform. The effects of message
signal bandwidth on the jammer performance has also been investigated by varying
the modulation index, β, of the jamming signal.
The same simulation procedure that was followed in Section 3.6 was performed again,
this time to determine the effects of different jamming waveforms on the representative
FM PR. Table 3.1 once again summarises the simulation parameters used with each
simulation. As demonstrated previously, a clean simulation was performed each time
without jamming present to provide a benchmark for system performance.
The waveforms investigated include:
• Broadband AWGN jamming
• Single tone jamming on carrier and pilot tones
• Broadband AWGN jamming modulated using WBFM modulation (β = 5)
• High bandwidth message signal modulated with WBFM modulation (β = 4)
• Medium bandwidth message signal modulated using WBFM modulation (β = 2)
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• Low bandwidth message signal modulated using WBFM modulation (β = 0.25)
One of the more difficult to quantify aspects of FM PR is the specific system perfor-
mance for a given target with a given set of parameters. This difficulty is due to the
reference FM waveform itself in that the signal structure and bandwidth fluctuates
based on the on-air content over the CPI. This uncontrollable trait of the FM wave-
form results in largely non-deterministic system performance from CPI to CPI. It is
therefore difficult to quantify jamming performance in a generic way. To circumvent
this problem, the effectiveness of the attack is assessed on the level of the CFAR out-
put across multiple simulations utilising different transmit waveforms for statistical
diversity.
To build up a basic statistical profile of each jamming waveform, each scenario was
simulated multiple times, each time incrementing the JSRE, starting at 30 dB and
going as high as 70 dB. The JSRE represents the ratio of the jammer power to the
target echo power at the input terminals of the receiver antenna as described in Section
3.3. The number of detections at the output of the CFAR was then compared to the
expected number from a clean simulation where no jamming was present. Due to
the unpredictable nature of an FM waveform, this process was repeated 4 times, each
time using a different transmit waveform to allow for signal variations and outlying
anomalies. This process allows for proper quantification of the effects of each jammer
waveform. The simulation parameters used are summarised in Table 3.1.
4.1 Broadband AWGN Jamming
As demonstrated in Section 3.6, AWGN jamming has the effect of increasing system
noise such that the overall noise floor at the output ARD map was increased, poten-
tially masking the target. Using the CFAR parameters described in Table 3.1, figure
4.1 summarises the simulation output for each jamming scenario with the y-axis rep-
resenting the number of detections normalised to a clean simulation with no jamming
and the x-axis representing the applied JSR.
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(a) Jamming applied to surveillance chan-
nel only
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(b) Jamming applied to Reference and
Surveillance channels
Figure 4.1: System performance with AWGN as an attack signal.
Comparing Figures 4.1a and 4.1b it is clear that noise jamming has a relatively consis-
tent effect on the performance of the system, regardless of the on-air content transmit-
ted. Averaging the outputs across each JSRE value produces the results demonstrated
in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Performance comparison between systems with broadband noise jamming
applied. (Red) Represents when jamming was applied to both the reference and
surveillance channels. (Blue) Represents when jamming was applied to only the
surveillance channel.
The red dots represent the PR performance when the jamming signal appears in both
the reference and surveillance channels while the blue triangles represent the PR per-
formance when the jamming signal appears only in the surveillance channel. As shown
in Chapter 3.6, there is an improvement in the PR performance for the same JSRE
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when the jamming signal appears in both the reference and surveillance channels due
to the DSI canceller.
The average performance difference was assessed by comparing the number of nor-
malised detections of each graph for each JSRE, excluding the end points where the
differential was less than 1%. As demonstrated in Figure 4.2, the average difference
was an 8.8% improvement in the number of positive detections when 30 cancellation it-
erations were used. The ability to differentiate between the target and false detections
within the CFAR output diminishes drastically below the 25% detection point.
Comparing each scenario at the 25% detection point, the number of detections in-
creases by 12.3% from 20% to 32.3% when the jamming signal appears in both chan-
nels. The JSRE required to reduce the number of detections below the 25% point for
each scenario was 52 and 53 dB respectively. This indicates a 1-2 dB increase in re-
quired JSRE or, as previously adumbrated, an average improvement of 8.8% in overall
number of detections as a result of the canceller.
4.2 Single Tone Jamming
The following simulation results demonstrate the effect on the system when jamming
was applied using a single tone imposed onto the carrier frequency. Figure 4.3a demon-
strates the output of the single tone jamming simulation where peaks can be seen to
appear across the entire range profile at various Doppler frequencies where the tar-
get is shown in the red oval. Unlike when Gaussian noise jamming was used where
the overall noise floor was raised, jamming with a single tone on the carrier creates
artefacts in the output ARD map that were easy to discern as intentional jamming.
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Figure 4.3: System performance for simulated tone jamming on carrier.
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Filtering the output ARD maps through the CFAR filter (applied in the Doppler
dimension as described in Table 3.1), results in zero target detections along the sim-
ulated flight track. Applying the CFAR filter in the range dimension rather than the
Doppler dimension results in partial detections (Nd = 35%) along the flight path as
demonstrated in Figure 4.3b. The disadvantage of using a CFAR filter operating in
the range dimension for an FM PR is its sensitivity to bandwidth fluctuations.
The CFAR filter was designed to provide optimum detection performance based on the
expected background noise which, in the case of an FM radio waveform, was assumed
to be Gaussian. The high sidelobe peaks throughout the range profile results in the
background noise profile assumption to be incorrect, therefore significantly reducing
detection performance. To counter this, the CFAR filter was applied in the range
dimension instead, however, this comes with its own drawbacks. It is therefore sug-
gested that when interference of this nature is detected, a dynamically selected CFAR
dimension can be used. This way, under normal operation, a CFAR applied in the
Doppler dimension can be used to maintain its robustness and a range based CFAR
filter can be used when jamming or unintentional interference is detected. The range
based CFAR detector, under these conditions, detects only the target with zero false
detections. This could assist the tracking filter in achieving and maintaining a track
since there were no false targets.
As with the broadband AWGN, Figures 4.4a and 4.4b summarise the performance of
separated reference and surveillance and co-located reference and surveillance channels
in the presence of single tone jamming over various JSRE when the CFAR filter was
applied in the Doppler dimension.
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(a) Jamming applied to surveillance chan-
nel only
30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
Jammer to Target Echo Power [dB]
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
D
et
ec
tio
ns
 n
or
m
al
is
ed
 to
 c
le
an
 s
im
ul
at
io
n
Doppler CFAR Output for Carrier Tone Jamming at Various J/S Levels
Applied to Both Reference and Surveillance Channels
dataset 1
dataset 2
dataset 3
dataset 4
(b) Jamming applied to Reference and
Surveillance channels
Figure 4.4: System performance with tone jamming on carrier (Doppler CFAR).
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As the bandwidth of the reference signal decreases, the carrier tone and pilot tone
levels increase as illustrated in Section 3.1. This leads to an increase in jamming
effectiveness due to the increased sidelobe peaks as illustrated in Figures 4.4a and 4.4b
where the lowest bandwidth reference signal, dataset 3 (green squares), demonstrates
the largest deterioration due to jamming. Averaging the outputs across each JSRE
produces the results demonstrated in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Performance comparison between systems where carrier tone jamming
has been applied with a Doppler based CFAR detector. (Red) Represents when jam-
ming was applied to both the reference and surveillance channels. (Blue) Represents
when jamming was applied to only the surveillance channel.
The average performance difference between the two system set-ups was 11.9% while
the performance difference at the 25% mark was 21.1%. The JSRE required to reduce
the number of detections to below the 25% point for each scenario was 44 and 47 dB,
meaning that the JSRE needs to be 2-3 dB higher for the co-located system to achieve
the same degradation in performance as the separated system as a result of the DSI
canceller when applying the CFAR in the Doppler dimension.
The results of applying the CFAR filter in the range dimension are illustrated in
Figures 4.6a and 4.6b. While the performance in the presence of tone jamming was
improved, the unpredictable nature of range based CFAR applied to FM PR due to
the bandwidth and subsequent range resolution fluctuations was clear.
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(a) Jamming applied to surveillance chan-
nel only
30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
Jammer to Target Echo Power [dB]
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
D
et
ec
tio
ns
 n
or
m
al
is
ed
 to
 c
le
an
 s
im
ul
at
io
n
Range CFAR Output for Broadband Noise Jamming at Various J/S Levels
Applied to Both Reference and Surveillance Channels
dataset 1
dataset 2
dataset 3
dataset 4
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Surveillance channels
Figure 4.6: System performance with tone jamming on carrier (Range CFAR).
Averaging the outputs of Figure 4.6 across each JSRE produces the results demon-
strated in Figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.7: Performance comparison between systems where carrier tone jamming
has been applied with a range based CFAR detector. (Red) Represents when jam-
ming was applied to both the reference and surveillance channels. (Blue) Represents
when jamming was applied to only the surveillance channel.
From Figure 4.7, the average difference between the two systems was 9.1% while the
performance difference at the 25% point was 7.3%. The JSRE required to reduce the
number of detections below the 25% point for each of the scenarios was 50 and 52
dB respectively, indicating a 1-2 dB increase in required JSRE in order to achieve the
same performance degradation when jamming both channels due to the DSI canceller.
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Comparing the Doppler CFAR output to range CFAR output demonstrates that the
range CFAR was more consistent at higher levels of JSRE, while the Doppler CFAR
outperforms the range CFAR when low power or no tone jamming was present. The
downside to implementing a range CFAR for FM PR is, however, also clear from
Figure 4.6 where a low bandwidth reference signal, (dataset 3 - green squares), results
in poor range resolution. This causes the CFAR filter to break down with only 62%
of the total detections being made when no jamming was applied.
4.3 Jamming using WBFM
Additive white Gaussian noise has been shown to have the effect of raising the noise
floor while tones can be used to produce ridges throughout the range dimension of
the ARD map. To achieve any significant correlation between reference and jamming
waveforms, the deterministic components of the FM waveform need to be exploited.
As discussed in Section 3.1, there are four deterministic components with respect to
a commercial FM waveform: the carrier tone, the stereo tone, the left-right tone and
the RDS data stream.
To determine the performance of the system when the deterministic components of
the transmitted FM waveform are attacked, the following WBFM jamming waveforms
were used:
• AWGN modulated as a WBFM waveform (β = 5)
• High bandwidth message signal modulated as a WBFM waveform (β = 4)
• Medium bandwidth message signal modulated as a WBFM waveform (β = 2)
• Low bandwidth message signal modulated as a WBFM waveform (β = 0.25)
4.3.1 Noise Modulated FM Jammer (β = 5)
To create the noise modulated FM waveform, WBFM modulation was applied to a
baseband Gaussian white noise message signal, such as the one used in the Gaussian
white noise simulations, giving the jammer waveform a constant β value. The output of
the WBFM modulation was then an FM signal that when demodulated, was Gaussian
white noise.
As with unmodulated broadband Gaussian white noise, the WBFM modulated noise
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causes increasing performance degradation with increasing JSRE, however, at signifi-
cantly lower JSRE levels as demonstrated in Figures 4.8a and 4.8b.
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(a) Jamming applied to surveillance chan-
nel only
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Figure 4.8: System performance with high bandwidth FM jamming.
Averaging the outputs across each JSRE in Figures 4.8a and 4.8b produces the results
demonstrated in Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.9: Averaged CFAR performance comparison between systems where noise
modulated FM jamming has been applied. (Red) Represents when jamming was
applied to both the reference and surveillance channels. (Blue) Represents when
jamming was applied to only the surveillance channel.
Once again it was clear that, due to the DSI canceller when the jamming signal appears
in both the reference and surveillance channels, the average performance improvement
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was 10.1% compared to when the jamming signal only appears in the surveillance
channel. A 3 dB reduction in required JSRE was observed when WBFM modulation
was applied to the noise signal as seen when comparing the system performance using
modulated and unmodulated noise in Figures 4.9 and 4.2 respectively.
4.3.2 High Bandwidth FM Jammer (β = 4)
Increased tone correlation, as demonstrated with tone jamming, can be achieved by
increasing the tone levels in the jamming signal. Increasing the tone levels was achieved
by decreasing the bandwidth of the message signal at the input. To illustrate the effect
of increasing the tone levels, simulations were run where the bandwidth of the jammer
message signal, m(t), was varied. The results of a high bandwidth message signal
(β = 4).
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(a) Jamming applied to surveillance chan-
nel only
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Figure 4.10: System performance with high bandwidth FM jamming.
Averaging the outputs across each JSRE in Figures 4.10a and 4.10b produces the
results demonstrated in Figure 4.11.
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Figure 4.11: Averaged CFAR performance comparison between systems where high
bandwidth music FM jamming has been applied. (Red) Represents when jamming
was applied to both the reference and surveillance channels. (Blue) Represents when
jamming was applied to only the surveillance channel.
The WBFM jamming signals with similar bandwidths produce similar jamming perfor-
mance, as illustrated in Figures 4.9 and 4.11 where both jamming signals have similar
β values. The JSRE required to reduce the relative PR system performance by 75%
was 50 and 51 dB when applied to only the surveillance and then the reference and
surveillance respectively, for both the noise modulated FM and high bandwidth FM
jamming.
High bandwidth FM jamming performs marginally better at lower JSRE, and was
almost identical to noise modulated FM jamming as the JSRE increases. This implies
that the slightly lower β value found in the high bandwidth FM jammer waveform
results in slightly higher pilot levels and therefore marginally increased integration
gain. This indicates that the content itself was insignificant to the performance of the
jammer, and rather the β value of the resultant message signal, m(t), that has the
biggest influence on the jamming performance of a WBFM jamming signal.
4.3.3 Medium Bandwidth FM Jammer (β = 2)
Reducing the β value of the modulated FM jamming signal from β = 4 to β = 2 results
in an increase in the carrier tone levels. To demonstrate the effect of lowering β, a
WBFM was applied to a medium bandwidth message signal (β = 2) as demonstrated
in Figure 4.12 and used as the jamming signal.
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(a) Jamming applied to surveillance chan-
nel only
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Figure 4.12: System performance with medium bandwidth FM jamming.
Averaging the outputs across each JSRE produces the results demonstrated in Figure
4.13.
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Figure 4.13: Performance comparison between systems with medium bandwidth mu-
sic FM jamming being applied. (Red) Represents when jamming was applied to both
the reference and surveillance channels. (Blue) Represents when jamming was ap-
plied to only the surveillance channel.
The results demonstrated in Figure 4.13 illustrate the effect of using a jamming signal
with a lower β value, i.e. with medium bandwidth. Even at low power levels, the ability
of the system to detect a target was greatly diminished. The average performance
difference between the two system set-ups was 10.8%. The JSRE required to reduce
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the number of detections to below the 25% point for each scenario was 48 and 49 dB,
meaning that the JSRE needs to be 1-2 dB higher for the co-located system to achieve
the same degradation in performance as the separated system.
4.3.4 Low Bandwidth FM Jammer (β = 0.25)
Decreasing the bandwidth further to β = 0.25, results in a significant increase in
the tone levels within the jamming waveform. Figure 4.14 illustrates the output of
simulations using a WBFM jamming waveform with a β = 0.25.
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(a) Jamming applied to surveillance chan-
nel only
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Surveillance channels
Figure 4.14: System performance with low bandwidth FM jamming
Averaging the outputs across each JSRE produces the results demonstrated in Figure
4.15.
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Figure 4.15: Performance comparison between systems with low bandwidth music
FM jamming being applied. (Red) Represents when jamming was applied to both the
reference and surveillance channels. (Blue) Represents when jamming was applied
to only the surveillance channel.
As with all the simulations, applying the jamming waveform in only the surveillance
channel results in the greatest reduction in PR performance. The average difference
in performance between the two system set-ups was 9%. Comparing the results from
Figure 4.15 to the results demonstrated in Figures 4.9, 4.11 and 4.13, it is clear that
when using a WBFM jamming waveform, the relative system performance decreases
with decreasing β.
4.4 Discussion of Results
To evaluate whether the FM PR was jammed or rendered ineffective, a base level of
acceptable performance needs to be defined. For the purpose of this study, a system
was defined as effectively jammed when its detection performance was below 25%. To
compare the performance of each jamming waveform against each other, the results of
each simulation were plotted on a single set of axis as demonstrated in Figures 4.16
and 4.17 where jamming applied to the surveillance channel only and then to both the
reference and surveillance channels respectively.
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Figure 4.16: Combined averaged plots for each jamming waveform across various
JSRE when applied in only the surveillance channel.
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Figure 4.17: Combined averaged plots for each jamming waveform across various
JSRE when applied to both the reference and surveillance channels.
Analysing the results from Figures 4.16 and 4.17 illustrates that the most effective form
of jamming an FM PR was when the deterministic components of the FM waveform
were attacked. Noise jamming has a consistent and predictable effect on the system
since the receiver becomes more and more desensitised as the JSRE increases. The same
performance degradation curve was seen when using high bandwidth WBFM jamming,
however, the curve itself was shifted to the left indicating that lower jamming power
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was required to achieve the same level of effectiveness e.g., 56 dB JSRE was required
to reduce the number of detections to below 25% when using noise jamming but only
51 dB JSRE was required when using high bandwidth WBFM jamming.
This result demonstrates that the message signal content itself, m(t), was insignificant
to the performance of the jammer, and rather it was the β value of the modulated
signal that plays the dominant role. This was due to the increase in carrier tone
levels as the bandwidth, and subsequently β decreases while the average power of
the transmitted spectrum remains constant as defined by (3.10) in Section 3.1. The
closer the waveform tends towards absolute tone jamming, the more the sidelobe peaks
become apparent in the output ARD maps as demonstrated in Figures 4.18(a-e). While
the reference message signal bandwidth can not be controlled by a jammer operator, a
combination of both low jammer message signal bandwidth and low reference message
signal bandwidth and high bandwidth fluctuations across a single CPI leads to to
improved jamming effectiveness.
Evaluating the background noise in the output ARD for each jamming waveform in
Figures 4.18(b-f) compared to when no jamming is applied in Figure 4.18(a), illustrates
that as β decreases, the background noise of the ARDs becomes less Gaussian. The
SNR of the target in each plot was significantly impacted, going from 42.2 dB when
no jamming was present to 13.2 dB with β = 5, 11.7 dB with β = 4, 12.9 dB with
β = 2 and 11.3 dB with β = 0.25 (when JSRE = 50 dB).
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(a) Single target shown with no jam-
ming.
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(b) WBFM Gaussian white noise jam-
ming.
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(c) High bandwidth (β = 4) WBFM
jamming.
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(d) Medium bandwidth (β = 2) WBFM
jamming.
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(e) Low bandwidth (β = 0.25) WBFM
jamming.
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(f) Single tone jamming applied on the
carrier.
Figure 4.18: ARD output for each jamming waveform for simulations where JSRE =
50 dB, compared to the clean simulation, with target highlighted in red oval.
The effect of carrier tone jamming on the CFAR output is severe. Carrier tone jamming
causes large sidelobe peaks to appear throughout the Doppler profile of the ARD
plot. This in turn, causes a target that appears near these peaks to be masked,
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leading to a dramatic reduction in CFAR detection performance. The reduction in
CFAR performance was due to the CFAR filter operating on the assumption that the
ARD background noise was Gaussian due to the Gaussian-like properties of the FM
waveform. As a result, when carrier tone jamming was applied, the high peaks and
low troughs cause the background reference cells to behave in a non-Gaussian fashion,
severely degrading the detection performance of the filter.
Table 4.1 summarises the results of using different jamming waveforms where the
jamming was applied to both the reference and surveillance channels and when it was
applied to only the surveillance channel. The relative performance differences between
the two scenarios were also indicated in the table.
Table 4.1: Summary of the required JSRE for a desired reduction in system
performance∗ given a specific jamming waveform.
Number of J/SE required to reduce detection
CGLS iterations
Jammer Waveform
performance by X% referenced to the clean simulation
Iterations Gaussian White Noise 25% 50% 75% 100% Delta at 25% Ave Delta
30 Surveillance Only 48 dB 51 dB 53 dB 57 dB
30 Reference and Surveillance 49 dB 52 dB 54 dB 58 dB
12.3% 8.8%
Iterations Noise Modulated FM (β = 5) 25% 50% 75% 100% Delta at 25% Ave Delta
30 Surveillance Only 45 dB 48 dB 50 dB 55 dB
30 Reference and Surveillance 46 dB 49 dB 51 dB 56 dB
11% 10.1%
Iterations High BW FM (β = 4) 25% 50% 75% 100% Delta at 25% Ave Delta
30 Surveillance Only 45 dB 48 dB 50 dB 54 dB
30 Reference and Surveillance 46 dB 49 dB 51 dB 55 dB
12.2% 10%
Iterations Medium BW FM (β = 2) 25% 50% 75% 100% Delta at 25% Ave Delta
30 Surveillance Only 42 dB 45 dB 48 dB 54 dB
30 Reference and Surveillance 44 dB 46 dB 49 dB 55 dB
11.8% 10.8%
Iterations Low BW FM (β = 0.25) 25% 50% 75% 100% Delta at 25% Ave Delta
30 Surveillance Only 40 dB 43 dB 46 dB 53 dB
30 Reference and Surveillance 41 dB 44 dB 48 dB 54 dB
8.7% 9%
Iterations Carrier Tone (Doppler CFAR) 25% 50% 75% 100% Delta at 25% Ave Delta
30 Surveillance Only 38 dB 42 dB 44 dB 50 dB
30 Reference and Surveillance 40 dB 44 dB 47 dB 55 dB
21.1% 11.9%
Iterations Carrier Tone (Range CFAR) 25% 50% 75% 100% Delta at 25% Ave Delta
30 Surveillance Only 37 dB 45 dB 50 dB 63 dB
30 Reference and Surveillance 40 dB 47 dB 52 dB 65 dB
5.8% 6.3%
* The system performance indicated here is representative of the system as described in Table 3.1
where jamming was applied to both the reference and surveillance channels and 30 iterations of
CGLS DSI cancellation was used.
4.5 Chapter Summary
The effects of various jamming waveforms applied to FM PR have been investigated
and the results have been summarised in Table 4.1. It has been shown that the most
effective jamming waveform was a single tone transmitted on the same centre frequency
as the reference signal being used by the FM PR. It has also been demonstrated that
when the jamming signal appears in both the reference and surveillance channels,
the DSI canceller can improve the performance of an FM PR by approximately 10%
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on average when compared to a system where the jamming signal appears in only
the surveillance channel. The importance of knowledge of the receiver location is
demonstrated in Appendix A where the required jamming power for different scenarios
is demonstrated.
Since FM waveforms have a constant average power, approximated by (3.10), by de-
creasing the number of sidebands required to accurately represent the message signal,
(decreasing β), the carrier tone levels increase as demonstrated in Figure 3.1. As the
jamming signal becomes more tone-like, severe artefacts start to appear across the
range profile in the ARD map output. Applying a CFAR filter to the ARD map in
the Doppler domain results in complete masking of the target as the peaks lead to
a change in the background noise model of the system which causes the CFAR filter
assumptions to break down, resulting in incorrect threshold levels, further degrading
system performance. Applying the CFAR filter in the range dimension improves the
performance slightly from 0% detections to 35% detections relative to the case when
no jamming is applied. It is clear from these results that an appropriate ES receiver
is required in order to detect the presence of jamming and for the PR to put measures
in place to try counter any potential jamming. One possible counter measure would
be to dynamically switch to applying the CFAR filter in the range dimension when
single tone jamming is detected. Another could be to dynamically increase the depth
of the cancellation null to attempt to further suppress the jamming signal. Monitoring
the channel impulse response (zero-Doppler line) in an attempt to locate additional
peaks caused by the jammer could be implemented. This could possibly also assist in
detecting the presence of noise-jamming.
For more advanced receiver systems, tone blanking or suppression could potentially
be used as an effective counter to tone jamming on any of the pilot tones. This would
be accomplished by removing the pilot tones from the surveillance channel before
processing. This would not, however, counter tones that were broadcast at arbitrary
frequencies within the FM channel spectrum or pilots whose spectral content is rapidly
fluctuating as is often the case. For this, a new CFAR filter will be required that takes
into account the change in the statistical profile of the background noise as a result of
the jamming.
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Chapter 5
Measured FM Passive Radar
Results
To verify the results of the simulations in Chapter 4, measurements were made using
a real PR at UCT. The system used for these measurements was the ComRAD3 PR
radar system by Peralex [113]. The ComRAD3 system is a 3 channel direct conversion
wideband receiver that covers the entire FM band from 88 MHz to 108 MHz.
The measured results illustrate the performance of the two most contrasting simulated
jamming waveforms, wide-band noise jamming and a single tone on the carrier. Due
to the uncontrollable nature of the FM transmit waveform, demonstrating the two
edge cases provides the most repeatable and deterministic results to compare with the
simulations shown in Chapter 4.
5.1 System set-up
The system specifications used for the field measurements were identical to those used
in the simulations with the exception of the basic system geometry, centre frequency,
cancellation bin size, clutter model, target size and Swerling model. The complete sys-
tem parameters for the measurements can be found in Table 5.2 while the parameters
that differ from the ones used in the simulations are outlined in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Differences between FERS simulated system parameters and the measured
system parameters.
Parameters Simulation Measurement
Carrier Frequency 89 MHz 91.1 MHz
Cancellation Bins 5 range, 5 Doppler 120 range, 5 Doppler
Clutter None Environmental
Target 23 dBsm, Swerling 0 Boeing 737-800
It must be noted that the difference between the simulated and measured cancellation
bins (5 vs. 120) is due to the lack of simulated clutter. This means that only the direct
signal i.e. zero range and Doppler bins, were required to be cancelled and increasing the
number of range bins past the first few achieve little more than increase the processing
overhead. Figure 5.2 shows the antenna set-up used for the field trials. It can be
seen that there were a total of 3 antennas, two surveillance antennas situated below a
reference antenna. The reference and surveillance antennas were perpendicular to each
other with the reference antenna pointing towards the Piketberg transmitter [149] and
the surveillance antennas pointed towards the Cape Town International airport with
a slight upwards tilt. The complete system geometry is demonstrated in Figure 5.1
where the ADS-B tracks of the three detected targets can be seen. This is the same
system set-up that was used in [94].
The transmitter to receiver baseline distance was 118.5 km between the UCT receiver
site and the Piketberg transmit site. The Piketberg transmitter, which transmits FM
radio using a vertically polarised dipole antenna with channel center frequencies of
88.0 MHz, 91.1 MHz, 94.3 MHz, 97.6 MHz, 101.1 MHz, 104.7 MHz and 107.6 MHz,
each with an ERP of 10 kW. Further details regarding the transmitter can be found in
[149]. It was observed that 91.1 MHz exhibited higher average bandwidth and better
channel separation than the other channels and was therefore chosen as the channel
of choice for the field trials.
The power difference between the reference and surveillance channels ranged between
7 dB and 15 dB with the average difference typically above 10 dB. This separation
was achieved by stacking the reference and surveillance antennas vertically and per-
pendicularly to each other as demonstrated in Figure 5.2.
While the ComRAD3 system is capable of digitising 3 channels coherently (two surveil-
lance and one reference, as evident by the 3 antennas), only a single reference and single
surveillance antenna were used for these trials. Channel 1 was used as the reference
channel and channel 3 as the surveillance channels. For these field trials, channels 1
and 3 were used as they offered the greatest channel separation. Channel 2 was not
used.
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Table 5.2: System parameters used for measurement campaign.
Transmitter (Tx)
Antenna Beam Pattern Isotropic
Antenna Gain 2.15 dBi
Antenna Altitude 850 m
Carrier Frequency 91.1 MHz
ERP 10 kW
Waveform Commercial FM radio
Reference and Surveillance Receivers (Rx)
Antenna Beam Pattern Sinc
Antenna Gain 7.2 dBi
Antenna Altitude 140 m
LO Error 50 ppb (std. dev. of 0.01 Hz @ 204.8 kSps)
Noise Figure 4 dB
Digitisation 204.8 kSps complex, 16 bit quantisation
Tx to Rx Baseline 118 500 m
Target
Initial Altitude NA
Final Altitude NA
Velocity 100 - 300 m/s
RCS @ 91.1 MHz Unknown
Jammer
Antenna Beam Pattern isotropic
Antenna Gain 2.15 dBi
Transmit Power -35 dBm before antenna gain
Carrier Frequency 91.1 MHz
Waveform AWGN, Sine wave on carrier
Processing Parameters
DSI Cancellation 120 range, 5 Doppler bins
DSI Cancellation CPI 102400 samples (0.5s)
Range/Doppler Processing 120 range, 1601 Doppler bins
Range/Doppler CPI 819200 samples (4s)
CFAR Algorithm GOCA-CFAR
CFAR Window 4 guard cells, 8 reference cells (either side of CUT)
CFAR Dimension Doppler (Robust against bandwidth fluctuations)
CFAR Threshold Pfa = 10
−5 (exponential noise model)
Due to licensing restrictions, a 10 W jammer could not be used within the FM band
[150]. To overcome this, a very low power jamming signal was used (-35 dBm) and
placed 24 m from the receive site as demonstrated in Figure 5.2. The jammer antenna
used was a dipole antenna with a gain of 2.15 dBi. The placement of the jammer, 45
degrees between both the reference and surveillance antennas were chosen to ensure
both the surveillance and reference channels experience the same jamming power levels.
By adjusting the jammer transmit power, an effective JSR that allows comparisons
between the measured and simulated results to be made.
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Figure 5.1: System geometry for field trials in the Western Cape of South Africa.
The transmitter location is shown in the top center of the image labelled Piketberg
Transmitter. The receiver site can be found in the center left of the map labelled
Menzies Building. There are 3 flight paths that are most commonly used by com-
mercial airliners, shown in green (A), red (B) and blue (C) as tracked by ADS-B
data for the three targets detected in the trials.
Figure 5.2 shows the view of the radar receiver antennas from the jammer antenna
location. It is noted that this form of ideal placement is highly unlikely due to the lack
of knowledge of receiver location in real world scenarios. With this in mind, further
experiments are required to evaluate the effects of jammer location relative to the
receiver.
In order to compare the measured results with the simulated results shown in Section
3.6, the JSR on the reference and surveillance channels needs to be the same across
both the simulated and measured scenarios. The direct signal power was calculated
using (3.14) as shown in (5.1).
Prdirect =
PtGtGrλ
2
(4piR)2
=
(16 400)(107.2/10)(91.1×10
6
3×108 )
2
(4pi × 118 500)2 W
= −55 dBm
(5.1)
The jammer power at the receiver was calculated in the same way using (5.1). With
the jammer situated 45 degrees off boresight of the reference antenna, as well as being
below it, the gain of the antenna was reduced by approximately 4 dB from 7.2 dBi to
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Reference Antenna
Surveillance Antenna
Jammer Location
Figure 5.2: (Left) Reference and surveillance antennas set-up on the roof of the Men-
zies building at UCT. The top antenna was the reference antenna, pointing towards
the Piketberg transmitter. The bottom two antennas were surveillance antennas,
perpendicular to the reference antenna and pointing towards the Cape Town Inter-
national airport. (Right) Radar antenna set-up as seen from the jammer location
approximately 24 meters apart.
3.2 dBi. Transmitting at a power of -35 dBm results in a received power level of -89.6
dBm at the reference antenna before cable losses.
Prjam =
(10−65/10)(102.15/10)(103.2/10)(91.1×10
6
3×108 )
2
(4pi × 24)2 W
= −89.6 dBm
(5.2)
This results in a Jamming-to-Signal ratio on reference channel (JSRreference) of -31.6 dB
with 2 dB of cable loss. This was directly comparable to the JSRreference in the simulated
results for a 5 W jammer as shown in (3.18). The JSRE varied from measurement to
measurement depending on where the target was as well as targets incident angle.
Assuming a calculated RCS of 23 dBsm, the resultant measured JSRE was determined
using (3.16). This gives a JSRE of between approximately 40 dB and 46 dB depending
on target location along the flight path and its incident angle. It is important to
observe that this range of JSRE was situation specific and will be different in reality
because our simulation assumed a non-fluctuating target RCS of 23 dBsm. In our
field-measurement results, there is, however, no means to accurately arrive at such an
absolute target RCS value.
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5.2 Measured Noise Jamming
The measurement was performed to compare the initial simulated results using Gaus-
sian white noise jamming with measured data. The system was set-up as described in
Section 5.1.
As demonstrated in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, a single target was visible in both ARD maps.
Figure 5.3 shows a single Boeing 737-800 approaching the Cape Town international
airport to land. Turning on the jammer and waiting 4 seconds (one CPI later), results
in a raised noise floor as demonstrated in Figure 5.4 where the target echo was clearly
masked slightly by the increased interference.
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
B
is
ta
tic
 D
op
pl
er
 [
H
z]
Bistatic Range [m]
120 000 125 000 130 000 135 000 140 000 145 000 150 000
Amplitude/Range/Doppler Map
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
-30
-35
-40
Figure 5.3: ARD map for measured system with no jamming applied. The target, a
Boeing 737-800 flying towards the Cape Town international airport is shown in the
red oval (127 km, 6 Hz). The targets’ ADSB track is shown by the green track (A)
in Figure 5.1 where RTx = 112 km and RRx = 15 km.
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Figure 5.4: ARD map for measured system in the presence of AWGN jamming
applied to both channels. The target is shown in the red oval and it is clear that there
is a reduction in performance compared to the case of no jamming, demonstrated in
Figure 5.3.
5.3 Measured Single Tone Jamming
Jamming of the PR through the use of a single tone on the carrier frequency was also
investigated and compared to the simulated results. To achieve this, the system was
set up such that the jammer transmits the waveform demonstrated in Figure 3.5.
With lack of funding to conduct a trial using cooperative targets flying a pre-defined
flight path and an FM transmitter broadcasting the same content for each pass over,
a compromise needed to be made. In order to maintain consistency in the results,
each result needs to be evaluated on its own merits. To achieve this, the jammer was
triggered on and off in 20 second bursts, equivalent to 5 CPIs. This allowed us to
observe the performance of the system with a given target both with and without the
presence of jamming. Obviously the target will move in the 20 second period and the
broadcast content will be different, however it was felt that this at least allows the
effects of the jamming to be observed on the same target.
Figure 5.5 demonstrates the output of the radar system with two targets clearly visible,
as highlighted by the red ovals. Turning on the jammer and processing the data for
another CPI results in Figure 5.6. The targets are highlighted by the red ovals where
it was clear that the target was masked by the artefacts that appear across the entire
range profile, as was the case in the simulated results in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 5.5: ARD map for measured system in the absence of jamming. Two targets
are visible, highlighted by red ovals. The target at (-128 km, 15 Hz) is shown to be
travelling towards the airport as it comes in to land, tracked by the blue track (C) in
Figure 5.1, with RTx = 121 km and RRx = 8 km. The second target at (-149 km, -5
Hz) is shown to be travelling away from Cape Town by the red track (B) in Figure
5.1, with RTx = 132 km and RRx = 17 km.
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Figure 5.6: ARD map for measured system output in the presence of single tone
jamming on the carrier frequency, applied to both the reference and surveillance
channels. This map is produced 1 CPI (4 seconds) after the map demonstrated in
Figure 5.5.
Passing the output ARDs through the CFAR filter in the Doppler dimension results in
missed target detections. Figure 5.7 shows the result of applying the CFAR detector to
the output ARDs of the measured system. The result was achieved by recording data
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in the absence of jamming for 20 seconds (5 CPIs) and then turning on the jammer,
transmitting a single tone on the carrier for 20 seconds (5 CPIs). The jammer was
then toggled off again for another 20 seconds. This was plotted in Figure 5.7 where the
green arrows represent normal operation and the red arrows represent the time when
the jammer was active. Both targets were clearly detected without jamming present
and were completely masked when jamming was present.
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Figure 5.7: Combined CFAR output showing the two targets in Figures 5.5 and 5.6
as they progress along their flight paths. The green arrows indicate where the target
is tracked in the absence of jamming. The red arrows indicate the missed detections
when jamming is applied. The CFAR filter in this output is applied in the Doppler
dimension.
5.4 Chapter Summary
To validate some of the simulated results shown in Chapter 4, a representative mea-
surement was performed using a real FM PR. The PR used for the measurement
campaign was a commercial PR from Peralex electronics, the ComRAD3 [113]. Due
to lack of funding, a complete measurement campaign with cooperative targets could
not be achieved, however measurements were taken to demonstrate the validity of the
simulated results in Chapter 4.
To perform the measurement campaign, the real FM PR was placed on the rooftop of
Menzies building at UCT. To circumvent having to transmit at relatively high power,
the jammer was placed on an adjacent rooftop, 24 m from the PR receiver antennas.
The jammer power was chosen such that the JSR between the reference transmitter
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and the jammer signal at the terminals of the PR receiver antenna was the same for
both the measured and simulated results. Targets were then tracked for a period of
time before the jammer was toggled on, this allowed for the targets to be clearly visible
by the system to the targets being masked by the jamming. The jammer was then
toggled off and the targets were once again detected by the system in their expected
location as illustrated in Figure 5.7.
The measured results were shown to match the simulated results where the effectiveness
of applying tone jamming to an FM PR was demonstrated. It was shown that peaks
could be inserted across the range profile at various Dopplers when a tone was used as
the jamming waveform, as was the case in the simulations. The system noise floor was
also shown to increase as expected from the simulated scenario when noise jamming
was applied to the FM PR.
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Chapter 6
DVB-T2 Passive Radar
The second generation of terrestrial Digital Video Broadcast, called DVB-T2, is in-
creasingly being deployed world-wide [82]. Germany, for example, is entirely serviced
by DVB-T2. Over the past decade there have been numerous PR demonstrators de-
signed and developed to operate with the original terrestrial digital video broadcast
standard, DVB-T [65, 83–90]. Now, however, PR are being adapted to utilise the
increasingly widespread DVB-T2 standard [91–95].
Digital broadcast protocols have the advantage that they have high and constant
bandwidth compared to traditional analogue systems. The wider bandwidths provided
by digital broadcast services yield finer PR range resolution, however these systems
are not without their drawbacks as discussed in Section 6.1. DVB-T2 is an evolution
of DVB-T that introduces a high level of flexibility to the standard. This higher
level of flexibility allows for use of the standard in a wider range of transmission
environments and support for higher data rate transmissions. Another advantage of
digital transmissions such as DVB-T2 is that the reference signal can be ‘demodulated’
and ‘remodulated’ to create a perfect, noise free reference for use as a matched filter.
The demodulation process is implemented using a similar process to what is found in a
standard commercial TV sets. Once the signal has been demodulated, the process can
be reversed and the signal can be remodulated to represent the exact signal that was
transmitted but this time without any features of the propagation channel (noise and
interference). The technique is commonly referred to as ‘demod-remod’. The exact
demod-remod process will not be covered in any further detail as it is not within the
scope of this work however, it has been extensively covered in [93, 100, 103, 151] while
the open standard can be found in [99].
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6.1 DVB-T2 Signal Overview
The DVB-T2 signal is an OFDM signal with a pre-defined, standard structure where
the number of sub-carriers is dependent on the operating mode. The DVB-T2 signal
has 3 levels of abstraction, a super frame which carries multiple smaller T2 frames, each
of which contain symbols carrying content data. The maximum length of a super frame
is 63.75 seconds if Future Extension Frames (FEFs) are not used which corresponds
to 255 T2 frames of 250 ms each. If FEFs are used, each super frame is 127.5 seconds
long. The number of data symbols in each T2 frame depends on the length of each
symbol. If, for example, each symbol is 32K (32 768 samples) long, then a total of 60
useful symbols can fit into each frame [99]. Each symbol carries data using a variation
Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM).
In order to work with a DVB-T2 signal, it is important understand how each T2
frame is constructed. The basic time domain structure of a T2 frame is demonstrated
in Figure 6.1.
P2 P2 G1
Data Symbol
1
G2
Data Symbol
2
Gn-1
Data Symbol
n-1 Gn
Data Symbol
nP1 G
Figure 6.1: Single T2 frame structure illustrating the position of the P1 symbol,
followed by the guard symbol and the P2 symbol before the data symbols.
The frame begins with the P1 symbol. The P1 symbol is used to speed up channel
search and allows for basic timing and coarse frequency offset correction between the
receiver and the transmitter. The P1 symbol is a 1K (1024 samples) OFDM symbol
that consists of three distinct parts A, B, C. The P1 symbol also contains information
concerning the FFT size (32K, 16K, 8K, 4K, 2K and 1K) of the remaining OFDM sym-
bols (P2 and Data) within the frame and whether either MISO or SISO transmission
is being used.
After the P1 symbol, a P2 symbol and a number of data symbols follow. The number
of data symbols within the frame is dependent on the FFT size specified by P1. The
P2 and data symbols contain pilot tones which are known reference values spaced at
different frequency carriers and symbol indices within each symbol. Pilot tones are
used by a receiver for channel estimation, timing and fine frequency offset correction.
The P2 symbols contain the relevant Layer-1 (L1) signalling, split into L1-pre signaling
and L1-post signaling, as well as a highly dense pilot pattern. The number of pilot tones
within a P2 symbol is much higher than the number of pilot tones in a data symbol
and is dependent on the parameters given by P1. The L1 signalling provides the means
to demodulate the DVB-T2 frame and extract information. This information includes
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the number of data symbols, the constellation size as well as the pilot pattern present
within the data symbols.
The data symbols contain the data and pilots grouped into Physical Layer Pipes
(PLP). The pilots can be further divided into Scattered Pilots (SP) and Continual
Pilots (CP). The SP are spread in symbol and frequency bins in one of 8 pre-defined
patterns using a Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) mapping scheme (specified by the
L1 information) as highlighted in Table C.1 in Appendix C. The CP are placed at the
same sub-carrier index for all data symbols in a frame. The sub-carrier index of the
CP is dependent on the scattered pilot pattern in use and the FFT size of each symbol.
Each PLP in the data symbol contains their own constellation mapping (Quadrature
Phase Shift Keying (QPSK), 16-QAM, 64-QAM or 256-QAM), where the number and
configuration of each PLP is given by the L1 information. Any remaining cells in the
DVB-T2 frame are filled with either auxiliary streams, which are transmitter specific
and are not required for demodulation, or dummy cells, which are empty cells.
Table 6.1: DVB-T2 signal parameters used in the Cape Town Area
Parameters Value
FFT Size 32768 E
Active Carriers 27841
Pilot Pattern PP4
Tu 3584 µs
Tg 224 µs (1/16)
Subcarrier Spacing 279 Hz
Bandwidth 7.77 MHz
P2 Pilot Amplitude
√
37/5
Continual Pilot Amplitude 8/3
Scattered Pilot amplitude 7/4
Scattered Pilot: Separation of pilot bearing carriers 12
Scattered Pilots: Number of symbols forming one
scattered pilot sequence 2
P2 Encoding 64 QAM
Data Encoding 256 QAM
Number of Continual Pilots 178
Scattered Pilots per Symbol 1159+
Total Pilots per Symbol∗ 1196
* Where the scattered pilots fall on the same frequency bin as the continual
pilots, the amplitude is set to the scattered pilot amplitude.
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6.2 Range-Doppler Ambiguities
As with most OFDM based communication protocols, pilot carriers are utilised which
have pre-defined patterns. These pilot carriers lead to ambiguities within the ARD
map due to their periodicity and raised amplitude levels. To evaluate these ambiguities,
the AF of a single DVB-T2 frame containing 32K symbols is illustrated in Figure 6.2.
The AF is a two-dimensional function of time delay and Doppler shift and is described
mathematically using (6.1):
χ(τ, v) =
∫ ∞
−∞
r(t)r∗(t− τ)e−j2pivtdt (6.1)
where τ and v represent the time delay and Doppler shift respectively. The peaks
Figure 6.2: 3D AF of a frame within the DVB-T2 signal.
seen in Figure 6.2 are due to the boosted CP and SP within the frame (PP4 in this
instance). The CP are on the same frequency bins throughout the DVB-T2 frame
which creates low amplitude ridges across the range profile at fixed Doppler frequencies.
While these ridges are not clearly visible above the noise floor in Figure 6.2, they
are illustrated clearly in Figure 6.3 where the Cross-ambiguity Function (CAF) of
the CP is shown. The SP can be seen scattered around the range-Doppler map in a
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pattern defined by the cyclic nature of their positioning within the DVB-T2 frame. The
mathematical representation for the positions of the ambiguities is described in detail
in [83, 84, 86, 89]. The ambiguities and their influence on target detection depends
heavily on the transmit mode and pilot pattern used. The three main ambiguity regions
are highlighted as intra-symbol, guard and inter-symbol ambiguities as demonstrated
in Figure 6.2.
6.2.1 A. Intra-symbol Ambiguities
Intra-symbol ambiguities refer to ambiguities corresponding to 0 < τ < Tu. This
leads to ambiguities in both range and Doppler. These peaks are due to the boosted
pilot amplitudes relative to the data symbols as highlighted in Table C.1 in Appendix
C. The intra-symbol ambiguities need to be addressed with regardless of the symbol
length as they are always present in the system unlike the other ambiguities which
may or may not appear depending on the symbol length.
Range Ambiguities
The SP pattern causes peaks in fast-time that repeat every 1
Ps·Cs seconds, where Ps is
the number of carriers between each pilot and Cs is the carrier spacing.
Doppler Ambiguities
Since the CP pattern repeats every N symbols, there is also periodicity over slow-time.
The symbol length, Tu, corresponds to a periodicity every
1
N ·Tu Hz in Doppler.
6.2.2 B. Guard Interval Ambiguities
Guard interval ambiguities are a result of the guard intervals at delays equal to Tu.
The guard intervals between symbols are repetitions of the end of each succeeding
symbol. These repetitive symbols result in ambiguities that only appear at regular
intervals equal to Tu as seen in Figure 6.2 where τ = 3.584 ms for a 32K symbol with
a 2K guard [93]. In this case, the guard interval ambiguities appear well outside the
detection range of the system at greater than 1 000 km.
6.2.3 C. Inter-symbol Ambiguities
Inter-symbol ambiguities refer to ambiguities corresponding to τ > Tu. Inter-symbol
ambiguities arise from SP pattern repetition every N symbols, which results in addi-
tional ambiguities appearing at a delays of n ·N ·Tu seconds. For systems utilising 1K,
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2K or 4K modes, this potentially falls within the detection range however, when 8K,
16K or 32K modes are used, these ambiguities fall well outside the detection range of
a typical system as highlighted in Table 6.2 where the guard interval range represents
the bistatic range at which guard interval and inter-symbol ambiguities will appear.
Table 6.2: DVB-T2 OFDM symbol guard intervals for different FFT sizes.
FFT
Size
Tu [ms]
Guard Interval
Range [km]
Guard Interval [ms]
1/128 1/32 1/16 19/256 1/8 19/128 1/4
1k 0.112 34 NA NA 0.007 NA 0.014 NA 0.028
2k 0.224 67 NA 0.007 0.014 NA 0.028 NA 0.056
4k 0.448 134 NA 0.014 0.028 NA 0.056 NA 0.112
8k 0.896 268 0.007 0.028 0.056 0.0665 0.112 0.133 0.224
16k 1.792 537 0.014 0.056 0.112 0.133 0.224 0.266 0.448
32k 3.584 1075 0.028 0.112 0.224 0.266 0.448 0.532 NA
6.3 Quantifying Pilot Effects
Since the AF is a linear process, it can be broken down into the individual contributions
of each component. To get a comprehensive understanding of the individual effects of
each component within the DVB-T2 signal, the AF of each component including the
data symbols, the CP, the SP and the P2 symbol pilots is calculated.
6.3.1 Continual Pilot Effects
Figure 6.3 illustrates the CAF of the CP after demod-remod where all other signal
components set to zero and the original demod-remod signal. The CP pattern consists
of raised carriers appearing on the same carriers across time. This causes ridges that
appear along delay. Where a SP falls on the same carrier as the CP, the CP is set to
the same amplitude as the SP. This results in a pulse train along the carrier where the
two pilots combine, leading to an additional peak forming on top of the CP ridge in the
same arrangement as the SP peaks in Figure 6.4. The contribution of the CP ridges to
the AF is relatively small since they appear only 2 dB above the noise floor. The peaks
caused by the SP appearing on the same carriers as the CP, however, appear 13 dB
above the noise floor. The peak levels are governed by the amplitude level of the pilots
which change depending on the FFT size as highlighted in Table C.2 in Appendix C.
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Figure 6.3: Continual pilot ambiguity function
6.3.2 Scattered Pilot Effects
Figure 6.4 illustrates the CAF of the SP where all other carriers set to zero with the
original demod-remod signal.
Figure 6.4: Scattered pilot ambiguity function
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As with the AF demonstrated in Figure 6.2, the SP AF exhibits peaks which are
periodic in both range and Doppler. The SP contribute significant power to the AF
as the peaks appear 33 dB above the noise floor, compared to 13 dB for the CP.
Along with the guard interval ambiguities (which are not shown here due to their delay
being impractical for a real 32K system), the final contribution to the AF is the P2
pilot pattern.
6.3.3 P2 Pilot Effects
Figure 6.5 illustrates the CAF of the P2 symbol pilots after demod-remod where all
other components set to zero with the original demod-remod signal.
Figure 6.5: P2 pilot ambiguity function.
It is clear from Figure 6.5 that the P2 symbol contributes almost nothing to the
complete AF and can therefore be ignored for the purposes of this work.
6.4 Typical DVB-T2 Passive Radar Processing
Chain
The processing chain of a DVB-T2 PR is significantly more complex than that of an
FM PR. This added complexity is due to the OFDM waveform in use which leads to
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ambiguities in the ARD map that need to be removed. As shown in Section 6.1, these
ambiguities appear at different locations depending on the pilot pattern used by the
transmitter. Since the pilot signals are completely deterministic, their exact locations
can be determined through the demodulation process where they can subsequently be
removed through processing.
Using OFDM based DVB-T and DVB-T2 transmissions as a PR illuminator of oppor-
tunity has been investigated by numerous researchers, most notably [83–86, 89, 90].
There are two common approaches to processing OFDM based signals in PR, the first
of which is known as mismatched filtering, proposed in [83, 84] and further explored
in [86, 89]. Mismatched filtering is a traditional cross-convolution based approach
which involves demodulating the reference signal and then remodulating it to obtain
a noise-free, slightly modified reference. This new reference signal is then used as a
matched filter to perform range-Doppler processing. Since the new reference signal is
a modified version of the original, it is no longer considered matched to the original
and therefore the term ‘mismatched filtering’ is used.
The second approach, shown in [85] and expanded on in [90], is referred to as inverse
filtering. Inverse filtering is a process whereby the signal undergoes demod-remod
to produce an exact noise-free copy of the reference signal. This noise-free reference
signal is then used to perform the range-Doppler processing by first performing a
carrier-wise division of the OFDM symbols in the surveillance channel using the same
OFDM symbols in the remodulated reference channel. A 2D FFT is then applied to
produce an ARD map. This in effect normalises the carriers and compresses all the
direct signal clutter into the zero-Doppler bin of the ARD.
Figure 6.6 illustrates the core processing steps required in a DVB-T2 PR. The black
blocks in Figure 6.6 are common to both mismatched and inverse filtering. The red
blocks are specific to mismatched filtering while the blue blocks are specific to inverse
filtering. The exact location within the processing chain of the DSI cancellation blocks
is discussed further in Section 6.4.3.
6.4.1 Mismatched Filtering
As mentioned Section 6.4, Mismatched filtering is a classic CAF approach whereby
the reference signal is cross-correlated with the surveillance signal according to (6.2).
χrs(τ, v) =
∫ ∞
−∞
r(t)∗s(t+ τ)e−j2pivtdt (6.2)
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Figure 6.6: DVB-T2 PR processing block diagram.
This is typical of how a classic FM PR processing chain operates where the range and
Doppler resolutions are related to the bandwidth of the signal and the integration time
respectively. This leads to a range resolution of approximately 40 m and a single frame
Doppler resolution of approximately 4 Hz. Mismatched filtering has been demonstrated
in [83, 84, 86, 89] to be an effective means of processing OFDM based DVB-T signals.
Mismatched filtering differentiates itself from matched filtering in that the reference
signal used in the range-Doppler processing step is a modified version of the original
rather than an exact copy. This modified or ‘mismatched’ reference signal allows the
removal of the signal ambiguities within the ARD map. It has been demonstrated that
mismatched filtering offers a way to effectively mitigate the effects of pilot ambiguities
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in the ARD map to enhance target detections. The major drawback however, is
that it is computationally expensive due to the convolution step in (6.2). This can
be mitigated slightly by using an FX batches processor (typically suitable for higher
bandwidth signals) whereby the FFT is taken from the output of the demod-remod
stage and then the cross-correlation process is performed as discussed in [68].
Ambiguity Removal with Mismatched Filtering
As described in Section 6.1, the DVB-T2 signal has ambiguities that need to be re-
moved in order to successfully detect and track targets. These pilot ambiguities can
be removed during the CAF process as shown in [93]. To achieve this, the pilot signal
levels need to be manipulated in the remodulation process to form the mismatched
reference signal.
As shown in Section 6.1, there are three so-called ambiguity regions which arise as a
result of the signal structure. Gao [84] and Harms [86] describe the processes required
to remove the different ambiguities in each region.
A. Intra-symbol Ambiguity Removal
It is mentioned in [93] and demonstrated in [92] that these ambiguities can be removed
by blanking the pilot carriers, however, since the ambiguities in the intra-symbol region
are due to the relative amplitude differences between the pilot and the data carriers,
as highlighted in Table C.1 in Appendix C, they are therefore removed through a
normalisation process. This normalisation is achieved by modifying the pilot levels in
the remodulating phase to 1/ASP. This then normalises the pilots to the background
carrier levels during the correlation process, resulting in the removal of the intra-
symbol pilot ambiguities. Normalising the pilots in such a way results in a slight
(approximately 0.44 dB) decrease in integration gain (in a 32K system) as shown in
(6.3).
Gloss =10 · log10
(
Active Carriers− Pilot Carriers
Active Carriers
)
=10 · log10
(
27841− 1196
27841
)
=− 0.44 dB
(6.3)
Setting the pilot amplitudes to zero, as suggested in [92] and [93], can be modeled
as an inverted pulse train, leading to additional ambiguities. As these ambiguities
are originally a result of the amplitude differences between the pilot and data carriers,
setting them to zero once again results in ambiguities within the ARD map as described
91
by (6.6).
Assuming the spectrum of a single symbol has no zero-value carriers, i.e. contains only
data carriers and pilots, the blanking of these pilots can be modeled by multiplying
the spectrum by a pulse train of zeros and ones which follows the SP pattern as
demonstrated in Figure 6.7.
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Figure 6.7: OFDM signal structure in frequency domain.
Blanking the carriers at regular time intervals corresponding to the SP pattern is the
same as multiplying the spectrum by a pulse train in the frequency domain. This is
shown in (6.4) where the pulse period is 1
(Ps)(Cs)
with Ps representing the pilot spacing
and Cs representing the carrier spacing.
Sout(f) = Sdata(f)× Sblank(f) (6.4)
where Sblank(f) is described as:
Sblank(f) = 1− ω0
NSP−1∑
n=0
δ(ω − nω0)
= 1− 2pi(Ps)(Cs)
NSP−1∑
n=0
δ(2pif0 − n2pi(Ps)(Cs))
(6.5)
Sblank(t) = δ(t)−
NSP−1∑
n=0
δ
(
t− n · 1
(Ps)(Cs)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pulse train with period 1
(Ps)(Cs)
(6.6)
The pulse period, T , which defines where the peaks will appear is therefore:
T =
1
(Ps)(Cs)
(6.7)
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The ambiguities arising from blanking the pilots will therefore be located in the same
position in the ARD map as the original boosted pilot ambiguities.
B. Guard Interval Ambiguity Removal
Unlike the intra-symbol ambiguities that arise due to the relative level differences
between the pilot and data carriers, the guard interval ambiguities arise due to the
cyclic repetition of the guard symbols. As a result, these ambiguities can be removed by
blanking the guard intervals in the remodulation step as demonstrated in [84, 86, 89].
This however, comes with a loss of integration gain relative to the length of the guard
interval itself. Table 6.2 highlights the bistatic ranges at which the guard interval
ambiguities are present for a given symbol length.
C. Inter-symbol Ambiguity Removal
As with the ambiguities caused by the guard intervals, ambiguities appearing in the
inter-symbol region are a result of their repetition over different symbols and as such,
can be removed by blanking the pilots. In most scenarios, as with the guard intervals,
the inter-symbol ambiguities will fall well outside the instrumented range of the radar
and can therefore be ignored.
Since the process of blanking the pilots and normalising the pilots are counteractive,
two parallel processes need to be initialised whereby one normalises and the other
blanks the pilots. Each ambiguity region then needs to be calculated in parallel using
the appropriately modified reference function with the two results stitched together to
form an ambiguity-free ARD map as demonstrated in [84].
Processing Gain
As with FM PR, the processing gain is a function of the signal bandwidth and the
CPI length. The processing gain for a DVB-T2 PR is therefore given as
Gp = B · T (6.8)
where B is the occupied bandwidth of the signal and T is the integration time. For a
DVB-T2 signal we can determine the integration gain based on the number of symbols
used in the creation of each ARD map. If we were to use a single frame with a 32K
symbol length, the system would achieve and integration gain of:
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Gp = 10 · log10(Nactive · Cs ·Nsymbols · Ts)−Gloss
= 10 · log10(27 841 · 279Hz · 60 · (3.584 + 0.224) ms)− 0.44 dB
= 62 dB
(6.9)
where Nactive is the number of active carriers, Cs is the carrier spacing, Nsymbols is
the number of symbols used per ARD map and Ts is the time length of each symbol
including the guard interval if used. Gloss is the loss in integration gain due to the
normalisation of pilots as shown in (6.3).
6.4.2 Inverse Filtering
Inverse filtering is a computationally efficient technique for producing ARD maps
that exploits the OFDM nature of the transmitted signal. This is accomplished by
‘normalising’ the surveillance channel relative to the reference channel. To demonstrate
this, consider the simplified representation of the direct signal at the receiver shown
in (6.10):
sds(t) = e
i2pif0t
N−1∑
n=0
[
Ane
iΦnei2pi(−
BW
2
+n BW
N−1 )t
]
(6.10)
where BW represents the total bandwidth occupied by active carriers, N is the number
of active carriers in use, f0 is the carrier frequency, and Ane
iΦn makes up the complex
amplitude for each carrier, n. Windowing and symbol numbering have been omitted
for clarity. Echoes from potential target will be time delayed copies of (6.10), seen
here in (6.11):
secho(t) = sds(t− td)
= ei2pif0(t−td)
N−1∑
n=0
[
Ane
iΦnei2pi(−
BW
2
+n BW
N−1 )(t−td)
] (6.11)
with
td =
R0
c
+
vbis
c
t (6.12)
where R0 is the difference in bistatic distance at the start of the symbol, vbis is the
bistatic velocity for this target, and c is the propagation speed. After down conversion,
the baseband representations of the direct and echo signal becomes:
sds,bb =
N−1∑
n=0
[
Ane
iΦnei2pi(−
BW
2
+n BW
N−1 )t
]
(6.13)
94
and
secho,bb = e
−i2pif0td
N−1∑
n=0
[
Ane
iΦnei2pi(−
BW
2
+n BW
N−1 )(t−td)
]
= e−i2pif0
R0
c e−i2pif0
vbis
c
t·
N−1∑
n=0
[
Ane
iΦnei2pi(−
BW
2
+n BW
N−1 )(1−
vbis
c
)t · e−i2pi(−BW2 +n BWN−1 )R0c
] (6.14)
The time-changing delay term, td, has three notable effects. It induces a Doppler shift(
e−i2pif0
vbis
c
t
)
, an additional phase term that is determined by the bistatic distance(
e−i2pif0
R0
c
)
, and a shift in phase of each individual sub-carrier
(
e−i2pi(−
BW
2
+n BW
N−1 )
R0
c
)
.
The sub-carrier phase shift, which is directly proportional to the bistatic distance of
the target, is what inverse filtering relies on for range processing.
The normalisation of the echo signal is where the term inverse filtering or reciprocal
filtering is derived. This normalisation is applied in the frequency domain, where the
complex amplitudes of the echo signal spectrum are divided, element wise, by the
complex amplitudes of the direct signal spectrum as shown in (6.17).
Sds,bb(k) = Ake
iΦk (6.15)
Secho,bb(k) = Ake
iΦk · e−i2pif0 R0c · e−i2pi(−BW2 +k BWN−1 )R0c · sinc
(
pif0N
BW
· vbis
c
)
(6.16)
Snorm,bb(k) ,
Secho,bb(k)
Sds,bb(k)
= e−i2pif0
R0
c · sinc
(
pif0N
BW
· vbis
c
)
· e−i2pi(−BW2 +k BWN−1 )R0c
(6.17)
The resultant output of the inverse filter is a rotating phasor where the speed of
rotation is directly proportional to the bistatic distance of the target echo. Inter-carrier
interference (caused by the shift in frequency of the echo signal) will be neglected for
the time being. Range processing is accomplished by taking the Discreet Fourier
Transform (DFT) of Snorm,bb:
Srange(p) , DFT
{
Snorm,bb
}
(6.18)
The maximum amplitude of Srange occurs at:
pmax ≈ BWR0
c
(6.19)
Successively processing the adjacent OFDM symbols yields a result that is similar to
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the prior symbol, differing only in phase due to the change in R0:
Srange, symbol (y+1) ≈ Srange, symbol (y) · e−i2pif0
R∆
c (6.20)
The change in bistatic distance is denoted here as R∆. Packing subsequent range lines
into a rows within a matrix therefore forms an additional rotating phasor down each
column:
sdoppler(p, y) , Srange, symbol (y)(p)
= Srange(p) · e−i2pif0
R∆
c
y
(6.21)
The speed of rotation will, in this case, be determined by the phase term e−i2pif0
R∆
c .
Taking a DFT in the slow-time dimension (down the matrix columns) yields the ARD
map:
ARD(p, q) = DFT
{
sdoppler(p, y)
}
(6.22)
The maximum amplitude of ARD(p, q) occurs at:
qmax =
f0R∆Nsym
c
(6.23)
where Nsym is the number of consecutive OFDM symbols processed for each ARD
map.
Limitations of Inverse Filtering
As the process of inverse filtering relies on the OFDM nature of the signal, it is highly
dependant on the exact specifications used within the transmission, specifically the
FFT length of each symbol and the resulting guard symbol length which directly
limits the maximum unambiguous range and Doppler of the system.
This means that for short OFDM symbols such as 1K, the maximum unambiguous
range is severely limited when compared to longer symbols such as 16K or 32K as
highlighted in Table 6.2. The upside to this is that the maximum unambiguous Doppler
of the system is limited by the inverse of the symbol length. This means that for
short symbol lengths (1K, 2K, 4K or even 8K), the unambiguous Doppler is large and
therefore does not pose any issues for typical applications. For larger symbol lengths
such as 16K and 32K however, the maximum unambiguous Doppler is severely limited.
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Processing Gain
As with mismatched filtering, the integration gain can be determined by the number
of symbols used in the creation of each ARD map. If a single frame with a 32K symbol
length were to be used, the system would achieve and integration gain of:
Gp = 10 · log10(Nactive · Cs ·Nsymbols · Tu)
= 10 · log10(27 841 · 279 Hz · 60 · 3.584 ms)
= 62.2 dB
(6.24)
where Nactive is the number of active carriers, Cs is the carrier spacing, Nsymbols is
the number of symbols used per ARD map creation and Ts is the time length of each
symbol including the guard interval.
6.4.3 DSI Cancellation in DVB-T2 Passive Radar
Depending on where the DSI cancellation is applied, the results could vary slightly.
If, as is the case with FM PR, the DSI cancellation is applied using the raw received
signal, part of the jammer signal could be removed and performance could potentially
be improved as demonstrated in Chapter 3 [152].
While the exact location of the DSI cancellation step within the processing chain can
vary, if it were to be implemented using the raw data, a CGLS-like canceller would be
needed since more advanced techniques such as ECA-CD require demodulation to be
used [75]. To ensure real-time operation, a CGLS canceller would need to process the
data in such a way that once convergence is achieved, it only iterates once or twice per
symbol. This approach will allow for fast processing times while also ensuring effective
cancellation due to the slow varying nature of the DVB-T2 signal. The disadvantage
to this approach would be that the canceller would not be able to adapt to a rapidly
changing clutter environment. The canceller would also not be able to adapt if the
signal itself changes from frame to frame as is allowed for in a DVB-T2 transmission
[99].
If the DSI canceller were to be applied after the remodulation stage, all of the jammer
signal would be removed from the reference channel, resulting in the canceller having no
additional effect on the performance of the system as shown in Chapter 3. If the system
were to utilise a single antenna for both reference and surveillance channels, whereby
the reference signal is extracted through the demod-remod process, the canceller would
only be capable of suppressing the reference DSI and would not be capable of removing
any additional interfering signals.
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Since DSI cancellation techniques such as ECA-CD rely on successful demodulation of
the reference signal, if the jammer were capable of disrupting the reference signal to the
point where demodulation is no longer possible, the entire remodulation process would
fail. In the case of remodulation failure, inverse filtering would be rendered inapplicable
and the mismatched filtering approach would be forced to revert to standard matched
filtering. This type of attack could be achieved by jamming the P1 symbol, however,
this would require significant power as is discussed in Chapter 7.
It is therefore feasible to assume that most DVB-T2 systems will either not use a DSI
canceller (as is currently the case due to the low zero-Doppler sidelobe levels within
the DVB-T2 AF) or would use a highly efficient canceller such as ECA-CD which
requires the demod-remod process in order to work. As a result, any DSI canceller
would not, if used in such a way, have any additional impact on system performance
in the presence of jamming.
6.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter has provided a brief overview of the DVB-T2 signal in the context of PR.
The contributions of the various pilot signals within the DVB-T2 signal have been dis-
cussed and their effects on the resultant AF demonstrated. It has been demonstrated
that the most significant contribution to the ambiguities within the AF are the scat-
tered pilots. While the continual pilot pattern produces ridges at constant Doppler at
particular ranges, their contribution to the AF is relatively small due to there being
so few continual pilot carriers per OFDM symbol.
The three ambiguity zones namely: intra-symbol, guard interval and inter-symbol am-
biguities have been demonstrated. The process of removing the ambiguities from each
zone during the creating of the ARD map has been demonstrated using both mismatch
filtering and inverse filtering techniques. As a result, a comprehensive review of these
two processing techniques has been presented where the advantages and disadvantages
of each technique has been demonstrated.
A brief discussion on DSI cancellation techniques in DVB-T2 PR has been presented,
outlining the advantages and disadvantages of time-domain and frequency-domain
based approaches.
98
Chapter 7
Electronic Attacks on DVB-T2
Passive Radar
Since passive radars radiate no EM energy, they are inherently difficult to detect
using conventional ES techniques. The DVB-T2 signal is designed to operate in single
frequency networks and can therefore handle high powered interference in such a way
that demodulation can still take place. If an attacker were to jam the DVB-T2 signal
in such a way to prevent demodulation, the P1 symbol would need to be attacked. In
general, it has to be assumed that an attacker does not know the exact whereabouts of
the PR receiver(s). As a result, it is difficult to inject a signal of sufficient power into
the reference channel such that demodulation is no longer possible. For these results, it
is therefore assumed that the jamming signal appears only in the surveillance channel
since the jamming signal is removed through the demod-remod stage.
As with FM PR, the most obvious approach to attacking a DVB-T2 PR is through
the use of noise jamming. Noise jamming has been demonstrated to be a relatively
effective means of attacking an FM PR. It has been demonstrated that raising the noise
floor of particularly the surveillance channel with increased noise jamming power is
critical when trying to mask a target.
As the processing gain of a DVB-T2 PR is greater than 60 dB, in order to mask a target,
significant levels of noise jamming would be needed across a relatively wide bandwidth.
A more practical approach would be to attack the deterministic components of the
DVB-T2 signal which could potentially lead to significant effects within the ARD map
while using relatively little power.
As shown in [134] and [135], OFDM based DAB and DVB-T PR can be effectively
attacked using the deterministic components of each signal. A similar approach is
therefore followed in demonstrating 5 attacks for DVB-T2 PR using both mismatched
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filtering and inverse filtering. These attacks include:
• Noise Jamming
• Full Pilot Attack
• Continual Pilot Attack
• Scattered Pilot Attack
• Pulsed Jamming
Unless otherwise stated, the results presented were achieved using real recorded DVB-
T2 signals with the parameters highlighted in Table 6.1. The recorded signals were
from a single channel receiver and therefore the second surveillance channel is simulated
with three targets inserted. The simulated target parameters are highlighted in Table
7. The ARD map is calculated to ±200 Hz and 12.6 to 100 km as this falls within the
capabilities of the system being developed at UCT as described in [94].
Table 7.1: Simulated target parameters.
Target
Bistatic
Range [km]
Bistatic
Doppler [Hz]
SNR [dB]
1 40 -35 -40
2 25 20 -35
3 80 140 -30
7.1 Jammer-to-Signal Ratio
As with the FM PR, one of the challenges in quantifying the performance of the
DVB-T2 PR in the presence of jamming is defining the manner in which the JSR is
presented. To define the JSR in the DVB-T2 context, we borrow from [134] and [135]
where the authors define the JSR as the ratio of the jammer power to the total signal
power in the surveillance channel. To elaborate on this, if the JSR is set at 0 dB, this
implies that the average jammer power within the surveillance channel is equal to the
average DVB-T2 signal power within the surveillance channel for each CPI.
This approach is taken partly to allow for comparison between the results in [134] and
[135] as well as allowing the results to be referred back to the target echo power levels
as was the case in Chapter 3.
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7.2 Electronic Attacks using Mismatched Filtering
To determine a performance baseline, Figure 7.1 illustrates the resultant ARD map
containing the three targets simulated using the parameters summarised in Table 7.
All three targets were clearly visible at their expected locations as highlighted by the
red ovals. As the surveillance channel is simulated, there is no zero-Doppler clutter
other than the DSI in the zero-range bin.
The three targets sit -40 dB, -35 dB and -30 dB below the peak signal as expected
while the noise floor is at approximately -60 dB. This means that the three targets sit
20 dB, 25 dB and 30 dB above the noise floor respectively when no DSI cancellation
is applied.
Table 7.2: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.1.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
None - - -
Figure 7.1: Reference plot for mismatched filtering.
The normalisation of the pilot signals achieved through mismatched filtering also re-
duces the level of any potential pilot attack signals. This normalisation process reduces
the pilot levels by an amount depending on each pilots’ relative boost. For the signal
parameters in Table 6.1, the relative CP and SP power reductions are:
CP power reduction:
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CP reduction =20 · log10
(
1
Boosted CP level
)
=20 · log10
(
3
8
)
=− 8.52 dB
(7.1)
SP power reduction:
SP reduction =20 · log10
(
1
Boosted SP level
)
=20 · log10
(
4
7
)
=− 4.86 dB
(7.2)
7.2.1 Mismatched Filtering - Noise Jamming
Noise jamming is applied to the surveillance channel with the JSR = 0 dB. This
implies that the average noise power is equal to the average DVB-T2 signal power
(direct signal plus simulated target echos) in the surveillance channel. This results in
a slight increase in the noise floor as demonstrated in Figure 7.2.
Table 7.3: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.2
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
AGWN - - 0
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Figure 7.2: Mismatched filtering with noise jamming at 0 dB JSR.
Since adding noise to the system is a linear operation, to mask the targets the noise
power needs to be at a JSR equal to the target levels above the system noise floor. In
this case, the targets will be masked when the JSR of the noise jammer approaches 20
dB as demonstrated in Figure 7.3 where the JSR for the noise jammer is 10 dB and
the weaker target can barely be seen above the raised noise floor.
Figure 7.3: Mismatched filtering with noise jamming at 10 dB JSR.
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Table 7.4: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.3.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
AGWN - - 10
The broadband and continuous nature of the noise jammer results in significant energy
being required to effectively jam the system due to the integration gain achieved by
the target echos. To successfully attack the system using reasonable power levels, the
deterministic components of the signal need to be attacked in such a way that the
inherent integration gain of the system can be leveraged.
7.2.2 Mismatched Filtering - Full Pilot Attack
The most obvious pilot attack is a full pilot attack. As summarised in Table 6.1, the
number of active carriers per symbol is 27 841 while the number of pilot carriers is
1 196. The pilot carriers make up roughly 4.3% of each symbol. The integration gain
on the pilot carriers is therefore reduced by:
Greduction =10 · log10
(
All Pilots
Active carriers
)
=10 · log10
(
1196
27841
)
=− 13.67 dB
(7.3)
A full pilot attack is demonstrated by injecting it into the surveillance channel with a
delay of 30 km and a Doppler shift of 35 Hz. The JSR referenced to the surveillance
channel is set to 0 dB and the results are demonstrated in Figure 7.4 where peaks can
be seen at the desired location as well as at the expected intervals.
Table 7.5: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.4.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
Full Pilot 30 35 0
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Figure 7.4: Mismatched filtering - Single full pilot attack with pilot map inserted
with a Doppler of 35 Hz and a range shift of 30 km.
As expected, due to the reduced integration gain of 13.67 dB and the normalisation
reduction of 4.86 dB, the main peak from the pilot pattern appears at -18.46 dB.
Comparing the full pilot attack to noise jamming, it is clear that pilot jamming has the
greatest impact on the system. The pilot levels can be adjusted to be near the target
level to mask targets at known locations within the ARD map. This is demonstrated
in Figure 7.5 where the pilot pattern is placed near a simulated target at 140 Hz in
Doppler and 67.4 km in range with a JSR of -10 dB. The ARD map is calculated to 300
km and 300 Hz in range and Doppler respectively to demonstrate the effectiveness of
the attack signal in masking a target. The false targets were clearly indistinguishable
from the real targets.
Table 7.6: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.5.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
Full Pilot 67.4 140 -10
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Figure 7.5: Mismatched filtering - Single full pilot attack -10 dB JSR where the
attack is placed near a target.
Since an attacker would not necessarily know the exact location of the PR, placing
false targets at particular locations within the ARD map via a full pilot attack is not
always possible. If a self protection jammer was to be used, the target will be able to
receive the DVB-T2 signal and attack a potential PR for a given range since this range
will be relative to where the target is. To account for different potential Doppler shifts,
the jammer could transmit the attack signal with different Doppler shifts ranging from
the minimum to maximum potential Doppler variations of the target. This produces
peaks which jam particular range bins while a ridge is formed from each adjacent
Doppler shift as demonstrated in Figure 7.6.
Table 7.7: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.6.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
Full Pilot 30 -200 to 200 in 10 Hz intervals 0
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Figure 7.6: Mismatched filtering - Doppler shifted ridges.
Extending the ARD map to illustrate the effectiveness of these ridges across a greater
range and Doppler extent is demonstrated in Figure 7.7.
Figure 7.7: Mismatched filtering - Doppler shifted ridges across wider range.
It is clear from Figures 7.6 and 7.7 where the targets are highlighted in red ovals, that
ridges can be placed along all Doppler at fixed ranges. The downside to this approach
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Table 7.8: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.7.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
Full Pilot 30 -300 to 300 in 10 Hz intervals 0
is that the energy gets spread across the Doppler profile and a higher JSR is needed
to obtain the same ridge level for wider Doppler extents. The spacing of the peaks
within the ridges can be increased by using larger Doppler shift intervals however, this
is a trade-off between completely masking the target and jammer power levels. For
example, having peaks spaced every 5 Doppler bins rather than every Doppler bin
would require less jammer energy while still resulting in the target being undetected.
7.2.3 Mismatched Filtering - Continual Pilot Attack
The simplest method to attack the PR is to use only the CP carriers since they remain
constant from symbol to symbol. The attacker therefore only needs to synchronise to
the symbol clock. Attacking the PR using only the CP can cause similar effects to
those demonstrated in Figure 6.3 where constant Doppler ridges were formed as the
CP remain on the same carriers across symbols. Where the CP and the SP appear
on the same carrier, the CP takes the value of the SP. This causes periodicity in time
and therefore range which can be seen in Figure 6.3 where sharp peaks appear on top
of the ridges.
Unlike when using all the pilots, using only the CP as an attack signal results in an
effective bandwidth and therefore integration gain reduction of:
Greduction =10 · log10
(
Continual pilots
Active carriers
)
=10 · log10
(
178
27841
)
=− 21.9 dB
(7.4)
The large reduction in integration gain compared to the full pilot attack combined
with the normalisation process which causes a further reduction of 8.52 dB as shown
in (7.1), leads to lower effectiveness of the CP attack. The ridges caused by the CP
remaining on the same carrier throughout the frame are seen in Figure 7.8.
The CP can be seen across all range bins as expected but with greatly reduced lev-
els with the peak sitting -29.13 dB below the direct signal peak. While this is the
easiest attack to implement, it is also the least effective due to the significantly lower
integration gain achieved by the CP.
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Table 7.9: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.8.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
CP Only 30 35 0
Figure 7.8: Mismatched filtering - Jamming using CP only.
7.2.4 Mismatched Filtering - Scattered Pilot Attack
The SP pattern has the greatest effect on the ambiguities in the ARD map as the SP
contain most of the pilot energy. Referring to Table C.3 in Appendix C, there were
27 841 active carriers per 32 768 or 32K extended (32K E) data symbol. Of this, 1 196
were pilot carriers (containing CP and SP) with 1 159 of those being SP. This results
in an integration gain reduction of:
Greduction =10 · log10
(
Scattered pilots
Active carriers
)
=10 · log10
(
1159
27841
)
=− 13.81 dB
(7.5)
As a result of the relatively low bandwidth reduction, and the periodicity of the SP
pattern in both fast and slow-time, SP jamming has the most impact and is the most
difficult to remove from the ARD map, even with the normalisation process further
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decreasing their effect by an additional 4.86 dB as shown in (7.2). Figure 7.9 illustrates
the effect of using the SP only as an attack signal where the SP can be seen -18.67 dB
below the peak signal.
Figure 7.9: Mismatched Filtering - Jamming using SP only.
Table 7.10: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.9.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
SP Only 30 35 0
It is clear that the most effective form of pilot jamming a system using mismatched
filtering is a full pilot attack. This is due to the processing gain achieved by the
jamming signal. A CP only attack is the easiest to implement since the jammer
only has to synchronise with the reference signal and transmit tones on the same
carrier without hopping from carrier to carrier between symbols. The CP only attack,
however, has the smallest effect on the output ARD map due to its low integration
gain.
Since the levels of the attack signal scales directly with the JSR used, the ambiguous
peaks caused will scale accordingly. Provided these peaks were above the target level,
they will be effective as a means of spoofing or masking a real target. This means that
in order to mask a target using a full pilot attack, the JSR needs to be approximately
18.5 dB above the target level within the channel. Since targets can appear as low
as 80-90 dB below the direct signal [4, 54], the JSR can be as low as -70 dB and
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any potential targets will still be masked by additional false targets due to the attack
signal.
7.2.5 Mismatched Filtering - Pulse Jamming
A periodic structure in the Doppler domain can be achieved by modulating the attack
signal periodically with the OFDM symbol clock. Either the signal can be turned off
for every k-th OFDM symbol or only be turned on for every k-th symbol. In both
cases this pulse modulation will lead to a periodic structure in the Doppler domain.
Since the continuous attack signal using all pilots already produces a set of equi-distant
peaks in the Doppler domain, the regular pulse-modulation will combine with these
peaks as illustrated in Figure 7.10.
The resultant integration gain achieved is lowered proportional to the number of sym-
bols that the signal remains off. To demonstrate this effect, the result of toggling the
full pilot attack signal on every 10-th symbol is shown in Figure 7.10.
Table 7.11: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.10.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
All Pilots Pulsed
Every 10-th Symbol 30 35 0
Figure 7.10: Mismatched Filtering - Full pilot toggled on every 10-th symbol.
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The integration gain in this case is:
Gp = 10 · log10(Nactive · Cs ·Nsymbols · Tu)
= 10 · log10(1 196 · 279Hz · 60/10 · 3.584 ms)
= 38.6 dB
(7.6)
Combining this with a further 4.9 dB reduction due to the normalisation process, the
attack signal experiences 33.7 dB of integration gain which puts the peak of the attack
signal at - 28.6 dB (33.7 dB - 62.3 dB) which is close to the - 29.1 dB found in Figure
7.10.
It was demonstrated in [135] that toggling the attack signal on for a single symbol
results in ridges appearing across Doppler when using inverse filtering. This is due to
the manner in which inverse filtering produces an ARD map where a FFT is applied
across each symbol to obtain the Doppler spectrum. Applying a large impulse to a
single symbol therefore results in a large disturbance in Doppler. With mismatched
filtering however, since the slow-time FFT is performed on a data matrix containing
matched filtered responses, the energy contained in a single symbol is spread out over
the entire range profile. This results in a slight increase in the background noise
without inducing sharp ridges across Doppler as demonstrated in Figure 7.11.
Table 7.12: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.11.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
All Pilots Toggled
ON for Single Symbol 30 35 0
Figure 7.11: Mismatched Filtering - Single symbol attack.
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7.2.6 Mismatched Filtering ECCM - Pilot Blanking
To remove any potential pilot jamming, the pilot energy needs to be suppressed in
the ARD map. As shown in Section 6.2, the intra-symbol ambiguities were caused
by the difference in power between the boosted pilot carriers and the data carriers.
As a result, the pilot jamming signal can be removed by blanking the pilots in the
remodulated signal at the expense of creating additional known ambiguities.
Figure 7.12 illustrates full pilot jamming processed using a reference with the pilot
carriers blanked. As with Figure 7.1, the three simulated targets have been added to
the surveillance channel as marked by the red circles.
Table 7.13: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.12.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
All Pilots 30 35 0
Figure 7.12: ECCM Mismatched Filtering - 3 targets with all pilot jamming using a
reference with blanked pilots.
Blanking the pilots in the remodulation stage instead of normalising them results in
the removal of the jamming signal as demonstrated in Figure 7.12. All three targets
remain, as illustrated by the red ovals, while the jamming signal is removed. As a
result of the pilot blanking, new ambiguities were added to the ARD map, however,
they appear at known, fixed positions and can therefore be removed by normalising
the ARD map based on the expected levels as suggested in [107]. While the noise
floor is slightly raised as a result of the jamming signal (compared to Figure 7.13), no
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target induced ambiguities were present above the noise floor. These ambiguities are
clearly seen in Figure 7.13 where a clean surveillance with no jamming and 3 targets
is processed using a reference with blanked pilots.
Table 7.14: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.12.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
None - - -
Figure 7.13: ECCM Mismatched Filtering - 3 targets without jamming using a ref-
erence with blanked pilots.
7.3 Electronic Attacks using Inverse Filtering
To demonstrate the effects of the different jamming techniques when inverse filtering
is used, a reference inverse filter ARD map containing the three simulated targets is
demonstrated in Figure 7.14. The target at 140 Hz Doppler shift is seen to wrap
around to −118.5 Hz as a result of the Doppler ambiguity issues outlined in Section
6.4.2. The target at 25 km in range and 20 Hz Doppler is seen to spread out in the
Doppler dimension due to it straddling between two adjacent Doppler bins, resulting
in a peak reduction of 3 dB. The noise floor is seen to be at approximately −85 dB.
It is important to note that the noise floor as it appears in Figure 7.14 is an artificial
noise floor rather than a system noise floor. This is partly due to the simulated nature
of the surveillance channel but more importantly due to the symbol mismatches caused
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by the inserted targets. As inverse filtering is performed using element-wise division,
if the surveillance channel contains the exact content that is found in the reference
channel, that is to say no targets, Doppler shifts or system noise, the noise floor at
non-zero Doppler values becomes undefined. As such, any non zero-Doppler within the
surveillance channel results in inter-carrier interference that leads to additional noise
being present in the output ARD map.
Figure 7.14: Inverse filtering benchmark performance with 3 targets and no jamming.
Table 7.15: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.14.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
None - - -
The spreading of targets in the Doppler dimension is a result of the target response
straddling between Doppler bins and can be largely removed through windowing as
demonstrated in Figure 7.15 where a Blackman window is applied.
Table 7.16: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.15.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
None - - -
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Figure 7.15: Inverse filtering benchmark performance with Blackman window.
As expected, the target sidelobes were reduced at the expense of widening the main
lobe, especially for the targets that dont straddle two bins. For the remainder of the
results, no windowing is used unless otherwise stated. Ambiguous target unwrapping
will not be discussed in this work as it is not within the scope.
7.3.1 Inverse Filtering - Noise Jamming
As mentioned in section 7.3, the noise floor of the ARD map is highly dependant on
the amount of noise on each carrier within the surveillance channel. As a result, when
no noise is present (only the direct signal and target echos), the noise floor is well
below the noise floor of the system when using mismatched filtering. This artificial
noise floor changes drastically with the addition of noise to the system. Figure 7.16
demonstrates the effect of adding Gaussian white noise to the system with a JSR of 0
dB.
Table 7.17: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.16.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
AGWN - - 0
When comparing the results demonstrated in Figure 7.16 to the results demonstrated
when mismatched filtering is used, it is clear that the noise floor of the inverse filtering
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Figure 7.16: Inverse Filtering - Noise jamming 0 dB JSR.
ARD map is significantly effected. The noise floor for both the mismatched filtering
and inverse filtering ARD maps in Figures 7.2 and 7.16 respectively were Gp below
the zero-range, zero-Doppler peak.
Increasing the noise JSR to 10 dB results in the targets being masked completely as
demonstrated in Figure 7.17.
Table 7.18: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.17.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
AGWN - - 10
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Figure 7.17: Inverse Filtering - Noise jamming 10 dB JSR.
It is clear that inverse filtering is not as robust against noise jamming as mismatched
filtering as the difference in noise floor levels at 3 dB JSR is almost 5 dB between
mismatched filtering and inverse filtering. This trend continues as the JSR increases
to 10 dB as can be seen in Figures 7.3 and 7.17. Unlike the matched filtering ap-
proach which is an optimal filter for extraction of signals, the inverse filter is highly
sensitive to disturbances in the surveillance channel. This phenomenon results from
the element wise division step in the inverse filtering process. When the surveillance
channel is normalised by the reference channel, any additional noise that is present
in the surveillance channel that is not present in the reference channel does not get
normalised. These errors in each carrier were therefore present as randomly rotating
phasors which when the DFT is applied, results in random noise (i.e. an elevated noise
floor) across the Doppler dimension as seen in Figure 7.17.
7.3.2 Inverse Filtering - Full Pilot Attack
A full pilot attack on inverse filtering is presented where the attack signal has a delay
of 30 km and a Doppler shift of 35 Hz. The JSR referenced to the surveillance channel
is 0 dB and the results are demonstrated in Figure 7.18.
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Table 7.19: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.18.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
All Pilots 30 35 0
Figure 7.18: Inverse filtering - Full pilot attack with 0 dB JSR.
The resultant peaks represent a shifted version of the pilot pattern where the first
peak appears at a range of 30 km and a Doppler shift of 35 Hz along with a constant
Doppler ridge. These peaks were large enough to be detected as false targets within
the ARD map. A ridge across range at constant Doppler can be seen at a lower level
to the peak. This ridge is caused as a result of the continual pilots remaining on a
constant carrier from symbol to symbol.
As with mismatched filtering, the effect of the attack signal is reduced during the
division step of inverse filtering (where the pilot carriers were effectively normalised)
which results in a further 4.9 dB loss in integration gain for the SP pattern. The end
result is peaks sitting at −18.9 dB (13.7+4.9). Using a full pilot attack, one can place
these peaks at any desired position, with each additional peak resulting in only a 3 dB
drop in peak power level for the same JSR. This is demonstrated in Figure 7.19 where
two pilot patterns were inserted 35 Hz apart from each other (at 35 Hz and 70 Hz
respectively). As was the case with mismatched filtering, this approach is significantly
more effective than barrage noise jamming due to the added integration gain achieved
by the pilot signal.
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Table 7.20: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.19.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
All Pilots 30 35 & 70 0
Figure 7.19: Inverse Filtering - Full pilot attack with two attack signals 0 dB JSR
7.3.3 Inverse Filtering - Continual Pilot Attack
Using only the continual pilots to attack the PR is the simplest form of attack since
the pilots remain on the same carrier from symbol to symbol. Due to the lack of
periodicity in slow-time, ridges were produced at constant Doppler across range as
demonstrated in Figure 7.20.
Table 7.21: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.20.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
CP Only 30 35 0
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Figure 7.20: Inverse Filtering - Continual pilot attack 0 dB JSR.
The peaks on top of the ridges appear at −41.8 dB while the average power of the
ridges is 6 dB lower at −47.8 dB. This is similar to what was seen when using mis-
matched filtering where a reduction in bandwidth results in a corresponding reduction
in integration gain as described in (7.4). The reduction in integration gain along with
the reduction in power as a result of normalisation (where the surveillance channel is
divided by the reference pilots) during the inverse filtering process results in an overall
level reduction of 30.4 dB.
The small peaks on top of the ridges occur where the scattered pilots appear on the
same carrier as the continual pilots as the resultant pilot values were set to that of
the scattered pilots, resulting in a periodic pilot response on that carrier. If this is
removed from the pilot pattern and only a CW tone is transmitted, those peaks will
be removed, leaving only the constant Doppler ridges.
7.3.4 Inverse Filtering - Scattered Pilot Attack
For completeness, we consider only using the scattered pilots as an attack signal. The
resultant effect is similar to the effect of a full pilot attack as demonstrated in Figure
7.21. The scattered pilots alone create peaks without the constant Doppler ridges
caused by the continual pilots as demonstrated in Figure 7.20.
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Table 7.22: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.21.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
SP Only 30 35 0
Figure 7.21: Inverse Filtering - Scattered pilot attack 0 dB JSR.
This type of attack is not favourable as synchronisation of the complete pilot map is
required to carry out the attack, in which case a full pilot attack would be preferred.
7.3.5 Inverse Filtering - Pulse Jamming
Continuing from the pulsed attack that was performed on the system utilising mis-
matched filtering, the effects of pulse jamming using inverse filtering were investigated.
The additional Doppler-domain peaks that are induced through pulsed jamming can
be explained in the following way.
In the Fourier domain, the modulation can be understood as a multiplication of two
pulse trains with different numbers of peaks on the same grid. In the dual domain this
is equal to the convolution of two pulse trains with the same number of peaks as their
Fourier counterparts. Let p1 and p2 be the number of peaks in the first and second
signal, respectively. To find the number of peaks in the resulting signal, we have to
first find the largest common denominator, d, for each peak. The number of peaks in
the convolved signal is then given by 1/(d · p1 · p2).
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In this case, one signal always has 2 peaks in the Doppler domain meaning that
d ∈ {1, 2}. If we turn the attack signal on or off every k-th symbol, we get 2 ·k peaks if
k is odd. If k is even we get k peaks. Pulse jamming where the attack signal is toggled
on every 10-th symbol is demonstrated in Figure 7.22. The JSR of the attack is 0 dB
whereby the average power in the attack signal is the same as the average power in
the surveillance channel.
Table 7.23: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.22.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
All Pilots Pulsed
Every 10-th Symbol 30 35 0
Figure 7.22: Inverse Filtering - Pulsed jamming toggled on every 10-th symbol
Figure 7.22 illustrates an ARD map where a pulsed attack signal consisting of the full
pilot signal with relative range of 30 km and Doppler of 35 Hz has been applied. The
attack signal is turned on every 10-th symbol which leads to recurring peaks in the
Doppler domain. As demonstrated, the periodicity of the CP contribution, which only
appears once per delay bin, is multiplied by the factor k while the SP contributions
also get multiplied by k, which in this case is 10.
In the extreme case of k = M , one single symbol per CPI is attacked. This leads
to solid ridges over the Doppler domain for constant delay which is demonstrated in
Figure 7.23. The spacing of these ridges is given by the spacing of the range ambiguity
function of the pilot signal. Due to the reduced duty cycle, we lose 20 · log10(M) of
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peak level in the ARD map which amounts to 35.5 dB for M = 60. Note that a
JSR of 0 dB in this case implies that the attack signal is at same average power as
the surveillance signal for only this one symbol. This means that the average power
needed by the jammer is lowered by 10 · log10(M) = 17.8 dB compared to continuous
jamming.
Table 7.24: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.23.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
All Pilots Toggled
ON for Single Symbol 30 35 0
Figure 7.23: Inverse Filtering - Single symbol jamming 0 dB JSR.
Due to the nature of the radar system, the receiver location is assumed to be unknown.
As a result, the exact distance to the receiver and velocity of the target relative to the
receiver is also unknown. The target will, however, be able to synchronize itself with
the transmit signal and transmit the jamming signal at the same time as the incident
signal reaches the target. Both signals will therefore arrive at a potential receiver
concurrently as both the target echo and jamming signal will have the same distance
to travel to the receive site.
This is very attractive for self-protection jamming even when the location of the re-
ceiver is unknown. A target can therefore receive the DVB-T2 signal utilised by the
PR and transmit a jamming signal that only attacks the delay bin of the target. For
this, even very low power is sufficient due to the processing gain. It must, however, be
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noted that regardless of the transmitted power level, a sophisticated ES receiver could
potentially locate the self-protection jammer.
7.3.6 Inverse Filtering ECCM - Pilot Boosting
To mitigate the effect of the attack signals, the pilot energy needs to be suppressed in
the ARD map. Due to the way inverse filtering is performed, the pilot signals can be
suppressed through the normalisation process which, unlike with mismatched filtering
which normalises through convolution, inverse filtering normalises through division.
In the same way that the pilots were normalised by dividing the attack signal by the
boosted pilot levels in the reference signal, the higher powered attack signal can be
normalised further by boosting the pilot signals within the reference signal.
Adding a 20 dB boost to the pilot levels results in the pilot attack signal being sup-
pressed as demonstrated in Figure 7.24.
Table 7.25: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.24.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
All Pilots 30 35 0
Figure 7.24: ECCM Inverse Filtering - Full pilot jamming with 20 dB reference pilot
boost.
Similar to when pilots were blanked in mismatched filtering, when using boosted pilots
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in inverse filtering, additional ambiguities were inserted into the ARD map. The am-
biguous peaks were however, much less of a problem in inverse filtering when compared
to mismatched filtering as these peaks simply appear along the zero-Doppler profile
rather than at different positions in Doppler.
The boosting of pilots also has the unwanted effect that if a target appears within the
ARD map, the target will have periodic ambiguities which mirror those seen along the
zero-Doppler line, albeit at significantly lower levels as demonstrated in Figure 7.25.
Table 7.26: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.25.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
None - - -
Figure 7.25: ECCM Inverse Filtering - No jamming with 20 dB reference pilot boost.
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Figure 7.26: ECCM Inverse Filtering - Single symbol jamming with 20 dB reference
pilot boost.
Table 7.27: Simulated jammer parameters for Figure 7.26.
Attack Range Shift [km] Doppler Shift [Hz] JSR [dB]
All Pilots Toggled
ON for Single Symbol 30 35 0
The boosted pilot technique also minimises the effect of pulsed and single symbol
jamming to a large extent as demonstrated in Figure 7.26 where the sharp ridges were
shown to be removed. However, the increase in noise floor is still significant and the
noise profile is no longer Gaussian in nature. Ideally, the use of boosted pilots will
only be to counter jamming and should therefore be dynamically adjusted based on
the system requirements.
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7.4 Discussion of Results
A brief discussion comparing the results of jamming a system using mismatched filter-
ing and inverse filtering is presented.
7.4.1 DVB-T2 Noise Jamming
Broadband noise jamming has been applied to both processing techniques where it was
demonstrated that mismatched filtering is more robust to noise than inverse filtering.
Since noise jamming is a linear process whereby the energy within the signal is spread
across the entire ARD map without any integration gain, it is clear that to have any
meaningful effect on the system, the noise power required is significant. An ARD map
processed using mismatched filtering sees a meaningful increasing in background noise
level when the JSR approaches 0 dB while the same ARD map using inverse filtering
experiences a significant increase in background noise level at around -5 dB JSR.
These levels were still significant, however since the jammer would require power levels
roughly equal to or -5 dB below the reference transmitter to mask target echos -35 dB
below the zero-range, zero-Doppler peak.
7.4.2 DVB-T2 Full Pilot Attack
Using the pilot carriers as an attack signal is very favourable for two reasons, firstly,
unlike noise jamming where no integration gain is achieved, significant integration (in
the order of 48 dB) is achieved. Secondly, using the pilot carriers as an attack signal
also benefits from the fact that it is more difficult to detect a signal that is synchronised
with the reference signal than one that is not due to it being masked by the desired,
high powered reference signal.
Using a full pilot attack results in significant ambiguities appearing in the ARD map
regardless of the processing technique used. A full pilot attack has been demonstrated
to be an effective means of attacking a DVB-T2 PR.
7.4.3 DVB-T2 Continual Pilot Attack
Using only the continual pilots, the attacker gives up the periodicity in slow time as
the pilots remain on the same carrier for the entire CPI. The advantage of this is that
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the attack signal is simple to execute and leads to ridges across the range profile of the
ARD at constant Doppler bins defined by the Doppler shift added by the attacker.
Additionally, the use of continual pilots as an attack signal leads to reduced attack
signal integration gain due to the reduced bandwidth within the signal. For a 32K
DVB-T2 signal, the integration gain reduction from only using the continual pilots is
21.9 dB. Coupling this with a further reduction in gain of 8.52 dB due to the normalisa-
tion process, the continual pilots experience 11.9 dB (Greduction (CP) − Greduction (Full pilot)
= (21.9 + 8.52)− (13.67 + 4.86)) less integration gain than the full pilot attack signal.
7.4.4 DVB-T2 Scattered Pilot Attack
Using the scattered pilots as the attack signal creates an effect similar to that seen
when using a full pilot attack with the difference being the lack of ridges across range
and decreased integration gain resulting from the loss of continual pilots. For this
reason and the fact that using a scattered pilot attack has the same complexity as
using a full pilot attack, scattered pilot attacks are not recommended.
7.4.5 DVB-T2 Pulsed Jamming
Since an attacker will in all likelihood have no knowledge of the PR receiver location,
creating ridges across Doppler at specific ranges is a desirable attribute for an attack
signal. To create these ridges across Doppler, slow-time periodicity needs to be added
to the signal. To achieve this, the full pilot attack signal is toggled on every k-th
symbol.
It has been demonstrated that toggling the attack signal on every 10-th symbol results
in ambiguities that spread across Doppler. Toggling the signal on for a fraction of
the CPI also results in reduced continual power requirements due to the reduced duty
cycle.
It is also demonstrated that transmitting the attack signal for a single symbol causes
severe ridges across Doppler when using inverse filtering. This is due to the fact that
the system is essentially experiencing an impulse in one of the symbols before a Doppler
FFT is performed. This effect is not replicated when mismatched filtering is used due
to the energy being spread across the ARD map during the convolution process. A
minimum of 4 symbols out of the 60 (15%) are need to be attacked to cause noticeable
effects in the mismatched filtering process.
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7.4.6 DVB-T2 Counter-counter Measures
A brief discussion of counter-counter measures has been provided. To remove the
attack signal from the system when using mismatched filtering, the pilot signals can
be blanked. While this removes the ambiguities resulting from the pilot attacks, it also
adds additional ambiguities to the standard ambiguity function. These ambiguities are
however, deterministic and can therefore be removed through additional processing as
discussed in [107].
Counter-counter measures for inverse filtering have also been demonstrated where the
pilot attacks were normalised using boosted pilots in the remodulated reference signal.
Boosting the pilots in the reference signal leads to additional ambiguous peaks within
the ambiguity function however, these peaks only appear along the zero-Doppler line
and were therefore easily dealt with. Depending on the power level of the target echos,
the additional ambiguities created as a result of the boosted pilots could potentially
appear above the background noise floor, however, this is unlikely.
It is noted that these ECCM techniques should be dynamic and only be used when
jamming is detected.
7.5 Chapter Summary
The performance of both mismatched filtering and inverse filtering processing tech-
niques has been evaluated in the context of a intentional jamming where it has been
demonstrated that mismatched filtering is more robust against noise jamming, requir-
ing 5 dB more JSR than inverse filtering, to achieve the same effect. This apparent
robustness of mismatched filtering is due to the matched filter convolution step that
distributes the noise across the entire range-Doppler profile. In the case of inverse
filtering, the more noise there is on each OFDM carrier, the higher the resultant inter-
symbol interference and therefore the higher the background noise floor within the
ARD map as discussed in Section 7.3.1.
Unlike with FM based PR where the attack signals do not achieve any significant
integration gain, the deterministic nature of the DVB-T2 signal allows for more ad-
vanced attack signals to be used where significant integration gain can be achieved.
As a result, more advanced attack signals have been investigated and the ability to
insert false targets with relatively low jamming power has been demonstrated. It is
demonstrated that both mismtached filtering and inverse filtering techniques can be
successfully attacked using both the continual and scattered pilot patterns. It has been
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demonstrated that false targets can be placed within the ARD map by synchronising
the jammer with the reference signal and then transmitting the pilot pattern with
appropriate range and Doppler shifts.
Since the pilot pattern has periodicity in fast time, ridges were created in the range
dimension of the ARD map. By pulsing the jamming signal, it is demonstrated that
periodicity in fast time can be added, resulting in peaks forming in both the range
and Doppler dimensions as demonstrated in Figures 7.11 and 7.22.
A brief discussion on possible counter measures is provided. It is demonstrated that the
effects of the attack signals can be almost entirely suppressed. Additional ambiguous
peaks appear within the ARD map when the attack pilot signal is suppressed through
blanking of the reference pilots in mismatched filtering as demonstrated in Figure 7.12,
however, these ambiguities were purely deterministic and can therefore be removed by
a technique proposed in [107]. When the attack signal is suppressed through boosted
reference pilots (when using inverse filtering), additional ambiguities appear in fast-
time on the zero-Doppler line. These zero-Doppler ambiguities were also deterministic
and can be removed by blanking the zero-Doppler line. This makes it an attractive
method for removing pilot jamming.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
The research shows that PR is inherently jammable, often with very low powers when
thought is given to the right type of interference required. Nevertheless, a jammer
needs to expend adequate effort in terms of jamming-power, as the location of the PR
receiver is generally unknown. Furthermore, the jammer, or EA tactic more generally,
would not know how effective it is at impairing PR performance. Against conventional
radar an additional ES “look-through” asset may be utilised to assess the effectiveness
of an EA, but such assessment is difficult to achieve with a PR. Therefore, PR is
susceptible to EA, however, it is not an effortless undertaking on the part of the PR
countermeasure.
It is also important to note that due to the nature of PR, the number of Tx/Rx pairs
and channel variations is massive, making it unfeasible to draw generic conclusions
from the results. All objectives that were set at the beginning of this study in Chapter
1 have been completed:
FM Passive Radar
• The effect of the DSI canceller in FM PR in the presence of intentional and
unintentional interference has been quantified.
• A complete waveform study has been performed to demonstrate the optimal FM
jamming waveform.
• Basic ECCM has been discussed to counter potential jamming of FM PR.
• A representative measurement of a real FM PR has been shown.
DVB-T2 Passive Radar
132
• Analysis of the two main processing techniques used in DVB-T2 PR has been
performed.
• An in depth performance review of the two most common processing techniques
in the presence of noise jamming has been presented.
• The deterministic components of the DVB-T2 waveform have been demonstrated
to be an effective form of EA for both mismatched filtering and inverse filtering
processing techniques.
• Basic ECCM has been presented to counter potential pilot attacks on DVB-T2
PR.
8.1 Conclusions
This thesis has demonstrated that successful jamming of an FM based passive radar
depends on two main factors, the jamming waveform and knowledge of the receiver
location. The effect of different jamming waveforms is summarised in Table 4.1 where
the most effective jamming waveform is shown to be a tone transmitted on the same
centre frequency as the reference signal.
The importance of a DSI canceller has been demonstrated where it has been shown
that it not only improves overall performance under normal operation but also acts
as a means of suppressing the jamming signal. Due to the DSI canceller, an FM PR
is more robust against jamming when the reference and surveillance antennas were
co-located where the jamming signal appears in both channels as opposed to being
separated where the reference channel remains free of jamming interference. As a
result, the DSI canceller can improve the performance of an FM PR by an average of
approximately 10% in the presence of jamming when the jamming signal appears in
both the reference and surveillance channels of the receiver.
It has been demonstrated that the dimension in which the CFAR filter is applied (either
in range or in Doppler), plays an important role in target detection and extraction
when tone jamming is applied to FM PR. Under normal operating conditions, the
CFAR filter for an FM PR is applied in the Doppler dimension due to the fluctuating
range resolution as a result of signal content. FM waveforms have a constant average
power, approximated by (3.10). As a result, by decreasing the number of sidebands
required to accurately represent the message signal (decreasing β), the carrier tone
levels were increased. This increased tone level results in an increase in correlation
artefacts in the output ARD maps. As a result of these additional artefacts appearing
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in the output ARD, the background noise of the system can no longer be modelled as
Gaussian and therefore the CFAR filter cannot accurately set a detection threshold,
leading to further performance reductions.
Due to the ridges in the ARD maps caused by tone jamming, it is almost impossible
for the CFAR filter to detect a target when applied in the Doppler domain. Applying
the same CFAR filter in the range dimension allows for higher probability of detec-
tion however it comes with the significant drawback that its performance is highly
dependant on the average bandwidth over the CPI. It is therefore suggested that in
order to effectively detect targets when encountering a possible tone jamming attack,
the CFAR filter be applied in both range and Doppler dimensions or switch between
the two depending on environmental conditions. A potential counter to tone jamming
would be to blank or filter out tones as they appear in the receiver.
In the case of DVB-T2 PR, it has been demonstrated that deterministic components
of the OFDM signals can be used by an attacker to jam, spoof or overload the system.
The pilot signals can be used to produce false targets in particular range and Doppler
bins and due to the integration gain achieved by the pilot jamming, lower power levels
can be used than with broadband noise jamming. The two main processing methods
employed in DVB-T2 PR have been investigated and their performance in the presence
of jamming has been evaluated. It has been shown that mismatched filtering is more
robust to noise jamming than inverse filtering due to the robustness of the correlation
process.
Along with an in depth analysis of the two main processing techniques for DVB-T2
PR, various attacks have been investigated including noise jamming, full pilot attacks,
continual pilot attacks, scattered pilot attacks and pulsed jamming attacks. Broadband
noise jamming has been demonstrated to have a linear effect on the system as expected
with an increase in system noise floor proportional to the amount of noise injected into
the PR frontend. Full pilot attacks were the most complicated to deploy however, they
have been demonstrated to be the most effective due to the increased integration gain
that is achieved.
Continual pilots have been demonstrated to be the least effective of the pilot attacks
however, the continual pilot attack is the simplest attack to implement as the pilots
themselves remain on the same carriers from symbol to symbol. This removes the
need to jam different carriers on each symbol. Scattered pilot attacks were relatively
effective however, since they require the same level of abstract to deploy as full pilot
attacks, they are not preferred. The final type of attack, pulsed attacks have been
shown to be highly effective against DVB-T2 PR, especially when used with inverse
filtering. Toggling a full pilot attack on and off every k-th symbol leads to ridges
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appearing across Doppler at various range bins which can be altered as desired.
For the purpose of this work, a full pilot attack was toggled every 10-th symbol which
demonstrated the effect of these ridges for both mismatched and inverse filtering. An-
other advantage to utilising a pulsed attack was that the duty cycle was significantly
decreased which results in lower continual power requirements for the jammer. Trans-
mitting the attack signal for a single symbol was shown to cause severe ridges across
range and Doppler when using inverse filtering however. Applying the same attack to
the system when using mismatched filtering demonstrated little effect as the energy
was spread across the ARD map as a result of the correlation process. In order to have
an effect on a system utilising mismatched filtering, it was deemed that a minimum of
4 symbols out of the 60 (15%) needs to be attacked.
Potential ECCM techniques were briefly investigated where pilot blanking and pilot
boosting for mismatched filtering and inverse filtering respectively were demonstrated.
Pilot blanking was demonstrated to produce additional ambiguities within the ARD
map when processed using mismatched filtering. Using pilot blanking combined with
ambiguity removal as suggested in [107], the effects of pilot jamming can be largely
mitigated. When using inverse filtering, pilot boosting can be used and as with pilot
blanking in mismatched filtering, the ambiguity removal process suggested in [107] can
be used to remove any additional ambiguities resulting from the mitigation process.
8.2 Future Work
There is scope for future work in both the FM and DVB-T2 PR configurations with
the following presented for consideration.
• Significantly more real world data is required before PR vulnerabilities can be
fully statistically quantified for use in both the military and commercial context.
• Given the DVB-T2 signals deterministic nature, experimental results should
closely match the simulated results shown in this work however, a real world
measurement campaign of DVB-T2 jamming should be carried out to further
validate the simulated results.
• The system performance at the output of a tracking algorithm could be evaluated
in the presence of jamming. Since the potential number of channel combinations
are huge, it is potentially impossible to evaluate every scenario however, this
could be done on a system by system basis to evaluate the vulnerabilities of each
135
particular system which could be fed into a vulnerability or threat evaluation
database.
• ECCM has been briefly discussed in this work however, a full investigation into
the most appropriate means of countering any potential attacks is required. A
complete implementation of these techniques needs to be done and the results
evaluated using real world data.
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Appendix A
Jamming Without Exact
Knowledge of Receiver Location
It is clear from the results shown in Chapter 3 that to jam an FM PR, the important
parameter is the JSRE in the surveillance channel. J is defined as the direct path
jamming power at the receiver and SE is defined as the target echo power at the
receiver. The JSRE is therefore defined as
J =
PJGJGRjλ
2
(4pi)2R2J
(A.1)
J = Direct path jammer signal power at surveillance receiver.
PJ = Jammer transmit power.
GJ = Jammer antenna gain.
GRj = Receiver antenna gain in direction of jammer.
RJ = User defined ‘Jammer Radius’ over which jammer is intended to be effective.
λ = Wavelength.
SE =
PTGTGRtλ
2σ
(4pi)3R2TxR
2
Rx
(A.2)
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SE = Target echo power at the surveillance receiver.
PT = Transmitter of opportunity transmit power.
GT = Transmit antenna gain in direction of target.
GRt = Receive antenna gain in direction of target.
RTx = Transmitter to target distance.
RRx = Target to receiver distance.
σ = Bistatic RCS of potential target.
λ = Wavelength.
J/SE =
[
PJGJGRjλ
2
(4pi)2R2J
]
÷
[
PTGTGRtλ
2σ
(4pi)3R2TxR
2
Rx
]
=
[
ERPJGRj4pi
ERPTGRtσ
][
R2TxR
2
Rx
R2J
] (A.3)
Rearranging (A.3) such that the required jammer ERP (ERPJ = PJGJ) is the subject
gives:
ERPJ =
[
J
SE
][
ERPTGRtσ
GRj4pi
][
R2J
R2TxR
2
Rx
]
(A.4)
The required ERPJ can be minimised if the exact location of the receiver is known.
This would allow the operator to select a highly directional antenna and place it within
the main beam of the surveillance receiver while minimising the distance between the
jammer and the receiver.
In typical deployment scenarios, the information available to the ECM operator is less
than ideal and it is therefore important to investigate a more general solution to the
problem. Analysing (A.4) three different performance evaluation scenarios are defined.
The first assumes no knowledge of the receiver other than the fact that it is surveying a
certain volume of space. A jammer can then be deployed such that a target of interest
flies within what is defined in Section A.1 as the ‘jammer radius’, i.e. the distance from
the jammer as defined by the operator. The second scenario assumes that a receiver
to be jammed is within the jammer radius throughout the flight duration, i.e. the
jammer is placed in such a position that any receiver within the jammer radius will
be jammed. The third scenario relies on self-protection or escort jamming where the
target itself carries the jammer. Each scenario is discussed in detail in Sections A.1 to
A.3.
This work focuses on the effectiveness of jamming on an FM based PR. Effectiveness
therefore references performance from the jammer perspective. This implies that unless
explicitly stated, ‘worst case’ is defined from the jammers perspective.
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A.1 Target Within Jammer Radius
The first scenario described, requires that the target to be masked or jammed lies
within the jammer radius, represented by RJ. The jammer radius is defined as a
distance away from the jammer that is selected by the jammer operator. In this case,
the jammer radius can be dynamic in that it can change depending on where the target
is in the scene. Assuming the operator knows the flight path of the target or targets,
this radius can be adjusted accordingly as the target moves relative to the jammer
location. The concept is illustrated in Figure A.1.
RRx
L
Sur Rx
Ref Rx
PCL
Jx
RJ
RTx
Tx
Figure A.1: Scenario with target within the jammer radius and the receiver in an un-
known location. The location of the receiver is unknown. The potential transmitter
locations are known to the operator via official documentation.
To ensure the effective jamming of any potential receiver, the JSRE must be maintained
at the desired level. This level can be calculated by referencing the position of the
target to the transmitter and jammer. The jammer power at the target position
along the flight path can be calculated using the one way path loss equation (A.1).
Similarly, the incident power on the target from the transmitter can be calculated
and the resultant echo power reflected off the target can be calculated. Regardless of
where the receiver lies, the distance from the target to the receiver, denoted by RRx,
will always be less than or equal to the altitude of the aircraft, assuming a ground
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based PR. This implies that, provided the jammer is using an antenna with a uniform
azimuth radiation pattern (i.e. a dipole antenna), any path loss that the jamming
signal receives will be less than or equal to the path loss incurred by the target echo,
with equal attenuation being when the receiver is on the same line as the target-jammer
and worse case (from a jamming perspective) being when the target-receiver distance,
RRx, is shorter than the jammer-receiver distance.
This approach can then be used to determine the parameters needed to ensure that
the required JSRE is achieved for any ground based PR, given that the target remains
within the jammer radius. The required ERPJ from (A.4) is therefore modified as
follows:
Jincident =
PJGJGRjλ
2
(4pi)2R2Jincident
(A.5)
SE =
PTGTGRtλ
2σ
(4pi)3R2RxR
2
Tx
(A.6)
where Jincident is the jammer power at the target location and SE is the echo power at
the target location. The distance from the target to the receiver is unknown to the
jammer operator. To account for this unknown, the distance between the jammer and
the receiver can be modelled as:
R2Jincident = (RJ +RRx)
2
= R2J + 2RJRRx +R
2
Rx
(A.7)
with RJ being the jammer radius to the target and RRx being the distance from the
target to the receiver. The target-to-receiver distance can be broken down into the
ground distance and the target altitude above ground such that:
RRx =
√
R2Rgx +R
2
H (A.8)
where RRx represents the target-to-receiver ground distance and RH represents the
targets altitude above the ground. This is a worst case scenario whereby the jammer
operator assumes that the receiver is positioned in line with the jammer-to-target line,
outside the jammer radius. In the event that the receiver is situated at any location
other than along the jammer-to-target line, the distance from the jammer-to-receiver
could be considerably smaller. The ERPJ required to produce a JSRE at the receiver
is therefore:
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JSE
=
[
PJGJGRjλ
2
(4pi)2(R2J + 2RJ
√
R2Rgx +R
2
H +R
2
Rgx
+R2H)
][
(4pi)3sqrt(R2Rgx +R
2
H)
2R2Tx
PTGTGRtλ2σ
]
(A.9)
∴ ERPJ =
[
J
SE
][
ERPTGRtσ
GRj(4pi)
][R2J + 2RJ√R2Rgx +R2H +R2Rgx +R2H
(R2Rgx +R
2
H)R
2
Tx
]
(A.10)
where JSRE is the required jammer to signal echo level at the receiver for effective
jamming and GRt and GRj are the receive gains in the direction of the target and
jammer respectively with σ being the target RCS.
Evaluating the last part of (A.10), it is clear that the target-receiver distance plays a
major role. A worst case scenario would be when the target is flying directly above
the receiver, provided that it is still within the mainbeam of the receivers surveillance
antenna. We can therefore say that the worst case value for RRgx is zero resulting in
an ERPJ of:
ERPJ =
[
J
SE
][
ERPTGRtσ
GRj(4pi)
][
R2J + 2RJRH +R
2
H
R2HR
2
Tx
]
(A.11)
A.2 Receiver Within Jammer Radius
The scenario presented in Section A.1 assumes no prior knowledge of the receiver and
therefore requires a relatively large amount of jamming power to be sure of jamming
any potential receivers. The jamming power can be significantly reduced if the as-
sumption can be made that the receiver lies within the so-called ‘jammer radius’. The
jammer radius is therefore defined in this context as the distance away from the jam-
mer that guarantees the jamming of any receiver within the radius. Once again we
define the jammer-to-signal echo ratio using (A.1) and (A.2) that results in a required
ERPJ of:
ERPJ =
[
J
SE
][
ERPTGRtσ
GRj4pi
][
R2J
R2TxR
2
Rx
]
(A.12)
The path distance between a potential transmitter and target can be calculated while
the path distance from the target to the receiver is unknown, other than it must be
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within the jammer radius, RJ . This is complicated further in that the target could lie
either inside or outside the jammer radius.
A. Target lies outside the jammer radius
An example scenario where the target lies on the outside of the jammer radius while
the receiver lies within it is shown in Figure A.2.
Tx
Jx
RJ
L
RTx
RRxRJ
Figure A.2: Scenario with target outside jammer radius and receiver within jammer
radius.
The blue dashed line represents the ground distance between the target and the edge
of the jammer radius, denoted by ∆RJ. Breaking down (A.12), the jammer radius,
RJ is set by the operator and RTx is determined based on the flight geometry. The
value for RRx depends on whether the target remains inside or outside the jammer
radius. For the target outside the jammer radius, the minimum possible value of RRx
is determined by the altitude of the target, RH, as well as its distance from the edge
of the jammer radius, ∆RJ, such that:
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RRx =
√
R2H +∆R
2
J (A.13)
This results in a required ERPJ of
ERPJ =
[
J
SE
][
ERPTGRtσ
GRj4pi
][
R2J
R2Tx(R
2
H +∆R
2
J)
]
(A.14)
B. Target lies within the jammer radius
An example scenario where the target lies within the jammer radius is shown in Figure
A.3.
Tx
Jx
RJ
L1
RTx
RRx
Figure A.3: Scenario with target inside jammer radius and receiver within jammer
radius.
With both the receiver and target being within the jammer radius, the worst case
value of RRx is achieved when the target is closest to the receiver, i.e. above it. RRx
becomes the altitude of the target, RH. The resulting worst case ERPJ is then given
by:
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ERPJ =
[
J
SE
][
ERPTGRtσ
GRj4pi
][
R2J
R2TxR
2
H
]
(A.15)
Combining the results of (A.14) and (A.15) results in an ERP range of
[
J
SE
][
ERPTGRtσ
GRj4pi
][
R2J
R2Tx(R
2
H +∆R
2
J)
]
≤ ERPJ ≤
[
J
SE
][
ERPTGRtσ
GRj4pi
][
R2J
R2TxR
2
H
]
(A.16)
A.3 Self Protection Jamming and Escort Jamming
The scenarios presented in Sections A.1 and A.2 represented forms of stand-off jamming
where a separate jammer is used to jam a receiver or mask a target. This approach can
lead to considerably more power being required if the receiver location is unknown.
Self protection jamming or escort jamming can therefore be used as an effective means
of jamming an FM based PR when the location of the receiver is unknown. This is
demonstrated by illustrating the relationship between the jammers required ERP and
the incident power on the target.
The target echo power at the receiver is given by
SE =
PTGTGRtλ
2σ
(4pi)3R2TxR
2
Rx
(A.17)
Using an isotropic antenna, the jammer power received at the receiver is
J =
PJGJGRjλ
2
(4pi)2R2J
(A.18)
Since the receiver gain is the same for the target echo, GRt, and the jammer signal,
GRj, and the target-receiver distance, RRx, the same as the jammer-receiver distance,
RJ , the resulting jammer ERP becomes
ERPJ =
[
J
SE
][
ERPTσ
4piR2Tx
]
(A.19)
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A.4 Section Summary
It is clear that an ECM operator requires some form of prior knowledge of the system to
be jammed. The first is the desired jammer to signal ratio. The second is the potential
scenario specifications such as the target to be masked as well as the transmitter band
that is being used. This information is readily available from public institutions such as
the countries regulatory bodies website etc. The final piece of prior knowledge required
for successful jamming is the targets location relative to the transmitter. This can be
achieved through careful planning.
There are four different approaches that can be used to ensure jamming of any potential
target, these include:
1. Receiver location known
ERPJ =
[
J
SE
][
ERPTGRtσ
GRj4pi
][
R2J
R2TxR
2
Rx
]
(A.20)
• Complete knowledge of receiver location is required.
• Most effective solution requiring the least power to jam.
2. Target lies within jammer radius
ERPJ =
[
J
SE
][
ERPTGRtσ
GRj4pi
][
R2J + 2RJRH +R
2
H
R2TxR
2
H
]
(A.21)
• No knowledge of possible receiver location.
• Requires high power levels to achieve desired J/SE.
3. Receiver lies within jammer radius
• Two possible options:
– Target lies outside jammer radius RJ .
ERPJ =
[
J
SE
][
ERPTGRtσ
GRj4pi
][
R2J
R2Tx(R
2
H +∆R
2
J)
]
(A.22)
– Target lies within jammer radius RJ .
ERPJ =
[
J
SE
][
ERPTGRtσ
GRj4pi
][
R2J
R2TxR
2
H
]
(A.23)
– Knowledge of potential receiver locations.
• Provides significant reduction in required power to achieve desired JSRE.
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4. Self protection jamming
ERPJ =
[
J
SE
][
ERPTσ
4piR2Tx
]
(A.24)
• Most effective option when receiver location is unknown.
It is clear that the performance of an FM based PR is highly dependant on a vari-
ety of factors, including antenna location, DSI cancellation as well as any potential
interference or jamming. Using the results shown in Chapters 3, we demonstrate the
feasibility of jamming an FM based PR over a particular volume.
A.5 Standoff Jamming
A.5.1 Known Rx Location
From (A.20) we can determine the minimum and maximum ERP required to cause
the minimum desired reduction in performance of the target PR given a set of scenario
parameters. As an example of a potential scenario, we investigate a flight path and
geometry applicable to the Western Cape area of South Africa as illustrated by Figure
A.6.
10 kW
20 kW
10 kW
0.3 kW 0.1 kW
1.3 kW
10 kW
Figure A.4: Google maps overhead view of FM transmitter locations throughout the
Western Cape area. The ERP of each transmitter is shown below the transmitter
name.
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It has already been demonstrated that if the receiver location is known, low jamming
power can be used to effectively mask the target of interest. Assuming a complete
scenario geometry such as the one shown in Figure A.5, (A.20) can be used to determine
the required jammer ERP.
Tx
Jx
Rx
L
R Tx
RRx
RJ
Figure A.5: Scenario 1 - Known receiver location where target flies a typical flight
path into Cape Town International airport. This scenario is similar to the one that
has been simulated with the receiver and transmitter locations known.
Along the flight path of the target, the smallest value for the bistatic range will be
achieved when the target comes in to land (ignoring the fact that the target would
inherently be masked due to the high powered direct signal and possible nulls in the
beam pattern as a result.). The parameters used in this scenario are shown in Table
A.1
Table A.1: Parameters for highest echo return along flight path shown in Figure A.5
Parameter Value
ERPT 10 kW
RTx 49 km
RRx 30 km
RJ 34 km
L 71 km
The desired JSRE can be selected from Table 4.1. Using a medium bandwidth FM
jamming (β = 2) waveform and a 50% reduction in system performance, assuming a
co-located receiver system, the required jammer ERP can then be determined as
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ERPJ =
[
J
SE
][
ERPTGRtσ
GRj4pi
][
R2J
R2TxR
2
Rx
]
=
[
46 dB
][
10 000 kW× 200 m2
4pi
][
(34 000 m)2
(49 000 m)2(34 000 m)2
]
= 46 dB + (−41.8 dB)
= 5.2 dB
= 3.3 W
(A.25)
The result from equation (A.25) coincides with the results shown in Chapter 3 where
the receiver can be jammed using a very low amount of jamming power (3.3 W in this
case).
A.5.2 Unknown Rx Location
Target Within Jammer Radius
The scenario whereby the exact location of the receiver is known is a very specific
example in that this would not necessarily be the case in practice. The scenario can
be generalised for an unknown receiver location. Figure A.6 illustrates an example
scenario similar to that shown in A.5 but with an unknown receiver location.
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Figure A.6: Possible flight path into the Western Cape area from Johannesburg
to be jammed. Each transmitter is highlighted while a typical flight path from
Johannesburg to Cape Town International airport is shown in blue. A jammer is
placed with a ‘jammer radius’, Rj, such that the entire flight path of interest is
covered.
To determine the required jammer ERP, ERPJ, we need to evaluate the particular
geometry of each of the potential transmitters in the vicinity. Assuming no additional
knowledge of any potential PR, other than that it operates over the FM band, equation
(A.21) will need to be evaluated for the given scenario as shown
ERPJ =
[
J
SE
][
ERPTGRtσ
GRj(4pi)
][
R2J + 2RJRH +R
2
H
R2HR
2
Tx
]
=
[
J
SE
][
GRtσ(R
2
J + 2RJRH +R
2
H)
GRj(4pi)R2H
][
ERPT
R2Txmin
] (A.26)
where [
J
SE
]
= Read off Table 4.1.
[
GRtσ(R
2
J+2RJRH+R
2
H)
GRj(4pi)R
2
H
]
= Determined based on scenario requirements in Figure A.6.
[
ERPT
R2Txmin
]
= Determined by careful evaluation of Figure A.6 as shown in Table A.2.
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Table A.2 summarises the transmitter parameters required to evaluate (A.26). The
higher the resultant value, the worse the performance of the jammer and therefore the
highest value is used when solving (A.26).
Table A.2: Transmitter ERPs and minimum distance to flight path for each of the
transmitters shown in Figure A.4.
Transmitter ERPT [kW] RTxmin [km]
ERPT
R2Txmin
Piketberg 10 60 2.78× 10−6
Malmesbury 10 21 2.27× 10−5
Tygerberg 1.3 5 5.2× 10−5
Constantia 10 21 2.27× 10−5
Paarl 0.3 9 3.7× 10−6
Worcester 0.1 48 4.34× 10−8
Ceres 20 16 7.81× 10−5
The highest value is achieved using the Ceres site with 7.81 × 10−5. The remaining
parameters are shown in Table A.3.
Table A.3: Worst case system parameters for Figure A.6.
Parameter Value
ERPT 20 kW
RT 16 km
RJ 40 km
RH 10 km
GRt GRj
σ 200 m2
The required jammer power can then be calculated by choosing a suitable waveform
and JSRE level from Table 4.1. In this example, medium bandwidth FM jamming
(β = 2) with a 46 dB JSRE is used to cause a 50% reduction in overall system
performance. Assuming the target is flying at cruising altitudes of 10 000 m Above
Mean Sea Level (AMSL), the required jammer ERP is calculated as
ERPJ =
[
J
SE
][
ERPTGRtσ
GRj(4pi)
][
R2J + 2RJRH +R
2
H
R2HR
2
Tx
]
=
[
46 dB
][
20 000 W · 200 m2
4pi
][
(40 000 m)2 + 2(40 000 m)(10 000 m) + (10 000 m)2
(10 000 m)2(16 000 m)2
]
= 46 dB− 15 dB
= 1.26 kW
(A.27)
150
An ERPJ of 1.26 kW is significant orders of magnitude more than the 3.3 W shown
previously, however, this applies to the worst case scenario whereby the receiver is
situated on the absolute edge of the jammer radius. Making a few small adjustments
to the flight path could lead to a dramatic reduction in overall required power.
Receiver Within Jammer Radius
By making the assumption that the PR that is to be jammed is situated within the
jammer radius, the total jamming power required to ensure jamming can be reduced
considerably. Using the same scenario described in Section A.5.2 with one of the
differences being the receiver lying within the jammer radius, the required ERP can
be determined. The lowest ERP requirement occurs when the target is furthest away
from the receiver, i.e. the target is furthest away from the jammer radius. In this
scenario, lets assume the furthest the target is away from the jammer radius is 20 km
as shown in Figure A.6. The desired JSRE can be selected from Table 4.1. Using
the same jamming medium bandwidth FM jamming (β = 2) waveform and a 50%
reduction in system performance, the minimum required jammer ERP can then be
determined as
ERPJ =
[
J
SE
][
ERPTGRtσ
GRj4pi
][
R2J
R2Tx(R
2
H +∆R
2
J)
]
=
[
46 dB
][
20 000 W · 200 m2
4pi
][
(40 000 m)2
(16 000 m)2(10 0002 m + 20 0002 m)
]
= 46 dB− 24 dB
= 22 dB
= 158.5 W
(A.28)
As the target approaches its destination and enters the jammer radius, the jamming
power requirement changes to
ERPJ =
[
J
SE
][
ERPTGRtσ
GRj4pi
][
R2J
R2TxR
2
H
]
=
[
46 dB
][
20 000 W · 200 m2
4pi
][
(40 000 m)2
(16 000 m)2(10 000 m)2
]
= 46 dB− 17 dB
= 794 W
(A.29)
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It is clear that knowledge of the existence of a receiver in a particular area allows the
jammer ERP to be reduced considerably. Further knowledge of a receivers location
would allow for higher gain antennas to be used that offer high directionality and
therefore result in reduced power requirements.
One method that can be used to reduce the jamming power required is to use multiple
receivers scattered around the flight path. This will allow more area to be covered
while maintaining a lower power level for each jamming site.
An example of improving the jamming performance with additional knowledge of the
potential receiver is illustrated in Figure A.7. If it is known that a receiver lies within
a particular region and the number of possible transmitters is narrowed down due to
geometry limitations such as the mountain range shown in Figure A.7, the required
jammer power level can be reduced.
Jx
Rx
Rx
Figure A.7: Refined jammer scenario with receiver located within jammer radius. A
receiver is assumed to be at either Malmesbury or at UCT (as has been the case
with practical field trials).
With receiver sites located somewhere within the jammer radius, specifically at the
UCT or Malmesbury sites as has been the case with previous field trials, the transmit-
ters that can be used are narrowed down with the Ceres and Worcester transmitters
falling away. Looking at Table A.2, the highest value given the new geometry is
achieved with the Tygerberg transmitter. The issue with the Tygerberg transmitter
as a source is that unless used as a forward scatter radar, a target flying close to the
transmitter would be masked by the direct signal interference. This would severely
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limit the performance of the radar should the target travel near the transmitter.
The new system parameters are therefore summarised as
Table A.4: Worst case system parameters for Figure A.7.
Parameter Value
ERPT 1.3 kW
RT 5 km
RJ 30 km
GRt GRj
σ 200 m2
Using the same medium bandwidth jamming waveform at 46 dB JSRE as previously,
the required worst case ERPJ can therefore be calculated as
ERPJ =
[
J
SE
][
ERPTGRtσ
GRj4pi
][
R2J
R2TxR
2
H
]
=
[
46 dB
][
1 300 W · 200 m2
4pi
][
(30 000 m)2
(5 000 m)2(10 000 m)2
]
= 46 dB− 21.3 dB
= 295 W
(A.30)
This results in a maximum ERPJ reduction from 794 W to 295 W, a 4.3 dB reduction
in required ERPJ.
A.6 Self Protection or Escort Jamming
Self protection jamming and escort jamming would be highly effective against an FM
based PR as it would be trivial to detect the transmitter power incident on the target
at any given point and simply transmit a Gaussian noise waveform at the appropriate
power level in order to achieve the desired JSRE with as little transmit power as
possible.
Assuming the same scenario as described in Section A.5.1, the maximum incident
transmit power from any transmitter is shown in Table A.5.
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Table A.5: Maximum incident power reflected off the target along the flight path
shown in Figure A.6 for each transmitter.
Transmitter ERPT [kW] RTxmin [km] Ptarget =
ERPσ
4piR2Tx
[dB]
Piketberg 10 60 -43.5
Malmesbury 10 21 -34.4
Tygerberg 1.3 5 -30.8
Constantia 10 21 -34.4
Paarl 0.3 9 -42.3
Worcester 0.1 48 -61.6
Ceres 20 16 -29
The maximum incident power that is radiated off the target occurs when the target
is close to the Ceres transmitter at -29 dB. In order for any potential FM based PR
to be jammed using AWGN, the self protection jammer would then need to transmit
broadband noise across the FM spectrum with an ERP determined by Table 4.1.
To guarantee a reduction in detection performance of at least 50% using a medium
bandwidth FM jamming (β = 2) waveform, the JSRE is required to be at least 46
dB. The worst case jammer ERP would therefore need to be 17 dB i.e. 50 W. It is
important to note that a target applying self protection jamming does not want to
radiate 50 W of RF as it would be problematic from an ES point of view. E.g. a
noise jammer could be located relatively simply through multilateration that could be
achieved by a network of spatially separated PR sensors.
This could be significantly reduced if additional assumptions were made by the jammer
operator. Given the nature of passive radar, the surveillance antenna would need to
have its antenna beam directed away from the reference transmitter due to the high
direct signal interference impact on receiver sensitivity. As a result, it can be said
that a target flying within a particular radius of the transmitter would be inherently
masked.
A.7 Conclusions
The exact performance of the jammer is closely tied to the geometry of the system
relative to the jammer. It has been shown that knowledge of the receiver location
plays a major role in determining the required jammer power in order to effectively
jam the radar receiver. In an ideal sense where the locations of both the receiver
and transmitter being used are known, the receiver can be jammed with using very
low power levels and a directional antenna. In the case where the receiver location is
unknown, an omni directional antenna or at the very least, an antenna with a wide
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beamwidth will be required, this therefore increases the amount of jamming power
required.
The most effective and reliable form of jamming of an FM based passive radar when
the receiver location is unknown is self protection or escort jamming. This is due
to the fact that in order to jam the radar using Gaussian noise-like waveforms, the
jammer power needs to be greater than the target echo power. The target echo power
can be determined by measuring the incident energy on the target from any particular
transmitter and could then transmit a jamming signal proportional to the received
energy. This would guarantee the lowest amount of power used to mask the target
from a receiver in an unknown location.
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Appendix B
Direct Signal Suppression
Algorithms
This Appendix provides a brief overview of the two cancellation algorithms utilised in
this work. As discussed in Chapter 3, the two techniques used in this work are ECA
and CGLS.
To remove the DSI from the surveillance signal, Ssurv, we need to subtract the inter-
fering signal, Sdsi, leaving (ideally) only the target echos. To produce an estimate of
Sdsi, the matrix A can be constructed by building a matrix from the recorded reference
signal and zero padding according to each bistatic range bin that you want to suppress
the DSI. We then require an estimate of the scaling coefficients, x, which are then used
to solve the equation Sdsi = Ax.
As the number of columns in A are made up of the number of delays and the rows
represent the number of samples, the matrix A is typically not square and is therefore
not invertable. This means that the equation Sdsi = Ax is not directly solvable. The
solution is therefore to minimise using a least squares approach.
B.1 Least Squares Regressive Theory
As described in [11], [72] and [153], in order to understand the ECA process, it is critical
to understand the underlying principle of which it is based off. Normal regression is
the process of fitting a general linear additive model, described as:
b = a1f1(x) + a2f2(x) + ...+ anfn(x) (B.1)
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which can be represented using matrix notation as:
b = Ax (B.2)
Here, b is a vector of observed values while x is a vector of filter coefficients. A is a
design matrix where each column consists of a linear predictor function f(x):
b =
[
b1 b2 ... bn
]T
x =
[
a1 a2 ... an
]T
A =
[
f1(x) f2(x) ... fn(x)
]
The error term, e = Ax− b is simply the difference between the observed values b and
the predicted values Ax. The least squares solution for calculating the filter coefficients
x is that which minimises the error term:
min|
n∑
i=1
(Ax− b)2| (B.3)
By taking the derivative of the error term, e, with respect to the filter coefficients x,
it is shown that the values of x which minimise e are given by:
x =A∗b
=[(ATA)−1AT ]b
(B.4)
where A∗ denotes matrix pseudo-inversion. Having calculated the filter coefficients,
the residual term between the observed and predicted values can then be expressed as:
e =[(ATA)−1AT ]b− b
=(A(ATA)−1AT − In)b
=Pb
(B.5)
The projection matrix, P , is therefore represented as:
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P = A(ATA)−1AT − In (B.6)
which has the effect of mapping b onto the vector subspace spanned by columns of A.
It is the formation of the projection matrix P that is ultimately exploited for DSI
suppression. Specifically, equation B.3 can be modified to the mathematical equivalent
of:
min|
n∑
i=1
(b− Ax)2| (B.7)
This results in the projection matrix:
P
′
= In − A(ATA)−1AT (B.8)
which, unlike the projection matrix in equation B.6, P , which projects towards b, the
projection matrix in equation B.8, P
′
, projects away from b, essentially removing the
DSI.
B.2 Extensive Cancellation Algorithm
As discussed, the ECA algorithm aims to solve the equation:
min|Ssurv − Ax|2 (B.9)
In order to suppress DSI in the surveillance channel, Ssurv, the clutter subspace matrix,
A, is constructed from frequency shifted, delayed and scaled replicas of the reference
signal, Sref . Construction of the clutter matrix, A, is achieved by creating the zero-
Doppler profile:
Azero−Doppler =

SRef [0] 0 ... 0
SRef [1] SRef [0] ... 0
... ... ... ...
SRef [Ns − 1] SRef [Ns − 2] ... SRef [Ns − (K − 1)]

where K is the number of range bins to be suppressed along the zero-Doppler line.
To account for non-stationary clutter, the final A matrix is constructed by applying p
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frequency shifts to each column of the Azero−Doppler matrix.
A =
[
∆−pAzero−Doppler ... Azero−Doppler ... ∆pAzero−Doppler
]
where p is the desired Doppler shift. For −p < i < p, the diagonal matrix ∆i is
responsible for applying the relevant frequency shift and is constructed as:
∆i

1 0 ... 0
0 ej2pi∗i ... 0
... ... ... ...
0 0 ... ej2pi∗i(Ns−1)

With the clutter subspace matrix constructed, the adaptive filter coefficients, x, can
then be calculated as described in equation B.4 in Section B.1 as:
α = (AHA)−1AHSsurv (B.10)
The resultant cancelled surveillance signal is therefore represented as:
ScancelledECA = Ssurv − Ax (B.11)
While ECA provides excellent DSI cancellation performance, it is computationally
expensive due to its “one-shot” nature. An alternative to ECA is the iterative CGLS
process as described in Section B.3.
B.3 Conjugate Gradient Least Squares
As shown in [72], the CGLS algorithm is an extension of the conjugate gradient tech-
nique whereby with each iteration, the gradient is chosen to be conjugate to the pre-
vious gradient. This can then be used to minimise Sdsi = Ax using the least squares
approach described in Section B.1.
The CGLS algorithm achieves this by iteratively tending towards a minimum value.
Once a satisfactory residual is achieved, the processing can be stopped. Alternatively,
the algorithm can be run for a fixed number of iterations, regardless of whether a
minimum has been achieved or not. The advantage of this approach over ECA is that
it results in fixed execution times and a fixed memory footprint as there is no matrix
inversion requirement. This makes CGLS highly suitable for real-time operation.
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In typical static clutter environments, the DSI remains fairly constant over time and
therefore a fixed number of iterations, once converged, can be used to adequately
remove the DSI from the surveillance channel as demonstrated in [11]. An excellent,
in depth technical report on CGLS is presented by Shewchuk in [154] for further
information.
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Appendix C
DVB-T2 System Parameters
Table C.1: DVB-T2 scattered pilot pattern parameters.
Scattered
Pilot (SP)
Pattern
Separation of
pilot-bearing
carriers (Ps)
No. of symbols
forming one SP
sequence (Cs)
Amplitude
(ASP)
Equivalent Boost
[dB]
PP1 3 4 4/3 2.5
PP2 6 2 4/3 2.5
PP3 6 4 7/4 4.9
PP4 12 2 7/4 4.9
PP5 12 4 7/3 7.4
PP6 24 2 7/3 7.4
PP7 24 4 7/3 7.4
PP8 6 16 7/3 7.4
Table C.2: DVB-T2 continual and P2 pilot parameters for different FFT sizes.
FFT Size
Pilot Amplitude 1K 2K 4K 8K 16K 32K
ACP 4/3 4/3 (4
√
2)/3 8/3 8/3 8/3
AP2
√
31/5
√
31/5
√
31/5
√
31/5
√
31/5
√
37/5
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Table C.3: Summary of active and pilot carriers for different DVB-T2 FFT sizes.
1K 2K 4K 8K N 8K E 16K N 16K E 32K N 32K E
Total No.
Active Carriers
853 1 705 3 409 6 817 6 913 13 633 13 921 27 265 27 841
PP1
CP 20 45 45 45 45 89 93
SP 71- 142- 284- 568- 576- 1136- 1160-
Total* 76 164 306 590 598 1178 1206
PP2
CP 20 42 44 46 50 87 89 175 177
SP 70+ 141+ 283+ 567+ 575+ 1135+ 1159+ 2271+ 2319+
Total* 75 158 302 588 600 1167 1193 2307 2357
PP3
CP 45 42 43 43 45 87 89
SP 35+ 71- 142- 284- 288- 568- 580-
Total* 40 90 162 304 310 608 622
PP4
CP 20 43 44 46 48 90 92 176 178
SP 35 70+ 141+ 283+ 287+ 567+ 579+ 1135+ 1159+
Total* 39 88 160 304 310 600 614 1170 1196
PP5
CP 19 42 45 46 46 90 92
SP 17++ 35+ 71- 142- 144- 284- 290-
Total* 22 52 89 161 163 315 323
PP6
CP 88 90 176 180
SP 283+ 289+ 567+ 579+
Total* 314 322 598 614
PP7
CP 45 50 53 58 88 91 180 182
SP 17++ 35+ 71- 72- 142- 145- 284- 290-
Total* 40 60 97 103 171 177 317 325
PP8
CP 47 52 86 89 175 181
SP 71- 72- 142- 145- 284- 290-
Total* 103 109 181 187 332 344
∗Note that some of the pilots fall on the same carriers and therefore they don’t
add up as expected.
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Appendix D
DVB-T2 Pilot Patterns
Figure D.1: Scattered pilot pattern PP1 (SISO).
Figure D.2: Scattered pilot pattern PP2 (SISO).
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Figure D.3: Scattered pilot pattern PP3 (SISO).
Figure D.4: Scattered pilot pattern PP4 (SISO).
Figure D.5: Scattered pilot pattern PP5 (SISO).
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Figure D.6: Scattered pilot pattern PP6 (SISO).
Figure D.7: Scattered pilot pattern PP7 (SISO).
Figure D.8: Scattered pilot pattern PP8 (SISO).
Figure D.9: Scattered pilot pattern PP1 (MISO).
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Figure D.10: Scattered pilot pattern PP2 (MISO).
Figure D.11: Scattered pilot pattern PP3 (MISO).
Figure D.12: Scattered pilot pattern PP4 (MISO).
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Figure D.13: Scattered pilot pattern PP5 (MISO).
Figure D.14: Scattered pilot pattern PP6 (MISO).
Figure D.15: Scattered pilot pattern PP7 (MISO).
Figure D.16: Scattered pilot pattern PP8 (MISO).
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